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ABSTRACT 
Social Processes in the Experience and Regulation of Emotions 
Jocelyn Shu 
 
The quality of our lives can be characterized, in part, by the emotions we experience.  Feeling a 
preponderance of negative emotions is characteristic of a range of psychological and affective 
disorders.  As such, the ability to regulate emotions has been recognized as critical for 
maintaining mental health.  While definitions of emotions abound, they have been primarily 
conceptualized as intrapersonal responses to one’s environment.  Yet, while our social 
interactions are an inseparable aspect of our emotional lives, relatively little emphasis has been 
placed in prior research on the social bases of emotional experiences.  This dissertation presents 
three bodies of research that investigate the role of social processes in experiencing and 
regulating negative emotions.   
In the first body of research, I present four studies that investigate how empathy, the 
ability to experience another person’s emotions, is involved in experiencing anxiety.  In the 
second body of research, I transition to investigating the social bases of emotion regulation.  
Here, I present two multi-phase studies that investigate how social emotion regulation may be 
best implemented to help others experiencing different kinds of negative emotions.  The third 
body of research investigates the neural bases of social emotion regulation.  The results of these 
studies highlight how social processes are an inherent part of emotional experiences and emotion 
regulation.
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Reflections on the nature of emotions and methods for managing emotions can be found 
from the beginnings of Western philosophy (Arnold, 1960) to contemporary theories of emotion 
in experimental psychology (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007).  As can be expected, 
numerous theories propose to define what emotions are and how we can regulate them.  Despite 
the many conceptualizations, emotion and emotion regulation have been largely formulated as 
processes that are intrapersonal in nature – that is, processes that pertain to an individual.  
However, humans are a social species for which both experiencing emotions and maintaining 
relationships with others are crucial for survival.  It is intuitively the case that social processes, 
which enable us to understand others and our social environment, play a role in how we 
experience emotions.  An example of such a process is empathy, which consists of the capacity 
to feel an emotion that another is expressing (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Mehrabian & 
Epstein, 1972; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  It is also the case that emotion regulation, which is 
important for maintaining well-being (Gross & Muñoz, 1995), is not just enacted for oneself but 
is often employed to help others manage their emotions.  Yet, relatively little emphasis in prior 
research has been placed on investigating how emotions and emotion regulation are experienced 
and enacted through social processes and within social contexts. 
 In this thesis, I argue that social processes should be considered as a factor in the 
experience and regulation of emotion.  To be sure, prior studies have investigated how social and 
affective processes interact.  However, the aim of this dissertation is to highlight how social 
processes can be inherently part of the processes involved in the generation and regulation of 
emotions.  In this dissertation, I will first summarize influential theories of emotion and emotion 
regulation in psychology, which largely formulate these constructs as intrapersonal processes.  I 
will then briefly discuss research that has investigated how social and affective processes 
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interact, and the questions that remain unaddressed for understanding how social processes 
underlie emotional experiences. 
I then present three bodies of research that delineate how social processes are involved in 
the experience and regulation of emotion.  The first body of research investigates how empathy 
is involved in experiencing anxiety.  The second investigates how perception of emotions in 
others can guide how we help others to manage their emotions, a process referred to as social 
emotion regulation.  Finally, the third body of research investigates the neural mechanisms 
underlying social emotion regulation.  I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications 
of this work for our current understanding of emotions and emotion regulation.  
 
Models of Emotion and Emotion Regulation 
Cognitive theories of emotion 
In the earliest theorizing on emotion in modern psychology, William James presented his 
counterintuitive proposition that when encountering a bear, it is not the case that one runs away 
due to fearing the bear, but that the sequence of responses is flipped, such that one feels fear due 
to running away from the bear and from interpreting this and other physiological responses as 
being associated with fear (James, 1884).  This formulation became known as the James-Lange 
theory as Carl Lange proposed a similar view of emotions the following year.  Although debated, 
this theory has influenced much subsequent thought on emotions.  However, amidst the cognitive 
revolution, Magda Arnold noted that should one see a bear in a zoo, it is unlikely that the 
presence of the bear would lead to responses associated with fear.  In a two-volume magnum 
opus titled Emotion and Personality, Arnold asked, “What is the psychological process that turns 
a perception into an emotional experience?” (Arnold, 1960, pg. 91).  Her thinking in response to 
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this question was the earliest work in modern psychology to systematically theorize on how 
emotions arise from cognitive appraisals, or evaluations, of stimuli (Arnold, 1960; Reisenzein, 
2006).  This work laid the initial foundation for subsequent cognitive theories of emotion, which 
are often referred to as appraisal theories of emotion. 
Richard Lazarus further developed appraisal theory through theoretical and empirical 
work that delineated how the contents and patterns of appraisals lead to the experience of 
discrete emotions, such as happiness and sadness, (Lazarus, R. S. 1991a; Smith & Lazarus, 
1993).  Lazarus proposed that systematic patterns of appraisals, which he termed core relational 
themes, determine the kind of emotion one experiences as a response to a stimulus or situation.  
These core relational themes pertain to specific ways in which a stimulus or situation is 
appraised to result in benefits or harm to oneself.  For example, the relational theme for anxiety 
is formulated to be an appraisal of uncertain or potential threat, whereas the relational theme for 
sadness is of an irrevocable loss.  Lazarus delineated two main categories of appraisals: primary 
and secondary.  Primary appraisals consist of a basic evaluation regarding whether a stimulus is 
good or bad, and relevant or non-relevant to one’s goals.  Secondary appraisals consist of 
evaluating whether one possesses psychological and physical resources for coping with a stressor 
(Lazarus & Smith, 1988).   
These theories of emotion led to appraisal theories becoming a dominant view of the 
nature of emotions in contemporary experimental psychology.  While various appraisal models 
of emotion have been proposed, they are consistent in viewing emotional experiences as 
processes consisting of a series of stages.  These stages delineate that an emotion is experienced 
as a result of cognitive appraisals formed from evaluating a stimulus in one’s environment 
(Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, R. S., 1991a). 
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Process model of emotion regulation 
 The study of emotions is important not only for understanding how emotions are 
generated, but also for informing our understanding of how emotions can be effectively 
regulated.  The ability to manage one’s emotions is associated with well-being, while deficits in 
the ability to regulate emotions has been attributed to numerous psychological and affective 
disorders (Gross & Muñoz, 1995).  The current understanding of how emotions can be 
deliberately regulated is largely influenced by the process model of emotion regulation, which 
builds from appraisal theories of emotion to delineate how emotions can be effectively managed 
(Gross, 1998a, 1998b).   
The process model organizes emotion regulation strategies according to the stage of the 
emotion generation process in which a strategy can be implemented.  In this model, emotion 
regulation strategies are divided into two broad categories: antecedent-focused and response-
focused strategies.  Antecedent-focused strategies can be implemented at stages of the emotion 
generation process prior to an emotion being fully experienced.  Such strategies include situation 
selection and modification, which are strategies that can be used to change or modify exposure to 
an emotion-eliciting stimulus.  Upon exposure to such a stimulus, another strategy that can be 
implemented is attentional deployment, which allows one to modulate attention and perception 
of the emotional stimulus.  Finally, one can implement reappraisal, one of the most well studied 
emotion regulation strategies, to change the appraisal or meaning of the emotional stimulus.  As 
opposed to antecedent-focused strategies, response-focused strategies modify an emotional 
response that has already been generated.  The most comprehensively studied strategy in this 
category is suppression, which involves modulating the physical expression of an emotion once 
it is fully experienced (Gross, 1998b).   
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Because antecedent-focused strategies are capable of modulating the experience of a 
negative emotion before it is fully experienced, they are often considered to be more effective 
and adaptive as emotion regulation strategies.  On the other hand, suppression has generally been 
considered to be a less effective regulatory strategy for managing emotions.  Research has 
demonstrated that suppressing the physical expression of negative emotions may not effectively 
modulate the experience of the emotion, and may lead to persisting physiological responses 
associated with negative emotions (Gross, 1998a).  However, cultural and social contexts have 
been demonstrated to moderate this effect, as discussed below. 
 
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in a Social Context 
 While models of emotion and emotion regulation have formulated these processes to be 
intrapersonal in nature, much research has also investigated how emotions and emotion 
regulation impact the social environment and vice versa.  This section provides a brief overview 
of research that has investigated how social and affective processes interact.  
 
Social emotions  
 Perhaps the most straightforward way in which social and affective processes have been 
thought to interact is through theoretical and empirical work on emotions classified as social 
emotions.  While it is acknowledged that all emotions have the potential to be elicited by social 
stimuli or to impact others, emotions have been categorized as being either social or non-social 
in nature.  Emotions, such as love, guilt, and anger, have been categorized as social emotions due 
to the observation that these emotions are usually elicited by interactions with and appraisals of 
other people (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008).  For example, the appraisal pattern for anger has been 
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formulated as interpreting oneself being subject to an unfair action or offence by another person 
(Lazarus & Smith, 1988).  In a similar vein, guilt is thought to arise from an appraisal of having 
treated someone else unfairly (Tangney & Salovey, 1999). 
 
Empathy and vicarious experience of emotions  
While some emotions have been thought to be social in nature, it is also the case that non-
social emotions can be experienced vicariously through the experience of others.  The process by 
which one experiences the emotions expressed by another is commonly considered in 
contemporary psychology to be part of the construct of empathy (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  Early research on empathy had sought to 
understand the social consequences of experiencing, or lacking empathy, particularly in regards 
to prosocial behaviors (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987).  More contemporary research has sought to delineate the neural mechanisms underlying 
empathy and vicarious experience of emotions (Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003; Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2012).  However, relatively little emphasis has been placed on considering how 
empathy may be a core route by which emotions are experienced.  This is surprising given that 
research has demonstrated that emotions seem to spread throughout social networks (Fowler & 
Christakis, 2008; Rosenquist, Fowler, & Christakis, 2010).  Perhaps due to the lack of this 
emphasis, little research has considered empathy as a process by which emotions most 






Impact of emotion regulation on social relationships 
Prior research has investigated how the use of emotions regulation strategies impacts 
one’s social relationships.  The trait tendency to reappraise negative emotions is associated with 
greater likability and stronger social relationships, whereas the tendency to suppress is associated 
with having poorer relationships.  It is thought that this may be because reappraising negative 
emotions is more conducive to experiencing positive emotions that can foster close relationships, 
whereas suppressing emotions may limit the communicative aspects of emotions that are 
required for forming close relationships (English, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2012; Gross & 
John, 2003).  However, the relationship between suppressing emotions and social functioning 
appears to be moderated by culture.  Cross-cultural research has demonstrated that in more 
collectivist cultures, the use of suppression as an emotion regulation strategy does not have 
detrimental social effects, as seems to be the case in more individualistic cultures.  This is 
thought to be the case as in collectivist cultures, relationships may be fostered through a greater 
degree of consideration for the impact of one’s behaviors and emotional expressions on others 
(Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007; Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008).  
While there is clear evidence that emotion regulation capacity impacts the quality of 
one’s social relationships, the reasons for this have not been fully explored.  It may be the case 
that the capacity to regulate one’s own emotions fosters stronger relationships not only due to 
better management of one’s negative emotions, but also because the capacity for self-regulation 
is related to the capacity to help others regulate their emotions.  However, empirical research has 
not explored how self and social regulation may be related.  While the study of emotion 
regulation was initially investigated as a social phenomenon, this was done so in the context of 
how caregivers regulate the emotional responses of children (Thompson, 1991).  The study of 
		
9	
social emotion regulation amongst adults, in the context of employing explicit emotion 
regulation strategies, has just recently begun to emerge and has been mostly theoretical in nature 
(Hofmann, 2014; Marroquín, 2011; Reeck, Ames, & Ochsner, 2016; Zaki & Williams, 2013).  
 
The Present Research 
Human beings belong to a social species, with few (if any) individuals who are able to 
survive and thrive, without maintaining relationships with others.  It is sensible that social 
processes, which enable us to understand and interact with others, should interact with processes 
that engender emotional responses.  Yet while it is well understood that our social environment 
affects, and is affected by, our emotional responses and ability to regulate emotions, less research 
has considered how social processes and contexts that enable us to understand and interact with 
others may be inherently part of how we experience and regulate emotions.  This dissertation 
presents two broad lines of research that propose this to be the case.  The first line of research 
investigates how social processes are involved in the generation of an emotion.  The second line 
of research investigates how emotion regulation is socially implemented by asking 1) how our 
perceptions of emotions in others allow us to effectively implement antecendent-focused 
emotion regulation strategies for others in distress, and 2) what the underlying neural 
mechanisms for implementing social emotion regulation are. 
These questions are addressed in three bodies of research.  In the first body, I use 
behavioral methods to investigate how we experience anxiety through empathy for others, and 
the consequences of experiencing anxiety vicariously.  In reflecting on how empathy is a conduit 
for experiencing emotions, we can consider empathy as a construct consisting of processing steps 
formulated in appraisal theories of emotion.  Here, the stimulus would be the emotional 
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expression of another person (or perhaps, of a non-human animal), whereas the appraisal would 
be the type of emotion perceived to be experienced by the target person.  In an empathic 
response, the appraisal of an emotion in another leads to a congruent emotional response in the 
observer.  Using this framework, this body of research consists of four studies that use 
ecologically valid stimuli excerpted from horror movies and other media sources that depict 
target victims facing approaching threats.  This research has been published in Shu, Hassell, 
Weber, Ochsner, & Mobbs (2017). 
In the second body of research, I transition to investigating social emotion regulation, the 
process by which we help others to regulate their emotions.  Here, I investigate how the type of 
emotion we perceive others to be experiencing allow us to effectively implement antecendent-
focused emotion regulation strategies to help others manage their emotions.  Specifically, in two 
studies, we investigate how different types of social support (advice vs. emotional support) and 
emotion regulation strategies (situation modification vs. reappraisal) are differentially helpful for 
people experiencing anxiety as opposed to sadness.  In these studies, we recruit participants 
online who are experiencing anxiety and sadness due to important events in their lives (targets), 
and participants who are recruited to provide social emotion regulation to targets (providers). 
This research is currently under review (Shu, Bolger, & Ochsner, under review). 
Finally, the third body of research investigates the neural bases of social emotion 
regulation.  In this study, we use a novel paradigm to investigate the neural mechanisms that 
enable providers of social emotion regulation to help others manage their emotions, specifically 
in the context of reappraising negative autobiographical memories.  This study investigates how 
neural regions involved in processing social information and emotion regulation interact during 





























In our daily lives, we are often exposed to anxiety inducing scenes depicting others 
facing threats, whether of actual events in the media such as wars and conflicts around the world, 
or of fictional scenes such as ones found in horror movies.  While anxiety is an emotion often 
associated with negative consequences for mental health and well being, it is a response to 
potential threat that activates adaptive defensive responses to threats, including increased 
vigilance and behavioral avoidance of threats (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Davis, Walker, Miles, & 
Grillon, 2010; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  Prior research on 
anxiety has mainly conceptualized anxiety as an intrapersonal response to potential threat (Graeff 
& Zangrossi, 2002; Lissek et al., 2005; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; McNaughton & Corr, 2004; 
Mobbs et al., 2009; Mobbs et al., 2007).  However, well-documented phenomena such as 
emotional contagion and affect sharing demonstrate that emotions are often vicariously 
experienced (Hatfield & Cacioppo, 1994; Hill, Rand, Nowak, & Christakis, 2010; Joiner & Katz, 
1999; Waters, West, & Mendes, 2014).  Yet, little research has considered the role of 
interpersonal processes in experiencing anxiety.  While the experience of vicarious anxiety may 
be prevalent in the general population, the phenomenon of vicarious anxiety and the mechanisms 
underlying it are not yet understood.  As anxiety disorders in the United States constitute the 
most commonly diagnosed mental disorders and exact tremendous costs to individuals and 
society as a whole (Kessler, Ruscio, Shear, & Wittchen, 2010), it is important to consider 
different causal pathways that may exist for experiencing anxiety.  In the present studies, we 
address who tends to experience vicarious anxiety and why by investigating the dispositional 
variables that predict experience of vicarious anxiety, the causal mechanisms by which vicarious 
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anxiety is experienced, the potential functions and sustained effects of experiencing vicarious 
anxiety, and the effects of regulating vicarious anxiety through the use of cognitive reappraisal.  
 
Functions and Effects of Experiencing Anxiety 
Anxiety and fear are two emotions conceptualized as belonging to a spectrum of 
defensive responses to threats.  With much conceptual and phenomenological overlap, anxiety 
and fear are often difficult to parse in experimental paradigms and have often been used as 
interchangeable concepts in research (Hartley & Phelps, 2012; Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 
2011).  However, research in humans and non-human animals has differentiated anxiety from 
fear by investigating the behavioral, physiological, and neural signatures associated with 
responses thought to correspond to anxiety and fear in humans.  Such work has proposed that 
anxiety is a response to potential threat that is distal or unpredictable, whereas fear is a response 
to a concrete threat that is immediate or predictable (Davis et al., 2010; Mobbs, Hagan, 
Dalgleish, Silston, & Prévost, 2015).  The functional roles of anxiety and fear have underlying 
mechanisms that enable sustained responses on the one hand with anxiety, and phasic responses 
on the other hand with fear (Davis et al., 2010; Walker, Toufexis, & Davis, 2003).  The phasic 
responses associated with fear are active (e.g., startle), elicited by a discrete stimulus, and 
dissipate quickly when the eliciting stimulus is no longer present (Davis et al., 2010).  In 
contrast, the sustained responses associated with anxiety are characterized by a longer duration 
and include increased autonomic responses, vigilance, risk-aversion, and avoidance of potential 
or future threats (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Hartley & Phelps, 2012; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  
		
14	
In a social species such as ours, in which conspecifics depend on each other for survival, 
it may be evolutionarily adaptive to experience anxiety vicariously when a potential threat is in 
one’s environment.  Such interpersonal transmission of anxiety would occur when someone 
experiences anxiety upon seeing another person expressing anxiety or fear.  Experiencing 
vicarious anxiety may activate defensive responses for distal threats and facilitate preparation for 
a threat that another has detected in the environment.  However, the sustained nature of anxiety, 
which enables prolonged defensive responses in the absence of direct threat, has the potential to 
be maladaptive in situations where threat is unlikely to be personally encountered.  Reflective of 
this, certain anxiety disorders have been demonstrated to be particularly associated with 
sensitivity to distal threats (Davis et al., 2010). 
 
Dispositional Variables and Underlying Mechanisms of Vicarious Anxiety 
Two dispositional factors seem likely to predict who tends to experience vicarious 
anxiety.  On the one hand, it is intuitive to expect those high on trait anxiety ⎯ the tendency for 
one to experience anxiety or negative affect (Watson & Clark, 1984) ⎯ to experience greater 
vicarious anxiety when exposed to others expressing anxiety or fear.  However, prior research 
has been inconclusive as to whether trait anxiety is associated with greater negative reactivity to 
stimuli that cause distress.  Several studies have instead found no relationship between trait 
anxiety and degree of reactivity to a variety of stressful events (Watson & Clark, 1984).  Other 
studies have found trait anxiety to be associated with variability in state anxiety when one’s self-
esteem is threatened, but not when faced with physical threats (Spielberger, 1972).  Another 
dispositional variable that may be associated with experiencing vicarious anxiety is trait 
empathy.  A core component of empathy is commonly thought to consist of the ability to feel the 
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emotions experienced by another person (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  Therefore, trait empathy may be associated with experience of 
vicarious anxiety such that those who are high on dispositional empathy experience greater 
vicarious anxiety when observing others expressing anxiety or fear.  In support of this, prior 
research suggests that empathy plays a role in adaptive responding to threats by demonstrating 
that state and trait empathy are associated with greater fear learning when observing a target 
person responding fearfully to a stimulus (Olsson et al., 2015).  Prior studies also demonstrate 
that trait empathy is associated with experiencing negative affect when observing others in 
distress.  Trait empathy was associated with experiencing increased state anxiety in classroom 
participants who observed a confederate speaker giving a lecture in a disorganized manner.  
However, state and trait measures of anxiety obtained from participants prior to the lecture were 
unassociated or negatively associated with experience of anxiety from observing the speaker 
(Kendall, Finch, & Montgomery, 1978).   
While one common conceptualization of empathy involves the capacity to vicariously 
experience emotions, empathy has also been conceptualized as a multi-faceted construct 
consisting of interrelated capacities (Davis, 1983; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  Accordingly, 
dispositional empathy can be measured with a multi-dimensional scale that assesses these 
separable capacities.  The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a measure that assesses four 
dimensions of empathy with the following subscales: Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, 
Fantasy, and Perspective Taking.  The Empathic Concern subscale assesses the tendency to feel 
an “other-oriented response” involving concern, sympathy, and compassion for others who are 
suffering.  As a construct, empathic concern has been proposed to be a response experienced 
towards another person when one perceives the person to need help and values the person’s 
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welfare (Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007).  In contrast, the Personal Distress 
subscale assesses the tendency to feel a “self-oriented response” involving distress in tense 
situations.  This construct is associated with the dispositional tendency to experience fear (Davis, 
1983), and is thus similar to trait anxiety.  The Fantasy subscale assesses the capacity to imagine 
oneself in the situation of fictional characters in movies and books.  Finally, the Perspective 
Taking subscale assesses the ability to take the perspective of another person.  Whereas the 
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy subscales assess affective dimensions of 
empathy, the Perspective Taking subscale assesses a cognitive dimension of empathy (Davis, 
1983).  
Prior research has demonstrated that the Empathic Concern subscale is associated with 
experiencing greater negative affect after viewing film clips inducing sadness and anger (Davis, 
Hull, Young, & Warren, 1987).  The Empathic Concern subscale is also associated with 
increases in cortisol when observing others experiencing stress, whereas the Personal Distress 
scale is not (Buchanan, Bagley, Stansfield, & Preston, 2012; Engert, Plessow, Miller, 
Kirschbaum, & Singer, 2014).  These studies demonstrate that the Empathic Concern subscale is 
similar to other more general trait empathy measures in its association with experiencing 
negative affect when observing others experiencing distress.  As with prior findings regarding 
trait anxiety, the Personal Distress subscale was not found to be associated with negative 
reactivity when observing others in distress.  These patterns suggest that the experience of 
vicarious distress is not only due to the tendency to experience the emotions of others, but 
involves interpersonal processes that predispose one to attend to and experience concern for 
others.  However, these studies do not specifically investigate the vicarious experience of anxiety 
– an important emotion to focus on for its clinical implications.   
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Understanding the dispositional factors that predispose one to experience vicarious 
anxiety informs the nature of its underlying mechanisms.  While trait anxiety is a measure of 
one’s tendency to experience intrapersonal feelings of distress, trait empathy and even more so, 
trait empathic concern, are measures of one’s tendency to experience interpersonal responses 
towards others (Davis, 1983).  If trait empathy predisposes one to experience anxiety when 
observing others expressing anxiety or fear, the mechanisms underlying vicarious anxiety should 
be interpersonal in nature as well.  Specifically, vicarious anxiety should be experienced as a 
function of perceiving a target expressing anxiety or fear.  This relationship is supported by prior 
work in rhesus monkeys demonstrating a strong correlation between the degree to which a model 
exhibits fear related behavior and the degree of an observer’s fear related behavior (Mineka & 
Cook, 1993).  In this model of vicarious anxiety, trait empathy should be associated with the 
propensity to perceive anxiety or fear in targets who are facing threats.  In support of this, trait 
empathy is associated with more accurate perception of emotions in targets when the targets are 
high in trait emotional expressivity (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008).  Conversely, individuals 
with high levels of psychopathy, a disorder characterized by a lack of empathy, are impaired in 
the capacity to detect anxiety in target faces (Blair, 2005; Blair et al., 2004).  Thus, it may be that 
empathy facilitates the ability to perceive anxiety in others who are facing threats, which in turn 
leads to greater experience of vicarious anxiety. 
 
Regulation of Empathy and Vicarious Anxiety 
We hypothesize that trait empathy will be associated with experiencing vicarious anxiety 
when observing others facing threats.  As trait empathy characterizes the tendency to experience 
empathic responses to others across different situations (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987), we 
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also predict that inducing state empathy should cause greater experience of vicarious anxiety 
when observing others facing threats.  In support of this, it has been demonstrated that inducing 
greater state empathy while watching others receive a shock leads to greater fear learning, as 
assessed by skin conductance responses in an observer.  As discussed earlier, this pattern of 
results was also demonstrated in correlational findings with a trait empathy measure (Olsson et 
al., 2015).  However, prior research has also found mixed results regarding whether an empathic 
perspective increases one’s experience of distress when observing others who are suffering.  In 
certain situations, people experience emotions that are sympathetic and warm in response to 
others in distress (Batson et al., 1987; Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983).  As 
with prior studies investigating the relationship between trait empathy and experience of distress, 
these studies do not always assess empathic responses to targets specifically expressing anxiety, 
as the targets are often expressing a range of distress emotions.  Appraisal theories of emotion 
have proposed that different emotions have different underlying appraisal patterns and 
motivational functions (Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  Thus, different empathic responses may be 
elicited in response to different emotions expressed by a target.  In these prior studies, it is also 
the case that participants often have the opportunity to help the targets who are expressing 
distress (helping or prosocial behavior is often the dependent variable of interest in these 
studies).  This context may elicit a different empathic response than when observing scenes of 
others facing threats in a context where one is unable to provide help. 
When observing targets facing threats who are unable to receive help, we predict that 
taking an empathic perspective will lead to increased perception of anxiety in targets, as well as 
increased experience of vicarious anxiety and its associated defensive responses (e.g., behavioral 
avoidance of threats).  Conversely, taking a perspective that decreases empathy should reduce 
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one’s experience of vicarious anxiety.  This prediction is informed by research on emotion 
regulation that has established the effectiveness of using cognitive reappraisal to down-regulate 
negative affect.  Reappraisal strategies involve thinking about an emotional stimulus from an 
objective or distanced perspective (Denny & Ochsner, 2014; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; 
Silvers, Shu, Hubbard, Weber, & Ochsner, 2015).  In the context of perceiving other people, 
such an objective perspective involves reducing empathy (Batson et al., 2007).  As prior work 
has established the effectiveness of reappraisal in reducing negative affect to distressing stimuli, 
we predict that down-regulating state empathy by using reappraisal-based cognitive strategies 
will decrease the experience of vicarious anxiety, along with its associated defensive responses, 
when observing others facing threats.   
 
The Present Studies 
Across four studies, we aim to delineate the relationship between empathy and 
experience of vicarious anxiety.  To investigate our hypotheses within the context of stimuli that 
may be commonly encountered by the general population, we constructed a set of short film clips 
obtained primarily from horror movies.  These film clips depict target victims facing a potential 
or approaching threat and were thus expected to elicit vicarious anxiety.  In Study 1, we address 
who tends to experience vicarious anxiety by investigating the role of trait empathy, as opposed 
to trait anxiety, in the experience of anxiety when observing a target victim facing a threat.  
While prior studies have indicated that trait empathy is positively associated with experiencing 
negative affect when witnessing others in distress, few studies have obtained self-reports of 
emotion that specifically confirm experience of anxiety in response to another person’s anxiety 
(as opposed to other negative emotions such as sadness and anger).  As anxiety is defined as a 
		
20	
sustained response, we measure anxiety both upon exposure to the film clips, and also as 
indicated by changes in a state anxiety measure after participants view the film clips and are no 
longer exposed to the stimuli.  In Study 2, we begin to address the mechanisms underlying 
vicarious anxiety by investigating the relationship between trait empathy and perception of 
anxiety in target victims facing threats.  We hypothesize that trait empathy will be associated 
with increased perception of anxiety in targets facing a threat.  In Study 3, we further investigate 
the mechanisms underlying vicarious anxiety and begin to address what the potential function of 
experiencing vicarious anxiety may be, by testing the following hypotheses: 1) the relationships 
seen for trait empathy in Studies 1 and 2 will extend to trait empathic concern.  As was the case 
in prior studies that had demonstrated a positive relationship between trait empathic concern and 
distress, we predict that the disposition to experience concern and compassion for others will be 
associated with experience of vicarious anxiety, whereas trait personal distress will not be. 2) 
The degree of anxiety perceived as being experienced by targets facing threats will be positively 
associated with experience of vicarious anxiety.  3) The degree of anxiety perceived to be 
experienced by targets will mediate a positive relationship between trait empathic concern and 
experience of vicarious anxiety.  4) Empathy and experience of vicarious anxiety will be 
associated with greater avoidance of threat after observing others facing threats.  In Study 4, we 
investigate a causal relationship between empathy and experience of vicarious anxiety by 
manipulating state empathy in a between-groups design.  In addition, we address the effects of 
experiencing and regulating vicarious anxiety.  In this study, one group is instructed to take an 
empathic perspective whereas the other group is instructed to down-regulate empathy by using a 
cognitive reappraisal strategy to view the film clips from an objective perspective.  We 
hypothesize that participants who take an empathic perspective will perceive greater anxiety to 
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be experienced by target victims, experience greater vicarious anxiety, and be more threat 
avoidant.  Conversely, participants who reduce their state empathy will demonstrate decreased 
perception of anxiety in targets, as well as decreased experience of vicarious anxiety and threat 
avoidance.  To investigate the protracted effects of taking an empathic perspective, we assess 
self-reported sleep disruption, a symptom of experiencing anxiety and trauma (Briere & Runtz, 




Participants. Fifty-one participants were recruited over a semester from introductory 
psychology courses at Columbia University for course credits.  This sample size was determined 
by the number of volunteers who signed up for participation in this study within the concurrent 
semester.  Three participants chose to end the study without completing the task and data 
obtained from these participants were not analyzed.  Data for one participant were not obtained 
due to a technical issue.  The final sample used for analyses consisted of 47 participants (29 
female and 18 male; MAge= 20.02 years, SD = 2.36, range = 18-29). 
Materials and procedures. Upon arriving at the lab, participants were greeted by an 
experimenter who informed the participant that the study would involve watching clips from 
horror movies and that participation in this study would be on a voluntary basis.  After providing 
consent, participants completed questionnaires on a computer, including the General Empathy 
Scale, a measure of trait emotional empathy designed to assess one’s tendency to react to and 
share the emotions of others in both positive and negative events.  The measure consists of 30 
items, which include statements such as “The suffering of others deeply disturbs me” and “I feel 
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other people’s joy”, which were assessed with a 9-point Likert scale (MSum = 191.32, SD = 26.46, 
α = .89) (Caruso & Mayer, 1998).  Trait and state anxiety was measured with the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Y Form) (STAI).  The STAI consists of two separate 20-item questionnaires 
on a 4-point Likert scale that assess trait anxiety (STAI-T; MSum = 40.94, SD = 9.81, α = .91) and 
state anxiety (STAI-S; MSum = 34.09, SD = 8.30, α = .88).  The trait anxiety measure includes 
statements such as “I am a steady person” and “I feel secure”, rated according to how 
participants are feeling in general.  The state anxiety measure includes statements such as “I feel 
jittery” and “I feel frightened”, rated according to how participants feel at the moment 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  The STAI-S conceptualizes state anxiety as a 
complex of negative high arousal affective responses associated with increased autonomic 
activity.  Increasing scores on the STAI-S reflect greater feelings of apprehension and tension, 
with high scores indicating experience of fear (Spielberger, 1972).  The STAI-S was assessed 
before and after watching the film clips to measure changes in responses related to state anxiety 
after the task. 
After completing the questionnaires, participants entered a testing room, which was 
dimly lit and consisted of a Windows PC for running the task.  After the participant was seated in 
front of the computer screen, the experimenter instructed the participant to put on headphones for 
the audio component of the film clips.  The experimenter left the room once the participant 
began the study.  The task was administered using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  During the task, participants watched 32 film clips that were 40 s each in 
duration, presented in random order.  After watching each film clip, participants rated the 
greatest degree of each emotion they experienced while watching the clip for the following 11 
emotion categories on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely): amusement, 
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anger, anxiety, confusion, contempt, disgust, fear, interest, sadness, surprise, and unhappiness.  
These emotion categories were adapted from self-report methods used in norming procedures 
that distinguished film clips by the emotion most strongly experienced while watching them 
(Gross & Levenson, 1995).  Multiple emotion categories were assessed to compare the degree of 
self-reported anxiety evoked by the film clips to that of other emotions.  Participants rated each 
emotion in random order for each trial and all ratings were self-paced.  After rating all the 
emotion categories, participants provided ratings on additional items that assessed their 
emotional and cognitive responses to the film clip.  Instructions and all ratings administered as 
part of this task are described in Table S4, Appendix A.  
Upon completion of the task, participants completed another set of questionnaires on a 
computer outside of the testing room.  Measures administered after watching the film clips 
included another administration of the STAI-S (STAI-SPost-Task; MSum = 49.17, SD = 13.89, α = 
.95) to gauge the level of state anxiety sustained after the task.  All questionnaires administered 
as a part of these studies are listed in Table S2, Appendix A.  Participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation after completing these measures.  Participants took approximately 
90 min to complete the entire study.   
Stimulus Set. Thirty-two 40 s film clips were obtained from 25 movies that were selected 
by consulting several sources.  These sources included prior studies that have used film clips to 
elicit fear and anxiety (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010), 
recommendations from film critics, and online commentary on video sharing sites (e.g., 
YouTube).  Film clips were selected based on the criteria that at least one target person was 
depicted in the scene facing a potential or approaching threat, with either the threat approaching 
the target person or the target person approaching the threat.  This criterion was based on 
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imminence theories of threat proposing fear and anxiety to be defensive responses to an 
approaching or potential threat (Graeff & Zangrossi, 2002; McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Mobbs et 
al., 2007).  Film clips were selected to elicit low, medium, and high degrees of anxiety.  To 
assess whether realism in the depicted scenes impacts the relationship between empathy and 
anxiety, half of the film clips depicted scenes that were imaginary and could not happen in real 
life (e.g., an approaching ghost), and half of the film clips depicted scenes that were non-
imaginary and could potentially happen in real life (e.g., an approaching shark).  A paired t-test 
indicated that imaginary scenes were rated to elicit higher anxiety (M = 5.38, SD = 1.77) than 
non-imaginary scenes (M = 4.96, SD = 1.89; MDiff = .43, t(46) = 3.51, p = .001).  As trait 
empathy was not differentially correlated for imaginary scenes (r = .32, 95% CI [.036, .56], p = 
.028) and non-imaginary scenes (r = .29, 95% CI [.008, .54], p = .045), subsequent analyses are 
collapsed across this category.  See Appendix A for additional information on the editing 
procedures for the clips, Table S3 (Appendix A) for descriptions of the scenes depicted in the 
film clips, and Figure S1 (Appendix A) for mean anxiety ratings on individual clips across 
participants in Study 1. 
 
Results 
Experience of vicarious anxiety was assessed by calculating two measures: the mean of 
anxiety ratings made immediately after exposure to each of the film clips, and the change in the 
STAI-S measure after watching the film clips for each participant.  This change score (ΔSTAI-S) 
was calculated by subtracting the STAI-S summed score obtained prior to watching the film clips 
(STAI-SPre-Task) from the STAI-SPost-Task summed score.  These two measures of anxiety assess 
both the self-reported experience of anxiety immediately upon exposure to the stimuli, as well as 
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the experience of sustained anxiety after exposure to the stimuli.  On the one hand, the mean 
anxiety score assesses participants’ lay understanding of emotion categories and provides insight 
into the specificity of how they are categorizing their affective responses to the film clips.  On 
the other hand, the ΔSTAI-S score is more diffuse, as the STAI-S assesses several self-reported 
affective dimensions to infer increased autonomic arousal, along with the experience of 
apprehension and fear (e.g., items assessing degree of feeling jittery, nervous, and frightened) 
(Spielberger, 1972).  Assessing ΔSTAI-S captures a critical component of experiencing anxiety, 
that of a heightened and sustained threat response in the absence of direct exposure to threat.  
Together, these ratings are used as convergent measures to assess the experience of anxiety in 
response to the film clips, both as a categorical emotion and as a more diffuse, sustained 
affective response. 
To assess the effects of trait empathy, as opposed to trait anxiety, on experience of 
anxiety from watching the film clips, separate correlations were conducted for trait empathy and 
trait anxiety with the measures assessing state anxiety experienced from watching the film clips.  
Partial correlations were also conducted for the relationships between trait empathy and anxiety 
experienced from the task, while controlling for trait anxiety.  STAI-SPre-Task, gender, and age 
were assessed as additional confounds in the relationships between trait empathy and experience 
of anxiety.  These measures were not found to affect the relationships between trait empathy and 
anxiety throughout all studies in this manuscript, unless otherwise indicated (analyses are 
reported in Appendix A). 
All results reported in this article are conducted with two-tailed tests unless otherwise 
noted.  In all studies, Pearson’s r (r) was used to test correlations between continuous variables 
with normal distributions, whereas the non-parametric Spearman’s rho (rs) was used to test 
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associations between continuous variables where at least one variable exhibited a non-normal 
distribution as indicated by significance (p ≤ .050) on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilk 
tests (see Table S1, Appendix A).  Point-biserial correlations (rpb) were performed to test 
associations between a categorical and continuous variable.  To assess gender as a potential 
confound in our analyses, gender was coded as male = 0, female = 1.  Parametric tests were used 
for all partial correlations.  
For mediation analyses, INDIRECT and PROCESS macros for SPSS were used to 
implement bias-corrected bootstrapping procedures to test the significance of the indirect effect 
(ab) of the predictor variable (X) on the outcome variable (Y).  For simple mediations, the 
product ab represents the degree to which a mediator (M) accounts for the total relationship (c) 
between X and Y.  The degree of the total relationship between X and Y that is unaccounted for 
by M is quantified by the direct relationship (c’).  The ab path is calculated by taking the product 
of the unstandardized path coefficients between the a path (the relationship between X and M) 
and the b path (the relationship between M and Y, with X held constant), and is tested with 
10,000 bootstrapped samples at a 95% confidence interval (unless otherwise indicated) (Hayes, 
2012; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Analyses for mediations are reported with unstandardized 
coefficients.  All analyses were conducted with SPSS Version 23.0 and R (3.3.1)/RStudio 
(0.99.484) (R Core Team, 2016; RStudio Team, 2015). 
Emotion ratings. Averaged across all trials and participants, mean anxiety (M = 5.17, SD 
= 1.78) was the highest rated emotion compared to the means of the other emotion categories 
rated while watching the film clips.  A repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the 11 emotion categories (F(3.15, 145.10) 
= 26.18, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
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demonstrated that mean anxiety was significantly greater than the means for all other emotion 
categories except for interest (See Table 2.1). The mean difference between anxiety and interest 
ratings was significant when correction for multiple comparisons was not applied (MDiff = .98, 
95% CI [.26, 1.69], p = .008).  See Table S11 (Appendix A) for correlations between the mean 
emotion ratings. 
Sustained anxiety after the task. To determine whether participants experienced 
sustained anxiety after viewing the film clips, a paired t-test was conducted to assess whether 
STAI-SPost-Task was greater than STAI-SPre-Task.  This analysis indicated that compared to the level 
of anxiety reported prior to observing targets facing threats, participants experienced greater 
anxiety that was sustained after completing the task (MΔSTAI-S = 15.09, 95% CI [11.35, 18.82], 
t(46) = 8.12, p < .001, dz = 1.18, see Figure 1a).   
Trait empathy and experience of anxiety during the task.  To assess whether trait 
empathy is associated with experiencing anxiety when observing targets facing threats, we 
performed a correlation between the General Empathy Scale scores and mean anxiety ratings 
averaged across all trials of the task.  Trait empathy was positively associated with mean anxiety 
ratings during the task (r = .31, 95% CI [.031, .55], p = .031, Figure 2.1b), as well as with mean 
ratings of surprise (r = .29, 95% CI [.00, .53], p = .050).  Trait empathy was not significantly (p 
> .050) associated with any of the other emotion categories (see Table S9, Appendix A).  Trait 
empathy and STAI-T were not significantly associated (r = .21, 95% CI [-.086, .47], p = .16), 
and the relationship between trait empathy and experience of anxiety during the task remained 
significant when controlling for STAI-T (r = .30, 95% CI [.015, .55], p = .040). 
Trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the task.  To assess whether trait empathy 
is associated with sustained anxiety after observing target victims facing threats, we performed 
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correlations to test the relationships between the General Empathy Scale scores with STAI-SPost-
Task and ΔSTAI-S.  Trait empathy was associated with both STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .46, 95% CI [.20, 
.66], p = .001) and ΔSTAI-S (r = .40, 95% CI [.12, .61], p = .006, Figure 2.1c).  These 
relationships remained significant when controlling for STAI-T (STAI-SPost-Task: r = .38, 95% CI 
[.097, .60], p = .010; ΔSTAI-S: r = .38, 95% CI [.10, .60], p = .009). 
Anxiety during the task mediates the relationship between trait empathy and 
sustained anxiety after the task.  As the anxiety ratings during the task indicate how 
participants are specifically categorizing their affective response to observing target victims, 
whereas the STAI-S assesses more diffuse responses related to anxiety, we used mediation 
analyses to assess whether anxiety ratings during the task specifically drive the relationship 
between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S.  Whereas a mediating effect of anxiety ratings during the 
task would indicate a specific role for the experience of anxiety in the relationship between trait 
empathy and ΔSTAI-S, the lack of such a relationship would suggest a more general affective 
response driving the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S. 
We first tested mean anxiety during the task as a mediator for the relationship between 
the General Empathy Scale scores and ΔSTAI-S.  Mean anxiety during the task mediated the 
relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .074, SE = .035, 95% CI [.013, .15]; c = 
.19, SE = .066, t = 2.90, p = .006; c’ = .12, SE = .061, t = 1.93, p = .060).  As trait empathy was 
significantly associated with both mean ratings of anxiety and surprise, we then conducted a 
multiple mediation analysis with mean anxiety and mean surprise ratings as parallel mediators 
for the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S.  Mean anxiety during the task mediated 
the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S, whereas mean surprise ratings did not have 
a significant indirect effect (see Figure 1d). 
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To assess the possibility of other high arousal negative emotions mediating the 
relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S, separate multiple mediation analyses were 
conducted to test the specificity of mean anxiety with mean ratings of anger, disgust, and fear. 
When mean anxiety and anger were tested as parallel mediators for the relationship between trait 
empathy and ΔSTAI-S, mean anxiety during the task mediated the relationship between trait 
empathy and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .073, SE = .040, 95% CI [.011, .17]) whereas mean anger did not 
(ab = .001, SE = .019, 95% CI [-.028, .056].  Similarly, when mean anxiety and disgust were 
tested as mediators for the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S, mean anxiety 
during the task mediated the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .065, SE = 
.045, 95% CI [.0007, .19]) whereas mean disgust did not (ab = .011, SE = .036, 95% CI [-.038, 
.11].   When assessed as parallel mediators in the same model, mean anxiety and fear did not 
significantly mediate the relationship between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S. 
Trait anxiety and experience of anxiety during and after the task.  STAI-T was not 
associated with mean anxiety during the task (r = .093, 95% CI [-.20, .37], p = .53).  STAI-T was 
associated with STAI-SPre-Task (r  = .57, 95% CI [.34, .74], p < .001) and STAI-SPost-Task (rs  = .42, 
95% CI [.15, .63], p = .003), but was not significantly associated with ΔSTAI-S (r = .14, 95% CI 
[-.15, .41], p = .35). 
 
Discussion 
The results from Study 1 support our hypothesis that trait empathy is associated with 
experiencing greater vicarious anxiety when observing others facing threat.  Trait empathy was 
positively associated with self-reported anxiety while watching target victims facing threats and 
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with sustained anxiety after completing this task.  Trait anxiety was not significantly associated 
with anxiety experienced during the task or with changes in sustained anxiety after the task.   
 
 
Figure 2.1. Results from Study 1 (n = 47).  a) Mean STAI-S scores obtained before and after 
watching the film clips.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the means.  b) 
Scatterplot with line representing the linear best fit for the General Empathy Scale (sum) and 
mean anxiety ratings averaged across all trials of the task.  c) Scatterplot with line representing 
the linear best fit for the General Empathy Scale scores (sum) and ΔSTAI-S.  For panels b and c, 
bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the regression lines.  Pearson’s r correlation 
coefficients are displayed.  d) Diagram illustrating the indirect effects of mean anxiety ratings 
and mean surprise ratings on the relationship between the General Empathy Scale and ΔSTAI-S 
in a multiple mediation model.  Mean anxiety significantly mediates the relationship between the 
General Empathy Scale and ΔSTAI-S, whereas mean surprise does not.  Unstandardized 
regression coefficients are displayed with the standard error in parentheses.  STAI-S = State 
measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, ΔSTAI-S = Difference score in STAI-S calculated 
by subtracting the score before the task from the score obtained after the task.  
†p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .001. 
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While trait empathy was also significantly associated with mean ratings of surprise during the 
task, a multiple mediation model indicated a specific effect for mean ratings of anxiety when 
anxiety and surprise were tested as parallel mediators in the relationship between trait empathy 
and sustained anxiety after the task.  Multiple mediation models also indicated a specific effect 
for mean anxiety during the task, when tested separately as parallel mediators with mean ratings 
of anger and disgust, in the relationship between trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the 
task.  These analyses indicate some level of specificity amongst high arousal negative emotions 
for the relationship between trait empathy and experience of anxiety from observing target 
victims facing threats.   
 However, a specific effect was not seen when mean ratings of anxiety and fear were 
assessed as multiple mediators in the relationship between trait empathy and sustained anxiety 
after the task.  As anxiety and fear share many conceptual similarities, these two emotion 
categories may be particularly difficult to dissociate, as is evidenced by the extremely high 
correlation between the mean ratings for these emotions during the task (r = .98, 95% CI [.96, 
.99], p < .001).  Mean anxiety was most highly correlated with mean ratings of fear, as compared 
to the other emotion categories.  In addition, the STAI-S measure used to assess sustained 
anxiety after the task includes items that assess aspects of feeling fear (e.g., “I feel frightened”), 
and thus it may be particularly difficult to dissociate anxiety from fear in relation to this measure, 
which assesses experiences of both emotions.  While this limits the degree to which anxiety can 
be specified as the only emotion to drive the effect between trait empathy and sustained anxiety, 
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the current analyses indicate specificity for experience of anxiety-related responses that pertain 
to defensive responding to threats1. 
 
Study 2 
 To test the hypothesis that trait empathy increases the perception of anxiety in others 
facing threats, we recruited another set of participants to complete a protocol similar to Study 1.  
In Study 2, participants rated the emotions experienced by the target victim in each film clip 
instead of their own emotions. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty-two participants were recruited from introductory psychology 
courses at Columbia University for course credits. One participant chose to end the study without 
completing the task and one participant was dismissed prior to completing the study due to 
having taken longer on the task than the allotted 90 minutes for the study.  Data obtained from 
these participants were not analyzed.  The final sample used for analyses consisted of 60 
participants (35 female and 25 male; MAge = 21.32 years, SD = 4.68, range = 18-40).  This target 
sample size was pre-determined through a power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1 for an a 
priori, one-tailed bivariate normal model correlation (r = .315, alpha level = .05, power = .80, 
and null = 0). We based the effect size for the power analysis on the correlation between trait 
empathy and mean ratings of experienced anxiety while watching the film clips in Study 1.  																																																								
     1 Mean ratings of anxiety and fear during the task were not dissociable throughout Studies 1-
3.  In these studies, analyses using a composite measure in which anxiety and fear ratings were 
averaged produced the same results as using only anxiety ratings (see Table S9, Appendix A).  
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Materials and procedures.  As in Study 1, participants first completed questionnaires 
including the General Empathy Scale (MSum = 195.03, SD = 27.80, α = .89), STAI-T (MSum = 
41.80, SD = 10.65, α = .91), and STAI-SPre-Task (MSum = 34.80, SD = 10.74, α = .93) on a 
computer outside of the testing room.  Participants then completed a task in which they watched 
the film clips used in Study 1 and made ratings after each clip.  In this study, participants rated 
the greatest amount of each emotion they perceived the target victim in each scene to have 
experienced on the 11 emotion categories used in Study 1 (1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely).  The film clips were presented in random order and the emotion categories were 
rated in random order after each film clip.  To confirm that each scene clearly depicted a victim 
facing a threat, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they identified a victim in each 
scene (1 = “No, it was ambiguous or there was no victim”, 2 = “Yes, there was clearly a 
victim”).  Upon completion of the task, participants completed the STAI-SPost-Task (MSum = 43.08, 
SD = 13.13, α = .94) along with other questionnaires on a computer outside of the testing room.  
See Table S5 (Appendix A) for all ratings and instructions administered during the task.  This 
study took approximately 90 min to complete.   
 
Results 
Identification of a victim in each clip.  Individual ratings were recoded for each film 
clip so that participants indicated whether or not a victim was identified in the scene by a 
response of 0 for “No, it was ambiguous or there was no victim” or 1 for “Yes, there was clearly 
a victim”.  A mean for each film clip was calculated based on ratings from all participants.  The 
mean of ratings for all 32 clips was .85 (SD = .16, range = .38-1.00), and the distribution of these 
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ratings indicated that a victim was clearly identified for the majority of the clips.  Mean scores of 
.79, .90, and .97 represented the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles respectively for the 32 film clips.    
Emotion ratings for target victims. Averaged across all trials, participants reported fear 
(M = 7.98, SD = .74) to be the greatest emotion experienced by victims on a 9-point scale, 
followed by anxiety (M = 7.49, SD = 1.06), and surprise (M = 7.02, SD = 1.18).  A repeated 
measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst 
the 11 emotions (F(5.69, 335.57) = 174.76, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean of fear ratings was greater than 
the means of all other emotion categories, including anxiety (MFear-Anxiety = .48, 95% CI [.16, .80], 
p < .001).  Mean anxiety was not significantly different from mean ratings of surprise (MAnxiety-
Surprise = .48, 95% CI [−.04, .99], p = .11), but was significantly different from the means of the 
other emotion categories (see Table 2.1).  The difference between mean anxiety and surprise 
ratings was significant when correction for multiple comparisons was not applied (MDiff = .48, 
95% CI [.18, .77], p = .002).  For correlations between the means of all emotion ratings, see 
Table S12 (Appendix A). 
Trait empathy and perception of anxiety in target victims. To assess whether trait 
empathy is associated with increased perception of anxiety in target victims, we performed a 
correlation between the General Empathy Scale scores and mean perceived anxiety ratings.  Trait 
empathy was positively associated with mean ratings of perceived anxiety in victims (rs = .31, 
95% CI [.063, .52], p = .015, see Figure 2.2).  This relationship remained significant when 
controlling for STAI-T (r = .29, 95% CI [.038, .51], p = .025).  Trait empathy was also positively 






Notes. Emotions were rated on a 9 pt. scale (1 = Not at All, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely).  
Mean ratings were averaged across 32 trials.  95% CIs are adjusted for multiple comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction. aMean differences from anxiety are significant without Bonferroni 
correction.  *p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .001. 
 
 
negatively associated with mean ratings of perceived amusement in target victims (rs = −.27, 
95% CI [-.49, -.017], p = .037).  There were no other significant correlations between trait 
empathy and mean perceived emotions in the targets (see Table S9, Appendix A).   
As trait empathy was associated with both perceived anxiety and negatively with 
amusement, a partial correlation was performed between the General Empathy Scale scores and 
Mean Emotion Ratings and Differences from Anxiety in Studies 1 and 2 
 Study 1 (n = 47) 
 
Study 2 (n = 60) 
 
















Anxiety [95% CI] 
 
Anxiety 5.17 (1.78) ⎯ 7.49 (1.06) ⎯ 
Fear 4.92 (1.82) -.25* [-.45, -.04] 7.98 (.74) .48** [.16, .80] 
Surprise 4.30 (1.62) -.87** [-1.40, -.35] 7.02 (1.18) -.48 a  [-.99, .04] 
Disgust 4.27 (1.62) -.90** [-1.49, -.30] 5.14 (1.64) -2.35** [-3.06, -1.65] 
Unhappiness 4.22 (1.90) -.95** [-1.51, -.39] 6.09 (1.73) -1.40** [-2.06, -.74] 
Interest 4.19 (1.66) -.98 a  [-2.24, .28] 4.67 (1.75) -2.83** [-3.69, -1.97] 
Confusion 3.82 (1.70) -1.35** [-2.26, -.44] 6.70 (1.33) -.79** [-1.29, -.29] 
Amusement 2.91 (1.42) -2.26** [-3.65, -.86] 1.72 (.88) -5.77** [-6.45, -5.09] 
Sadness 2.83 (1.48) -2.34** [-3.06, -1.62] 3.85 (1.78) -3.64** [-4.41, -2.88] 
Contempt 2.59 (1.35) -2.58** [-3.43, -1.74] 3.35 (1.82) -4.15** [-5.00, -3.29] 
Anger 2.47 (1.40) -2.70** [-3.48, -1.92] 3.55 (1.73) -3.95** [-4.72, -3.17] 
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mean anxiety ratings, controlling for mean amusement, to test the specificity of the relationship 
between trait empathy and perceived anxiety.  This relationship was significant (r = .27, 95% CI 
[.010, .49], p = .042).  However, a partial correlation between trait empathy and perceived 
amusement when controlling for anxiety was not significant (r = -.20, 95% CI [-.44, .057], p = 
.12), indicating that the relationship between trait empathy and amusement may have been 
somewhat driven by the shared variability between amusement and anxiety ratings.  A partial 
correlation between trait empathy and mean perceived anxiety, when controlling for fear, was 
not significant (r = .13, 95% CI [-.13, .37], p = .33).   
As in Study 1, additional analyses were conducted to assess the specificity of the 
relationship between trait empathy and perceived anxiety in relation to high arousal negative 
emotions.  While trait empathy was not significantly associated with mean ratings of perceived 
anger (rs = -.095, 95% CI [-.34, .16], p = .47) or disgust (r = .11, 95% CI [-.14, .36], p = .38), 
mean perceived anxiety was significantly associated with both ratings of anger (rs = .30, 95% CI 
[.052, .52], p = .019) and disgust (rs = .42, 95% CI [.19, .61], p = .001).  Separate partial 
correlations performed between trait empathy and mean perceived anxiety indicated that the 
relationship between them remained significant when controlling for mean ratings of perceived 
anger (r = .34, 95% CI [.089, .55], p = .009) and disgust (r = .28, 95% CI [.025, .50], p = .032).  
Trait anxiety and perception of anxiety in target victims.  STAI-T was not 
significantly associated with mean perceived anxiety (rs = .20, 95% CI [-.060, .43], p = .13).   
Perception of anxiety in target victims and sustained anxiety after the task.  Mean 
perceived anxiety was not associated with STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .14, 95% CI [-.12, .38], p = .29) or 
with ΔSTAI-S (rs = .058, 95% CI [-.20, .31], p = .66).  
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Replications of findings from Study 1.  Replication analyses indicated a significant 
increase in anxiety sustained after the task, a significant positive relationship between trait 
empathy and ΔSTAI-S, and no significant relationship between STAI-T and ΔSTAI-S (see 




Figure 2.2. Results from Study 2 (n = 60).  Scatterplot of raw data with line representing the 
linear best fit for the General Empathy Scale scores (sum) and mean perceived anxiety ratings 
for the target victim in each film clip, averaged across all trials of the task.  Band represents the 








We aimed to establish a stimulus set depicting targets experiencing anxiety.  However, 
fear was the most highly perceived emotion in target victims.  As clear threats are often depicted 
to be approaching targets in the film clips, this finding is congruent with conceptualizations of 
fear as a response to immediate threat.  It may be that participants perceive targets to primarily 
experience anxiety, and then fear as the threat approaches and becomes more imminent to the 
target (Mobbs et al., 2009). However, the temporal dynamics of how participants perceived 
emotions to be experienced by targets was not assessed.  The fact that most of the clips in this 
stimulus set end by depicting the threat at its most imminent position to the target victim may 
also influence overall judgments of the targets’ emotions towards greater experience of fear 
rather than anxiety.    
Supporting our hypothesis that trait empathy enhances perception of anxiety in targets 
facing threats, trait empathy was associated with perceiving greater anxiety to be experienced by 
target victims.  However, trait empathy was also associated with perceiving targets to experience 
greater fear.  As fear and anxiety were the two emotions most greatly perceived to be 
experienced by target victims, these patterns suggest that trait empathy facilitates perception of 
emotions most strongly experienced by a target, as agreed upon by a consensus of observers.  
While these patterns do not support a relationship strictly between trait empathy and perception 
of anxiety, they indicate that in the context of targets facing threats, trait empathy facilitates 
perception of emotions that facilitate defensive responding to threats. 
 As we were unable to dissociate the relationship between trait empathy and perception of 
anxiety from fear in targets, we cannot assess whether expression of fear or anxiety drives the 
relationship between trait empathy and experience of anxiety.  However, as trait empathy was 
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not significantly associated with perceiving other high arousal negative emotions, such as anger 
and disgust, and trait empathy remained significantly associated with mean ratings of perceived 
anxiety when controlling for these emotions, there is some support for a specific relationship 
between trait empathy and perception of emotions closely associated with anxiety in response to 
observing others facing threats. 
Finally, mean perceived anxiety ratings for target victims were not associated with 
sustained anxiety after the task.  As prior research has demonstrated a positive association 
between the degree of observed fear related behaviors in others and the degree to which an 
observer exhibits fear related behaviors themselves (Mineka & Cook, 1993), it may be that the 
relationship between perceiving anxiety in others and experience of anxiety occurs in a more 
temporally proximal context.  The next study tests this relationship.  
 
Study 3 
 In Study 3, we used the IRI to investigate how specific dimensions of trait empathy are 
associated with experience of vicarious anxiety.  As the trait empathy measure used in Studies 1 
and 2 assessed general empathic responses to both positive and negative situations, the Empathic 
Concern subscale of the IRI was of particular interest as it specifically assesses the tendency to 
experience interpersonal responses to others who are in distress.  We predicted that the 
relationships seen between a general measure of trait empathy and anxiety in Studies 1 and 2 
would extend to the Empathic Concern subscale.  We also predicted that the Personal Distress 
subscale would not be associated with perception or experience of anxiety in response to the 
target victims, due to its conceptual similarities with trait anxiety.   
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We investigated the relationship between the degree of anxiety perceived in a target and 
the degree of vicarious anxiety experienced after observing the target.  We hypothesize that the 
degree of anxiety perceived in a target will be positively associated with the degree of anxiety 
experienced from observing the target, and that the magnitude of perceived anxiety will mediate 
the relationship between trait empathy/empathic concern and experience of vicarious anxiety.  
To test these relationships, we adapted the protocols used in Studies 1 and 2 so that participants 
rated both their own emotions and the target victim’s emotions after viewing each film clip.   
A potential confound in the relationship between trait empathy and experience of 
vicarious anxiety may be that individuals who are more emotionally reactive report having 
higher trait empathy, and that it is emotional reactivity instead of empathy that drives reports of 
experiencing vicarious anxiety.  To address this, we administered a measure of trait emotional 
reactivity, the Impulse Strength subscale of the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire.  This 
subscale assesses emotional reactivity with statements such as “I experience my emotions very 
strongly” and “My body reacts very strongly to emotional situations” (Gross & John, 1997).  
 As prior literature has established a relationship between experiencing anxiety and 
avoidance of risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), we predict that trait 
empathy/empathic concern and the experience of vicarious anxiety should also be associated 
with greater risk-aversion after observing target victims facing threats.  To assess risk-aversion 
as an outcome of experiencing vicarious anxiety, we administered items from the Domain 
Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) (Blais & Weber, 2006).  The DOSPERT assesses risk-
taking with items describing risky activities.  On this scale, participants rate the likelihood they 
would engage in the activity described in each item (1=Extremely unlikely, 2 = Moderately 
unlikely, 3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = Not sure, 5 = Somewhat likely, 6 = Moderately likely, 
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7=Extremely likely).  Due to time constraints, we used two subscales consisting of 12 items from 
the 30-item DOSPERT: the Health/Safety subscale (example item, “Walking home alone at night 
in an unsafe area of town”), and the Recreational subscale (example item, “Taking a skydiving 
class)”.  These subscales were selected as they present scenarios involving physical threats, and 
thus assess a specific domain of risk that pertains to the type of threats faced by the target victims 
in the film clips. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty-five participants were recruited from introductory psychology 
courses at Columbia University for course credits. Three participants chose to end the study 
without completing the task.  Data from two participants were not fully obtained due to technical 
issues.  The data obtained from these participants were not analyzed.  The final sample used for 
analyses consisted of 60 participants (34 female and 26 male; MAge = 20.33 years, SD = 2.18, 
range = 18-29).  This target sample size was pre-determined to be identical to that of Study 2.  
Materials and procedures. After consenting to the study, participants first completed 
questionnaires on a computer outside of the testing room that included the STAI-T (MSum = 
42.13, SD = 9.80, α = .91), STAI-SPre-Task (MSum = 35.98, SD = 10.13, α = .93), General Empathy 
Scale (MSum = 198.03, SD = 30.82, α = .92), IRI (28 items on a 5-point scale (0-4) with four 
subscales consisting of seven items. Total score: MSum = 69.98, SD = 10.87, α = .80; Empathic 
Concern: MSum = 20.62, SD = 4.02, α = .78; Personal Distress: MSum = 12.20, SD = 4.83, α = .78; 
Fantasy: MSum = 18.85, SD = 5.09, α = .82; Perspective Taking: MSum = 18.32, SD = 4.32, α = 
.74), the BEQ (16-item measure on a 7-point scale.  The Impulse Strength subscale consists of 
six items.  Total score: MSum = 71.75, SD = 17.39, α = .91; Impulse Strength subscale: MSum = 
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28.32, SD = 7.53, α = .81), and DOSPERTPre-Task (12 items on a 7-point scale, MSum = 46.13, SD 
= 13.20, α = .76). 
After completing the questionnaires, participants entered the testing room and completed 
a task in which they viewed 24 of the film clips used in Studies 1 and 2.  Selection of these film 
clips was based off of ratings provided in Study 2 regarding whether or not a victim was easily 
identified in the scene.  For each clip used in this study, at least 80% of the participants from 
Study 2 indicated that a victim was clearly identified in the scene (see Table S3, Appendix A).  
As in Studies 1 and 2, the film clips were presented in random order.  After watching each clip, 
participants made eight ratings with four emotion categories on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = Not at 
all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely) based on the greatest amount of each emotion (fear, anxiety, 
sadness, and amusement) they felt during each clip and the greatest amount of each emotion they 
perceived the target victim to have experienced in each clip (see Table S6 in Appendix A for 
instructions given).  The emotion ratings were blocked so that ratings for one’s own emotions 
were made sequentially in one block and ratings for the victim’s emotions were made 
sequentially in a following block.  The blocks were presented in random order after each clip 
such that participants rated their emotions first after some clips and rated the victim’s emotions 
first after other clips.  The emotion categories that were rated within a block were presented in 
random order.  After completion of the task, participants came out of the testing room and 
completed the STAI-SPost-Task (MSum = 48.35, SD = 12.55, α = .94) and DOSPERTPost-Task (MSum = 
44.65, SD = 12.65, α = .75).  This study took approximately one hour to complete2. 																																																								2	Heart rate and galvanic skin response measures were collected during the task.  As neither of 
these measures was significantly associated with self-reported measures of empathy and anxiety 




Relationships between trait empathy and the IRI subscales.  The General Empathy 
Scale was associated with the following IRI subscales: Empathic Concern (rs = .73, 95% CI [.58, 
.83], p < .001), Personal Distress (r = .29, 95% CI [.039, .51], p = .025), and Fantasy (r = .57, 
95% CI [.37, .72], p < .001).  The General Empathy Scale was not associated with the 
Perspective Taking subscale (r = -.079, 95% CI [-.33, .18], p = .55), which suggests that the 
Perspective Taking subscale is a measure that assesses a cognitive dimension of empathy 
dissociable from the affective dimensions assessed by the other subscales of the IRI.   
Experienced emotions.  The following results pertain to participants’ own emotions. 
Emotion ratings for self.  Averaged across all trials, participants rated anxiety to be the 
greatest experienced emotion (M = 5.75, SD = 1.62), followed by fear (M = 5.44, SD = 1.75), 
sadness (M = 2.92, SD = 1.79), and amusement (M = 2.71, SD = 1.40).  A repeated measures 
ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the means 
for the four emotion categories (F(1.84, 108.52) = 87.03, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (applied to p-values and confidence intervals) 
indicated that mean anxiety was greater than the means for all other emotion categories (MAnxiety-
Fear = .31, 95% CI [.13, .50], p < .001; MAnxiety-Sadness = 2.83, 95% CI [2.28, 3.37], p < .001; 
MAnxiety-Amusement = 3.04, 95% CI [2.24, 3.84], p < .001).  These results reflect a similar pattern 																																																																																																																																																																																		
reported a lack of correspondence between such physiological measures and self-reports of 
emotional experience (Gump & Kulik, 1997; Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2004).  It may be that 
other factors involved in the formation of an emotional experience, such as cognitive appraisals, 
preclude a direct relationship between physiological measures and self-reports of emotional 
experience (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; LeDoux, 2014; Mauss et al., 2004).  
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found in Study 1, in which the mean for experienced anxiety was greatest amongst all emotion 
categories. 
Trait empathic concern and experience of anxiety during the task.  The Empathic 
Concern subscale was associated with mean ratings of experienced anxiety during the task (rs = 
.48, 95% CI [.25, .65], p < .001), as well as with mean ratings of fear, sadness, and negatively 
with amusement.  In contrast, the Personal Distress subscale was not significantly associated 
with mean ratings of experienced anxiety during the task (r = .15, 95% CI [-.11, .39], p = .26).  
The difference of the dependent correlations between the Empathic Concern subscale on the one 
hand and Personal Distress subscale on the other hand, with mean ratings of experienced anxiety 
was significant (t = 2.21, p = .03, see Figure 3a).   
Mean ratings of anxiety were associated with the Fantasy subscale (r = .35, 95% CI [.10, 
.55], p = .006), and were not significantly associated with the Perspective Taking subscale (r = 
.14, 95% CI [-.12, .38], p = .29).  Mean ratings of anxiety were not significantly associated with 
the Fantasy subscale when controlling for the Empathic Concern subscale (r = .14, 95% CI [-.12, 
.38], p = .28).  However, mean ratings of anxiety remained significantly associated with the 
Empathic Concern subscale when controlling for the Fantasy subscale (r = .36, 95% CI [.12, 
.57], p = .005).  See Table 2.2 for correlations between all subscales of the IRI and mean emotion 
ratings. 
To assess the specificity of the relationship between the Empathic Concern subscale and 
mean ratings of experienced anxiety, a partial correlation was conducted for this relationship, 
controlling for mean sadness.  This relationship remained significant (r = .41, 95% CI [.17, .60], 
p = .001).  However, a partial correlation between the Empathic Concern subscale and mean 
sadness when controlling for anxiety was not significant (r = -.030, 95% CI [-.28, .23], p = .82), 
		
45	
indicating that the relationship between trait empathic concern and sadness was driven by the 
variability that sadness ratings shared with anxiety ratings.  A partial correlation between trait 
empathic concern and mean experienced anxiety when controlling for fear was not significant (r 
= .15, 95% CI [-.11, .40], p = .24).   
Trait empathic concern and sustained anxiety after the task.  The Empathic Concern 
subscale was associated with STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .34, CI 95% [.095, .55], p = .008) and with 
ΔSTAI-S (rs = .40, CI 95% [.16, .59], p = .002).  These relationships were significant when 
controlling for STAI-T (STAI-SPost-Task: r = .45, 95% CI [.23, .64], p < .001; ΔSTAI-S: r = .46, 
95% CI [.24, .64], p < .001).  The Personal Distress subscale was associated with STAI-SPost-Task 
(r = .36, CI 95% [.11, .56], p = .005), but not significantly with ΔSTAI-S (rs = .19, CI 95% [-
.069, .42], p = .15).  The Fantasy subscale was also associated with STAI-SPost-Task and ΔSTAI-S, 
whereas the Perspective Taking subscale was not significantly associated with sustained anxiety 
after the task (see Table 2). 
Anxiety during the task mediates the relationship between trait empathic concern and 
sustained anxiety after the task.  Mean experienced anxiety during the task mediated the 
relationship between the Empathic Concern subscale and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .79, SE = .24, 95% CI 
[.40, 1.38]; c = 1.77, SE = .42, t = 4.26, p < .001; c’ = .98, SE = .42, t = 2.34, p = .023).  This 
effect remained significant when controlling for the Fantasy subscale (ab = .62, SE = .24, 95% 
CI [.25, 1.22]; c = 1.27, SE = .47, t = 2.71, p = .009; c’ = .65, SE = .46, t = 1.43, p = .16).  Mean 
experienced anxiety also mediated the relationship between the Fantasy subscale of the IRI and 
ΔSTAI-S (ab = .49, SE = .19, 95% CI [.19, .95; c = 1.29, SE = .34, t = 3.82, p < .001; c’ = .79, 
SE = .31, t = 2.56, p = .013]).  However, this effect was not significant when controlling for the 
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Empathic Concern subscale (ab = .18, SE = .15, 95% CI [-.075, .53]; c = .77, SE = .37, t = 2.07, 




Notes. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index.  STAI-T = Trait measure of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory STAI-S = State measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, ΔSTAI-S = Difference 
score in STAI-S calculated by subtracting the score before the task from the score obtained after 
the task.  Coefficients in bold represent correlations significant at trend level (p ≤ .10).  *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001 
Correlations Between IRI Subscales, Emotion Ratings, and STAI Measures in Study 3  
(n = 60) 















Anxiety .48*** .15 .35** .14 
Fear .47*** .17 .33* .13 
Sadness .27* -.02 .11 .25 
Amusement -.44*** -.25 -.25 .11 
Target Victims’ Emotions 
Anxiety .27* .02 .24 .05 
Fear .27* -.02 .10 .04 
Sadness .19 -.07 .02 .07 
Amusement -.41*** -.35**  -.28* .09 
STAI Measures     
STAI-T -.18 .43*** -.04 -.06 
STAI-SPre-Task -.28* .20 -.25 -.05 
STAI-SPost-Task .34** .36** .32* .06 
ΔSTAI-S .40** .19 .46*** .15 
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We used a multiple mediation model to determine whether the mean anxiety score 
specifically drives the relationship between trait empathic concern and sustained anxiety after the 
task, with participants’ mean anxiety and sadness ratings as parallel mediators.  Mean anxiety 
significantly mediated the relationship between the Empathic Concern subscale and ΔSTAI-S 
(ab = .82, SE = .27, 95% CI [.36, 1.44]), whereas mean experienced sadness did not (ab = -.025, 
SE = .14, 95% CI [-.32, .26]). 
Assessing trait emotional reactivity as a confound in the relationships between trait 
empathy/empathic concern and experience of anxiety.  The Impulse Strength subscale of the 
BEQ was significantly correlated with the General Empathy Scale (r = .60, 95% CI [.41, .74], p 
< .001) and all of the IRI subscales at significant or trend levels: Empathic Concern (rs = .45, 
95% CI [.22, .63], p < .001), Personal Distress (r = .47, 95% CI [.25, .65], p < .001), Fantasy (r = 
.39, 95% CI [.16, .59], p = .002), and Perspective Taking (r = −.23, 95% CI [-.46, .024], p = 
.075).  To assess trait emotional reactivity as a confound in the relationships between trait 
empathy/empathic concern with experience of anxiety (see Appendix A for replication analyses 
with the General Empathy Scale), multiple linear regressions were conducted in which the 
General Empathy Scale and Empathic Concern subscale were entered in separate models as 
predictors, with the Impulse Strength subscale, for anxiety during the task and sustained anxiety 
after the task.  Tests for collinearity indicated that multicollinearity concerns between the 
predictors were not an issue in these models as tolerance was greater than .1 and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) was less than 10 (O’brien, 2007). 
  In predicting mean experienced anxiety during the task, multiple linear regression 
indicated that the General Empathy Scale and the Impulse Strength subscale accounted for 
31.1% of the variance in mean experienced anxiety ratings (Adjusted R2 = .29, F(2, 57) = 12.86, 
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p < .001).  The General Empathy Scale scores significantly predicted mean ratings of anxiety (β 
= .62, t = 4.53, p < .001, tolerance = .64, VIF = 1.57), whereas the Impulse Strength subscale 
scores did not (β = −.13, t = -.91, p = .34, tolerance = .64, VIF = 1.57).  The Empathic Concern 
and Impulse Strength subscales accounted for 22.2% of the variance in mean experienced 
anxiety ratings (Adjusted R2 = .20, F(2, 57) = 8.15, p < .001).  The Empathic Concern subscale 
significantly predicted mean ratings of anxiety (β = .45, t = 3.42, p = .001, tolerance = .78, VIF = 
1.28), whereas Impulse Strength subscale scores did not (β = .042, t = .32, p = .75, tolerance = 
.78, VIF = 1.28).   
In predicting sustained anxiety after the task, multiple linear regression indicated that the 
General Empathy Scale and the Impulse Strength subscale accounted for 34.8% of the variance 
in ΔSTAI-S (Adjusted R2 = .32, F(2, 57) = 15.19, p < .001).  The General Empathy Scale scores 
significantly predicted ΔSTAI-S (β = .63, t = 4.70, p < .001, tolerance = .64, VIF = 1.57), 
whereas Impulse Strength subscale scores did not (β = −.074, t = -.55, p = .58, tolerance = .64, 
VIF = 1.57).  The Empathic Concern subscale and Impulse Strength subscale accounted for 
24.7% of the variance in ΔSTAI-S (Adjusted R2 = .22, F(2, 57) = 9.34, p < .001).  The Empathic 
Concern subscale scores significantly predicted ΔSTAI-S (β = .44, t = 3.40, p = .001, tolerance = 
.78, VIF = 1.28), whereas Impulse Strength subscale scores did not (β = .10, t = .79, p = .44, 
tolerance = .78, VIF = 1.28).  
Perceived emotions.  The following analyses pertain to emotions perceived in target 
victims. 
Emotion ratings for target victims. Averaged across all trials, target victims were 
perceived to experience fear the most (M = 7.90, SD = .77), followed by anxiety (M = 7.53, SD = 
.93), sadness (M = 3.68, SD = 1.86), and amusement (M = 1.56, SD = .75).  A repeated measures 
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ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the four 
emotions (F(1.83, 108.21) = 543.84, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons indicated that the means for all four emotion categories were significantly 
different from each other (MFear-Anxiety = .36, 95% CI [.16, .57], p < .001; MAnxiety-Sadness = 3.86, 
95% CI [3.29, 4.43], p < .001; MSadness-Amusement = 2.11, 95% CI [1.41, 2.81], p < .001).  These 
results demonstrate a similar pattern as seen with the emotion ratings in Study 2.  
Trait empathic concern and perception of anxiety in target victims.  The Empathic 
Concern subscale was significantly associated with mean ratings of perceived anxiety in target 
victims (rs = .27, 95% CI [.012, .49], p = .040), as well as with perceived fear and negatively 
with perceived amusement (see Table 2.2).  In contrast, the Personal Distress subscale was not 
associated with mean ratings of perceived anxiety during the task (rs = .019, 95% CI [-.24, .27], 
p = .89).  The difference of the dependent correlations between the Empathic Concern subscale 
on the one hand and Personal Distress subscale on the other hand, with mean perceived anxiety 
was marginally significant (t = 1.95, p = .06).  Mean perceived anxiety was marginally 
associated with the Fantasy subscale (rs = .24, 95% CI [-.017, .46], p = .067), and was not 
associated with the Perspective Taking subscale (see Table 2.2). 
 
Relationships between perceived and experienced emotions.  The following analyses pertain 
to how perceived emotions in the target victim are related to experienced emotions. 
Perception of anxiety in target victims and experience of anxiety during the task.  Mean 
perceived anxiety for target victims was associated with mean experienced anxiety (rs = .48, 95% 
CI [.26, .65], p < .001, see Figure 2.3b), as well as with mean ratings of experienced fear (rs = 
.44, 95% CI [.20, .62], p < .001), and sadness (rs = .44, 95% CI [.20, .62], p < .001).   
		
50	
Mean ratings of experienced anxiety were also associated with perceived fear (rs = .48, 
95% CI [.25, .65], p < .001) and perceived sadness (rs = .42, 95% CI [.18, .61], p < .001).  When 
controlling for perceived sadness, mean perceived anxiety remained significantly associated with 
experienced anxiety (r = .29, 95% CI [.038, .51], p = .025).  Perceived sadness was marginally 
associated with experienced anxiety when controlling for perceived anxiety (r = .24, 95% CI [-
.017, .47], p = .067).  See Table S13 (Appendix A) for all correlations between mean 
experienced and perceived emotions.  
Perception of anxiety in target victims mediates the relationship between trait empathic 
concern and experience of anxiety during the task.  Mediation analyses were conducted to test 
a causal model in which trait empathic concern enhances the capacity to perceive anxiety in 
target victims, which in turn drives experience of vicarious anxiety when observing targets 
facing threats.  Mean perceived anxiety partially mediated the relationship between the Empathic 
Concern subscale and mean experienced anxiety during the task (see Figure 2.3c).  This 
relationship did not change when controlling for the Impulse Strength subscale (ab = .040, SE = 
.027, 95% CI [.003, .11]; c = .18, SE = .053, t = 3.42, p = .001; c’ = .14, SE = .053, t = 2.68, p = 
.010).  A similar pattern of results was seen in the relationship between the General Empathy 
Scale and mean experienced anxiety.  Mean perceived anxiety partially mediated the relationship 
between the General Empathy Scale and mean experienced anxiety (ab = .005, SE = .003, 95% 
CI [.0006, .013]; c = .029, SE = .006, t = 5.00, p < .006; c’ = .024, SE = .006, t = 4.16, p < .001).  
This relationship did not change when controlling for the Impulse Strength subscale (ab = .005, 
SE = .004, 95% CI [.0002, .015]; c = .033, SE = .007, t = 4.53, p < .001; c’ = .027, SE = .007, t = 
3.76, p < .001).   
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To test for emotional specificity of mean perceived anxiety as a mediator in the 
relationship between trait empathic concern and experience of anxiety, a multiple mediation 
model was conducted with mean perceived anxiety and mean perceived sadness as parallel 
mediators in the relationship between trait empathic concern and mean experienced anxiety.  
Perceived anxiety did not specifically mediate the relationship between trait empathic concern 
and mean experienced anxiety in this model.  Mean perceived anxiety partially mediated the 
relationship between the Empathic Concern subscale and mean experienced anxiety when 
perceived sadness was controlled for as a covariate in the model, with a lowered 90% CI level 
(ab = .018, SE = .015, 90% CI [.001, .052]; c = .16, SE = .045, t = 3.62, p < .001; c’ = .14, SE = 
.046, t = 3.16, p = .003).  These mediation models were not significant for the relationship 
between the General Empathy Scale and mean experienced anxiety.   
Support for a reverse mediation model was also found when mean experienced anxiety 
was tested as a mediator for the relationships between the General Empathy Scale and perceived 
anxiety (ab = .006, SE = .003, 95% CI [.0006, .011]; c = .010, SE = .004, t = 2.54, p = .014; c’ = 
.004, SE = .004, t = .82, p = .41), as well as between the Empathic Concern subscale and 
perceived anxiety (ab = .039, SE = .018, 95% CI [.009, .082]; c = .072, SE = .029, t = 2.50, p = 
.015; c’ = .033, SE = .031, t = 1.07, p = .29).  In this model, trait empathy would induce greater 
experience of anxiety when observing targets facing threats, which in turn causes greater 
perception of anxiety in targets.  This alternative model seems less plausible, as it proposes the 
experience of anxiety prior to perceiving anxiety in a target.  However, a potential explanation 
for this relationship may be that perceiving anxiety in others and experiencing anxiety are 
mutually enhancing in a feedback loop. 
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Perception of anxiety in target victims and sustained anxiety after the task. In this 
study, mean anxiety perceived in victims was associated with STAI-SPost-Task at trend level (rs = 
.22, 95% CI [-.034, .45], p = .088), and was significantly associated with ΔSTAI-S (rs = .27, 95% 
CI [.013, .49], p = .040).  The relationship between mean perceived anxiety and ΔSTAI-S was 
significantly mediated by mean ratings of experienced anxiety (ab = 3.59, SE = .81, 95% CI 
[2.07, 5.33]; c = 5.48, SE = 1.93, t = 2.85, p = .006; c’ = 1.89, SE = 1.83, t = 1.03, p = .31).   
Serial mediation. To assess all of the main variables of interest in one causal model, we 
conducted a serial mediation analysis, which tests the effect of multiple sequential mediators in 
an indirect relationship.  We tested our hypothesized model in which trait empathic concern (X) 
causes greater perception of anxiety in targets facing threats (M1, a path), which causes greater 
experience of anxiety during the task (M2, d path), which in turn causes greater change in 
sustained anxiety after the task (Y, b path).  The indirect effect is estimated by calculating the 
product of the a, d, and b path coefficients.  The d path holds the effect of X constant, while the b 
path holds the effects of both X and M1 constant.  Bias corrected confidence intervals for the 
indirect effect (adb) are calculated with 10,000 bootstrapped samples.  This analysis also tests 
each mediator separately to assess the contribution of the simple mediations on the indirect effect 
in the relationship between X and Y (Hayes, 2012).   
The indirect effect for this model (X = Empathic Concern subscale, M1 = mean perceived 
anxiety in target victims, M2 = mean experienced anxiety during the task, Y = ΔSTAI-S) through 
the adb pathway was significant (adb = .15, SE = .084, 95% CI [.038, .41]; c = 1.77, SE = .42, t 
= 4.26, p < .001; c’ = .94, SE = .43, t = 2.21, p = .032).   In contrast, reversing the sequence of 
the mediators (in which M1 = mean experienced anxiety and M2 = mean perceived anxiety in 




Figure 2.3. Results from Study 3 (n = 60). a) Scatterplots of raw data with lines representing the 
linear best fit for the relationships between mean ratings of experienced anxiety with the 
Empathic Concern (solid line: rs = .48, p < .001) and Personal Distress (dotted line: r = .15, p = 
.26) subscales of the IRI.  b) Scatterplot of raw data with line representing the linear best fit for 
the relationship between mean ratings of perceived anxiety for target victims and mean ratings of 
experienced anxiety. The Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient is displayed.  For panels a and 
b, bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the regression lines.  c) Diagram illustrating the 
indirect effect of mean perceived anxiety for target victims on the relationship between the 
Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI and mean ratings of experienced anxiety during the task.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed with the standard error in parentheses. IRI 





relationship between the Empathic Concern subscale and ΔSTAI-S (adb = .052, SE = .083, 95% 
CI [-.051, .31]).  This was due to the b path being insignificant between perceived anxiety and 
ΔSTAI-S. 
A similar pattern of results was seen for the indirect effect of the General Empathy Scale 
on sustained anxiety after the task through the adb pathway (X = General Empathy Scale, M1 = 
mean perceived anxiety in target victims, M2 = mean experienced anxiety during the task, Y = 
ΔSTAI-S; adb = .015, SE = .010, 95% CI [.003, .053]; c = .28, SE = .050, t = 5.52, p < .001; c’ = 
.17, SE = .056, t = 3.08, p = .003).  Similarly, reversing the sequential order of the mediators (M1 
= mean experienced anxiety, M2 = mean perceived anxiety in target victims) did not result in a 
significant indirect effect through the adb pathway (adb = .008, SE = .010, 95% CI [-.005, 
.041]).   
Effect of trait empathic concern and vicarious anxiety on risk-aversion. To assess 
whether empathy is associated with greater risk-aversion after observing target victims facing 
threats, partial correlations were performed to test associations with DOSPERTPost-Task, while 
controlling for scores on the DOSPERTPre-Task.  The relationship between the General Empathy 
Scale and DOSPERTPost-Task was not significant (r = -.18, 95% CI [-.42, .079], p = .17).  
However, the Empathic Concern subscale was negatively associated with DOSPERTPost-Task 
scores (r = -.32, 95% CI [-.53, -.067], p = .014), indicating that those high in trait empathic 
concern became more risk-averse after observing target victims facing threats.  This relationship 
was not significant between the other subscales of the IRI and DOSPERTPost-Task (Personal 
Distress: r = .14, 95% CI [-.12, .39], p = .27, Fantasy: r = -.17, 95% CI [-.41, .086], p = .19, 
Perspective Taking: r = -.11, 95% CI [-.35, .15], p = .42). 
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Partial correlations also indicated that sustained anxiety after the task was associated with 
greater risk-aversion after the task.  Controlling for DOSPERTPre-Task, DOSPERTPost-Task was 
associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = -.29, 95% CI [-.50, -.031], p = .028) and ΔSTAI-S (r = -.34, 
95% CI [-.55, -.095], p = .008).  DOSPERTPost-Task was not significantly associated with STAI-T 
(r = .12, 95% CI [-.14, .36], p = .36) or STAI-SPre-Task (r = .14, 95% CI [-.12, .38], p = .28).  
These patterns indicate that while trait empathic concern and sustained anxiety were associated 
with greater risk-aversion after observing target victims facing threats, state and trait anxiety 
assessed before observing targets facing threats were not associated with risk-aversion after the 
task.  
Replications of findings from Study 1 and Study 2.  Replication analyses indicated that 
there was significantly increased anxiety sustained after the task, and significant positive 
relationships between the General Empathy Scale with experience of anxiety during the task and 
ΔSTAI-S.  Anxiety during the task significantly mediated the relationship between trait empathy 
and ΔSTAI-S, whereas sadness did not.  As in Study 2, trait empathy was significantly 
associated with increased perception of anxiety in target victims (see Appendix A for analyses). 
Internal meta-analyses of data across Studies 1, 2, and 3.  As the designs for Studies 
1-3 were similar, we conducted internal meta-analyses to estimate the average effect sizes of the 
main correlations reported in these studies (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Cumming, 
2014).  Effects were averaged across Studies 1 and 3 for correlations involving mean ratings of 
experienced emotions during the task.  Effects were averaged across Studies 2 and 3 for 
correlations involving mean ratings of perceived emotions for target victims.  Anxiety, fear, 
sadness, and amusement were the only emotion categories analyzed in these meta-analyses as 
Study 3 had only assessed these emotions during the task.  Effect sizes were obtained from either 
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the Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlation coefficient, depending on the method used for each 
correlation as reported in the study.  Meta-analyses were conducted with the metacor function in 
the ‘meta’ package in R, which uses Fisher’s z transformations of correlations, inverse variance 
weighting for the fixed effects model, and the DerSimonian-Laird estimate in the random effects 
model (Schwarzer, 2007).  
For ratings of participants’ own emotions across Studies 1 and 3 (n = 107), all mean 
effects were significant for correlations between the General Empathy Scale and mean ratings of 
anxiety, fear, sadness, and amusement.  Effects for anxiety (fixed effects: Mr = .45, 95% CI [.29, 
.59], z = 4.91, p < .001; random effects: Mr = .44, 95% CI [.18, .65], z = 3.33, p = .001) and fear 
were the largest.  For ratings of target victims’ emotions across Studies 2 and 3 (n = 120), mean 
effects were significant for correlations between the General Empathy Scale and mean ratings of 
perceived anxiety (fixed effects: Mr = .34, 95% CI [.16, .49], z = 3.72, p < .001; random effects: 
Mr = .34, 95% CI [.16, .49], z = 3.72, p < .001), fear, and amusement.  The mean effect for the 
correlation between trait empathy and perceived sadness was not significant (see Table S16, 
Appendix A).   
Mean effects across studies indicated that there were no significant positive relationships 
between STAI-T and mean ratings of experienced emotions during the task in Studies 1 and 3, or 
with mean ratings of perceived emotions in target victims in Studies 2 and 3.  This was also the 
case for correlations between STAI-SPre-Task and mean ratings of experienced and perceived 
emotions during the task (see Table S17, Appendix A). 
Across Studies 1, 2, and 3 (n = 167), the mean effect for the correlation between trait 
empathy and ΔSTAI-S was significant (fixed effects: Mr = .43, 95% CI [.30, .55], z = 5.79, p < 
.001; random effects: Mr = .43, 95% CI [.28, .56], z = 5.24, p < .001).  However, the mean effect 
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for the correlation between STAI-T and ΔSTAI-S was not significant (fixed effects: Mr = -.029, 
95% CI [-.18, .13], z = -.36, p = .72; random effects: Mr = -.027, 95% CI [-.19, .14], z = -.32, p = 
.75).  Across Studies 1 and 3, mean effects were significant for all relationships between 
experienced emotions and ΔSTAI-S.  Mean ratings of anxiety, fear, and sadness were positively 
associated with ΔSTAI-S, whereas mean amusement was negatively associated with ΔSTAI-S.  
Across Studies 2 and 3, there was a trend in the fixed effects model indicating a positive 
correlation between mean perceived anxiety in target victims and ΔSTAI-S (fixed effects: Mr = 
.17, 95% CI [-.016, .34], z = 1.79, p = .074; random effects: Mr = .17, 95% CI [-.047, .36], z = 
1.53, p = .13).  The mean effect was also significant for the relationship between perceived 
sadness and ΔSTAI-S (see Table S18, Appendix A). 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the relationships between specific dimensions of trait 
empathy, as assessed by the IRI, and experience of vicarious anxiety.  As predicted, the 
Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI demonstrated a similar pattern to perceiving and 
experiencing vicarious anxiety as the General Empathy Scale.  However, the Empathic Concern 
subscale assesses a more specific aspect of empathy than the General Empathy Scale, indicating 
that a tendency to attend to others and feel compassion to those who are suffering is associated 
with experiencing vicarious anxiety when observing others facing threats.  Also as predicted, the 
Personal Distress subscale of the IRI, which was positively associated with trait anxiety, was not 
significantly associated with experience of vicarious anxiety.  While the Fantasy subscale was 
associated with experiencing anxiety from watching the film clips, this relationship did not 
remain significant when controlling for the Empathic Concern subscale, suggesting that the 
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relationship between the Fantasy subscale and experience of anxiety in this task may be due to 
variability that the Fantasy subscale shares with the Empathic Concern subscale.  The 
Perspective Taking subscale was not associated with perceiving or experiencing anxiety, 
indicating that experience of vicarious anxiety is not associated with a cognitive dimension of 
empathy.  We did not find support indicating trait emotional reactivity to be a confound in the 
relationships between trait empathy and experience of anxiety.  
 As hypothesized, the degree of anxiety perceived in target victims facing threats was 
positively associated with the degree of anxiety experienced when observing target victims 
facing threats.  Furthermore, the degree of anxiety perceived in target victims partially mediates 
the relationship between trait empathy/empathic concern and experience of anxiety during the 
task.  A serial mediation analysis provided support for a causal model of vicarious anxiety in 
which trait empathy/empathic concern increases the perception of anxiety in others who are 
facing threats, which in turn induces greater experience of anxiety when observing the targets, 
which leads to sustained anxiety after observing the targets.   
We hypothesized that empathy and vicarious anxiety would be associated with greater 
risk-aversion.  While the General Empathy Scale was not significantly associated with risk-
aversion, trait empathic concern and sustained anxiety after the task were both associated with 
greater risk-aversion after viewing target victims facing threats.  As the Empathic Concern 
subscale specifically assesses the tendency to attend to others in distress, whereas the General 
Empathy Scale assesses the tendency to experience empathic responses to others in both positive 
and negative situations, the additional emphasis of the Empathic Concern subscale on an 
interpersonal response to others in distress may be what drives the relationship with risk-
aversion.  These findings provide initial support for a role of empathy in facilitating defensive 
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responses for threats in the environment through the experience of vicarious anxiety. 
 
Study 4 
 In Study 4, we manipulate state empathy in a between-groups design to demonstrate a 
causal role for empathy in the experience of vicarious anxiety.  We hypothesize that participants 
in an Empathy condition will experience greater vicarious anxiety compared to those in an 
Objective condition.  Participants in the Empathy condition were instructed to take an empathic 
perspective when observing target victims facing threats, whereas participants in the Objective 
condition were instructed to down-regulate state empathy by employing reappraisal-based 
strategies to take an objective, fact-based perspective.  We also hypothesize that participants in 
the Empathy condition will become more risk-averse after watching target victims facing threats 
as compared to participants in the Objective condition.  In addition, we investigate how 
decreasing state empathy impacts the relationship between trait empathy and experience of 
vicarious anxiety.  To assess protracted effects of empathy on the experience of vicarious 
anxiety, follow-up measures were administered the next day, including a measure that assessed 
self-reported sleep disruption during the previous night.  In a clinical context, sleep disturbances 
are commonly reported by individuals who have or are experiencing trauma, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (Benca, Obermeyer, Thisted, & Gillin, 1992; 
Briere & Runtz, 1989; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2009).  We hypothesized that those in the 
Empathy condition would experience greater sleep disruption than those in the Objective 






Participants. One hundred and two participants were recruited from the Columbia 
University community, for a target recruitment number of 100 participants (for 50 participants 
each in the Empathy and Objective conditions).  Two participants did not complete the study.  
One of these participants had been uncomfortable viewing the film clips and decided to end the 
study early, the other participant had exceeded the time limit allowed to complete the study and 
had not completed the main experimental tasks.  The target recruitment number of 50 
participants for each condition was determined prior to running the study and was based off of a 
recommended sample size guideline of at least 50 participants in each condition for a between 
groups design, when the expected effect size of the results are unknown (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2013).  An a priori power analysis was not conducted to determine the sample size 
for this study, as the differences in design for the current study from the prior studies would 
make estimating the effect size of our results based off of findings from the prior studies 
unjustified. 
In the Empathy condition, there were 17 males and 33 females (MAge = 21.3 years, SD = 
7.66, range = 18-64).  In the Objective condition, there were 20 males and 30 females (MAge = 
21.6 years, SD = 4.94, range = 18-37).  Participants received either course credits or $17 for 
completing the entire study, including the follow-up questionnaire administered the next day.  
All participants received an additional $3 reward for one of the tasks in the study.  One 
participant did not complete the follow-up questionnaire. 
 Materials and procedures. Participants were assigned to either the Empathy or 
Objective condition in counterbalanced order.  Upon arriving at the lab, participants were 
informed that the study involved a task in which they would watch clips from horror movies and 
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other similar types of sources.  After consenting to participate in this study, participants 
completed questionnaires on a computer outside of the testing room that assessed individual 
differences and demographics including the STAI-T, STAI-SPre-Task, IRI, BEQ, and 
DOSPERTPre-Task (see Table S2 in Appendix A for descriptive statistics on the measures 
collected).  Participants also completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ).  The ERQ 
was administered to assess participants’ scores on the Reappraisal subscale, which measures the 
dispositional tendency to use cognitive reappraisal to regulate one’s emotions in daily life 
(example item, “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about 
the situation”) (Gross & John, 2003).  To further assess trait emotional reactivity as a confound 
in our results, participants completed the Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS), a 21-item measure 
that assesses the degree to which participants report sensitivity to, and intensity and persistence 
of emotional experiences (example item, “I tend to get very emotional very easily”) (Nock, 
Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008).   
After completing the questionnaires, participants entered a testing room in which the 
experimenter trained them on the experimental task.  Depending on the condition that the 
participant was in, the participant underwent training procedures that instructed them to view the 
clips from either an empathic or objective perspective.  Instructions for the Empathy condition 
were partly based on wording from items on the General Empathy Scale questionnaire (which 
was not administered in this study).  Instructions for the Objective condition were based off of 
similar protocols in prior studies implementing cognitive reappraisal strategies (Denny & 
Ochsner, 2014; Silvers et al., 2015).  In the Empathy condition, participants were given the 
following instructions: 
In the following clips, please try to imagine yourself as the main character or 
victim in each scene.  Try to immerse yourself in the situation that the person 
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depicted is in and be thoughtful of that person’s feelings.  Imagine what it feels 
like to experience what is happening to the person depicted. Tune in to the 
emotions of this person, and try to let yourself feel deeply what the person is 
feeling. 
 
In the Objective condition, participants were give the following instructions: 
In the following clips, please try to remember that these scenes are from movies, 
so the characters depicted are not actually experiencing the emotions that they are 
expressing.  Try to focus on the facts of the scenes instead of the emotions 
expressed by the characters in them.  Don’t give too much thought to the feelings 
of the person depicted.  Be as objective as possible about what is happening to the 
person. Remember that this person is acting, so don’t get carried away by the 
emotions they are expressing. 
 
After receiving these instructions, participants practiced taking the respective perspective by 
watching two film clips and verbally describing the perspective they took after watching each 
clip to the experimenter.  
 After completing the training session, participants completed the experimental task in 
which they watched 15 of the film clips used in Study 3.  Only 15 clips were used due to time 
constraints, and the clips were selected to be the ones inducing the greatest degree of anxiety in 
the prior studies (see Table S3 and Figure S1, Appendix A).  The clips were presented in random 
order across participants.  After each clip, participants rated the following emotions based on the 
degree to which they experienced them while watching the clips, and the degree to which they 
perceived the emotions to be expressed by the victim depicted in each scene: anxiety, sadness, 
calm, and amusement (1=Not at all, 5=Somewhat, 9=Extremely).  The order in which the 
emotion categories were presented and rated was random on every trial.  Ratings for experienced 
and perceived emotions were blocked together, and the order by which experienced or perceived 
emotions were rated first was randomly ordered on every trial.  After completing the emotion 
ratings, participants also rated how much they were able to empathize or take an objective view, 
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depending on the respective condition (1=Not at all, 5=Somewhat, 9=Extremely, see Table S7 in 
Appendix A for instructions given to participants).  After completing this task, participants were 
taken out of the testing room to complete a few questionnaires including the STAI-S Post-Task and 
DOSPERTPost-Task to assess changes on these measures after viewing the clips. 
 After completing these questionnaires, participants returned to the testing room and 
completed the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In this task, participants were instructed to 
blow up a balloon presented on the computer screen by pressing a key on the keyboard.  In each 
trial of this task, participants earned three points for every successful pump they made without 
the balloon exploding.  However, with every press, participants risked the balloon exploding, 
upon which zero points would be received for that trial.  The average break point across trials for 
which the balloon exploded was 64 pumps.  Participants were informed that they would receive a 
monetary reward depending on the average number of points they earned across trials.  Fifteen 
trials were administered on this task, which has been determined to be sufficient for reliable 
results (Lejuez et al., 2002).  All participants received a $3 reward for this task at the end of the 
study.  The lab-based portion of this study took about an hour to complete. 
 On the following morning after participants watched the film clips, a follow-up 
questionnaire was sent by email to assess emotional and behavioral differences between groups 
in the time period after watching the video clips.  For a list of all measures in the follow-up 
questionnaire, see Table S8 (Appendix A). 
 
Results 
Perspective ability. To establish construct validity for the tasks in the Empathy and 
Objective conditions, correlations were performed between mean ratings of perspective ability 
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averaged across trials, the IRI subscales, and the Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ.  We expected 
perspective ability to be positively associated with the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI in 
the Empathy condition, and to be positively associated with the Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ 
in the Objective condition.  In the Empathy condition, mean perspective ability (M = 6.12, SD = 
1.33) was associated with the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI at trend level (rs = .25, 95% 
CI [-.032, .49], p = .081).  This relationship was significant in a partial correlation controlling for 
age and gender (r = .41, 95% CI [.14, .62], p = .004).  Mean perspective ability was not 
significantly associated with any of the other subscales of the IRI (Personal Distress: rs = -.031, 
95% CI [-.31, .25], p = .83; Fantasy: rs = .078, 95% CI [-.20, .35], p = .59; Perspective Taking: rs 
= .16, 95% CI [-.13, .42], p = .28), and was not associated with the Reappraisal subscale of the 
ERQ (rs = .092, 95% CI [-.19, .36], p = .53). 
In the Objective condition, mean perspective ability (M = 7.20, SD = 1.05) was correlated 
with the Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ (r = .30, 95% CI [.021, .53], p = .036), but was not 
significantly correlated with any of the subscales of the IRI (Empathic Concern: r = -.23, 95% CI 
[-.47, .056], p = .11; Personal Distress: r = -.12, 95% CI [-.38, .16], p = .41; Fantasy: r = -.040, 
95% CI [-.32, .24], p = .78; Perspective Taking: r = .21, 95% CI [-.073, .46], p = .14).  
Effect of condition on experienced emotions.  The following analyses pertain to 
participants’ own emotions. 
Emotion ratings for self.  All means for ratings across emotions categories were 
significantly different between the Empathy and Objective conditions (all independent samples t-
tests in this manuscript are performed with Welch’s t-test for unequal variances. See Table S19 
in Appendix A for descriptive and test statistics). Mean anxiety was greater in the Empathy 
condition (M = 6.69, SD = 1.38) than in the Objective condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.70; MDiff = 
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2.43, 95% CI [1.82, 3.05], t(94.05) = 7.85, p < .001, d = 1.58), as was the case with sadness.  
Mean calm and amusement ratings were greater in the Objective condition than in the Empathy 
condition (see Figure 4a). 
In the Empathy condition, participants rated anxiety to be the emotion most greatly 
experienced, a pattern consistent with the prior studies.  A repeated measures ANOVA 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the means for the four 
emotion categories (F(2.08, 101.93) = 79.53, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (applied to p-values and confidence intervals) indicated that 
mean anxiety was greater than the means for all other emotion categories (MAnxiety-Sadness = 3.75, 
95% CI [2.93, 4.57], p < .001; MAnxiety-Calm = 3.65, 95% CI [2.57, 4.72], p < .001; MAnxiety-
Amusement = 4.59, 95% CI [3.57, 5.60], p < .001). 
In the Objective condition, a different pattern from prior studies was seen in which 
anxiety was not the emotion most greatly experienced (see Figure 2.4a).  A repeated measures 
ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the means 
for the four emotion categories (F(1.98, 96.90) = 37.72, p < .001).  However, post-hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (applied to p-values and confidence intervals) 
indicated that mean anxiety was only greater than the mean of ratings for sadness (MAnxiety-Sadness 
= 2.29, 95% CI [1.73, 2.85], p < .001).  Mean anxiety ratings were marginally less than mean 
ratings for calm (MAnxiety-Calm = -1.24, 95% CI [-2.49, .011], p = .053,) and were not significantly 
different from mean ratings of amusement (MAnxiety-Amusement = .71, 95% CI [-.27, 1.68], p = .31). 
Trait empathic concern and experience of anxiety during the task.  To understand the 
impact of down-regulating state empathy on the relationship between trait empathy and 
experience of vicarious anxiety, we tested the condition that participants were in as a moderator 
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in the relationship between trait empathic concern and mean ratings of experienced anxiety.  The 
condition participants were in significantly moderated the relationship between the Empathic 
Concern subscale of the IRI and mean ratings of experienced anxiety during the task (ΔR2 = 
.026, F(1, 96) = 4.42, p = .038).  In the Empathy condition, a similar pattern as in prior studies 
was seen in the relationship between trait empathy and experienced anxiety.  The Empathic 
Concern subscale of the IRI was positively associated with mean ratings of experienced anxiety 
(rs = .31, 95% CI [.038, .54], p = .027).  This relationship remained significant when controlling 
for ERS and IS (r = .48, 95% CI [.22, .67], p = .001).  No other subscales of the IRI were 
significantly associated with mean experienced anxiety.  In the Empathy condition, the Empathic 
Concern subscale was also negatively associated with mean ratings of experienced calm (rs = -
.30, 95% CI [-.54, -.028], p = .032), and was not significantly associated with mean ratings of 
experienced sadness (rs = -.032, 95% CI [-.31, .25], p = .83) or amusement (rs = -.20, 95% CI [-
.45, .083], p = .16).  
In the Objective condition, the Empathic Concern subscale was not associated with mean 
ratings of experienced anxiety (r = .001, 95% CI [-.28, .28], p = .99).  This suggests that down-
regulating state empathy diminishes the impact that dispositional empathy has on experiencing 
vicarious anxiety (see Figure 2.5).  In this condition, the Empathic Concern subscale was 
associated with mean sadness (rs = .29, 95% CI [.016, .53], p = .039), and was not significantly 
associated with mean ratings of calm (rs = -.19, 95% CI [-.44, .093], p = .19) or amusement (rs = 
.16, 95% CI [-.13, .42], p = .28).   
Sustained anxiety after the task.  In the Empathy condition, STAI-SPost-task (MSum = 
46.18, SD = 10.09) was greater than STAI-SPre-task (MSum = 39.42, SD = 11.71; MDiff  = 6.76, 95% 
CI [3.52, 10.00], t(49) = 4.19, p < .001, dz = .59).  In the Objective condition, STAI-SPost-task (M = 
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41.46, SD = 10.88) was also greater than STAI-SPre-task (M = 37.62, SD = 11.05; MDiff  = 3.84, 
95% CI [.77, 6.91], t(49) = 2.52, p = .015, dz = .36).   
The mean for STAI-SPost-task was greater in the Empathy condition than in the Objective 
condition, as indicated in a between-subjects t-test (MDiff  = 4.72, 95% CI [.56, 8.88], t(97.46) = 
2.25, p = .027, d = .45).  However, ΔSTAI-S was not significantly different between conditions 
(MDiff  = 2.92, 95% CI [-1.49, 7.33], t(97.70) = 1.32, p = .19, d = .26).  In a multiple mediation 
analysis, significant indirect effects were found in the relationship between condition and 
ΔSTAI-S both through mean ratings of anxiety (which had a positive effect) and sadness (which 
had a negative effect).  The opposing directions of these effects may account for the lack of a 
total effect between condition and ΔSTAI-S (see Appendix A for analyses) (Hayes, 2009; Shrout 
& Bolger, 2002).   
Effect of condition on perceived emotions in target victims.  As predicted, anxiety was 
perceived to be more greatly experienced by target victims in the Empathy condition (M = 8.15, 
SD = .59) than in the Objective condition (M = 7.57, SD = 1.41; MDiff = .57, 95% CI [.14, 1.01], 
t(65.39) = 2.66, p = .010, d = .54).  Mean perceived calm was greater in the Objective condition 
than in the Empathy condition.  There were no significant differences in ratings for perceived 
emotions between the two conditions for sadness and amusement (see Figure 2.4a and Table S19 
in Appendix A for descriptive and test statistics).  In both the Empathy and Objective conditions, 
participants rated perceived emotions for victims in a pattern consistent with the prior studies.  
Anxiety was the most greatly perceived emotion in both conditions.  For the Empathy condition, 
a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference 
amongst the means for the four emotion categories (F(1.81, 88.74) = 403.48, p < .001) and post-
hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (applied to p-values and 
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confidence intervals) indicated that mean anxiety was greater than the means for all other 
emotion categories (MAnxiety-Sadness = 4.31, 95% CI [3.56, 5.06], p < .001; MAnxiety-Calm = 6.11, 95% 
CI [5.62, 6.60], p < .001; MAnxiety-Amusement = 6.82, 95% CI [6.41, 7.24], p < .001).  For the 
Objective condition, a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a 
significant difference amongst the means for the four emotion categories (F(2.34, 114.80) = 
136.67, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
(applied to p-values and confidence intervals) indicated that mean anxiety (M = 7.57, SD = 1.41) 
was greater than the means for all other emotion categories (MAnxiety-Sadness = 3.74, 95% CI [3.08, 
4.40], p < .001; MAnxiety-Calm = 5.02, 95% CI [4.07, 5.98], p < .001; MAnxiety-Amusement = 5.81, 95% 
CI [4.82, 6.80], p < .001). 
Effect of condition on relationships between perceived and experienced emotions. 
Perception of anxiety in target victims and experience of anxiety during the task.  In the 
Empathy condition, mean perceived anxiety in target victims was positively associated with 
mean experienced anxiety (rs = .51, 95% CI [.27, .69], p < .001), negatively associated with 
mean ratings of experienced calm (rs = -.53, 95% CI [-.70, -.29], p < .001) and amusement (rs = -
.32, 95% CI [-.55, -.041], p = .025), and was not associated with mean experienced sadness (rs = 
.10, 95% CI [-.18, .37], p = .49).  However, in the Objective condition, mean perceived anxiety 
was not significantly associated with any of the means for experienced emotions.  See Table 2.3 
for correlations between all perceived and experienced emotions in the Empathy and Objective 
conditions. 
Perception of anxiety in target victims mediates the relationship between condition and 
experience of anxiety during the task. To test a causal model in which increasing state empathy 
leads to greater perception of anxiety in target victims, which in turn causes experience of 
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vicarious anxiety during the task, a mediation analysis was conducted to assess mean perceived 
anxiety as a mediator in the relationship between condition and mean ratings of experienced 
anxiety.  Consistent with the mediation results in Study 3 for the relationship between trait 
empathy and experience of vicarious anxiety, mean perceived anxiety partially mediated the 
relationship between condition (1 = Empathy condition, 0 = Objective condition) and mean 
experienced anxiety (ab = .18, SE = .090, 95% CI [.039, .39]; c = 2.43, SE = .31, t = 7.85, p < 
.001; c’ = 2.26, SE = .32, t = 7.16, p < .001).  This relationship was unchanged when controlling 
for the Impulse Strength subscale and ERS (ab = .16, SE = .090, 95% CI [.028, .39]; c = 2.43, SE 
= .31, t = 7.86, p < .001; c’ = 2.27, SE = .32, t = 7.15, p < .001).   
To test for specificity of perceived anxiety as a mediator between condition and mean 
experienced anxiety, a multiple mediation model was tested with mean perceived anxiety and 
mean perceived sadness as parallel mediators.  While mean perceived anxiety significantly 
mediated the relationship between condition and mean experienced anxiety, mean perceived 
sadness did not (see Figure 2.4b).  These patterns indicate a certain level of specificity amongst 
the negative emotions assessed for a mediating role of perceived anxiety in the relationship 
between empathy and experiencing anxiety.  However, the results are tentative in supporting this 
model, as the indirect effect of perceived anxiety is a relatively small percentage (7.8%) of the 
total effect between condition and experience of anxiety.  As in Study 3, an indirect effect was 
also seen in a reverse mediation analysis in which mean experienced anxiety was tested as a 
mediator in the relationship between condition and mean perceived anxiety (ab = .36, SE = .15, 





Figure 2.4. Results from Study 4 (n = 100).  a) Mean ratings for emotions experienced by 
participants during the task and perceived in target victims.  Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals for the means.  b) Diagram illustrating the indirect effects of perceived anxiety and 
		
71	
perceived sadness on the relationship between condition type and experienced anxiety during the 
task in a multiple mediation model.  Mean perceived anxiety partially mediates the relationship 
between condition type and experienced anxiety during the task, whereas mean perceived 
sadness does not.  Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed with the standard error in 






Figure 2.5. Results from Study 4 (n = 100).  Scatterplots of raw data with lines representing the 
linear best fit for the relationships between the Empathic Concern subscale and mean ratings of 
experienced anxiety in the Empathy condition (solid line: rs = .31, p = .027) and Objective 
condition (dotted line: r = .001, p = .99).  Bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the 







Notes. Coefficients in bold represent correlations significant at trend level (p ≤ .10). *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001 
 
 
Serial mediation. As in Study 3, we conducted a serial mediation analysis to test the 
effect of perceived and experienced anxiety as multiple sequential mediators in the indirect 
relationship between condition and sustained anxiety after the task (X = condition, M1 = mean 
perceived anxiety in target victims, M2 = mean experienced anxiety during the task, Y = ΔSTAI-
S).  The indirect effect for this model was significant through the adb pathway (adb = .43, SE = 
.24, 95% CI [.10, 1.10]; c = 2.92, SE = 2.22, t = 1.32, p = .19; c’ = -2.14, SE = 2.69, t = -.79, p = 
.43).   In contrast, reversing the sequence of the mediators (M1 = mean experienced anxiety, M2 = 
mean perceived anxiety in target victims) did not result in a significant indirect effect through the 
adb pathway for the relationship between condition and ΔSTAI-S (adb = -.58, SE = .52, 95% CI 
Correlations Between Mean Perceived and Experienced Emotions in Study 4 (n = 100) 
 Target Victims’ Emotions 
Own Emotions Anxiety Sadness Calm Amusement 
Empathy Condition 
Anxiety .51*** -.17 -.54***  -.34* 
Sadness .10 .80*** -.15 .31* 
Calm -.53*** .20 .62***  .33* 
Amusement -.32* .44*** .25 .60*** 
Objective Condition 
Anxiety .10 .07 -.04 .10 
Sadness .05 .41** -.03 .51*** 
Calm -.09 -.14 .15 -.18 
Amusement -.04 .29* -.02 .50*** 
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[-2.00, .16]).  As in Study 3, this was due to the b path being insignificant between perceived 
anxiety and ΔSTAI-S. 
Effect of condition on threat responses.   
Changes in risk-aversion.  To assess changes in risk-aversion within the two conditions, 
separate paired t-tests were conducted on the mean DOSPERT scores before and after watching 
the video clips for the two groups.  In the Empathy condition, DOSPERTPost-Task (MSum = 41.64, 
SD = 13.82) was significantly lower than DOSPERTPre-Task (MSum = 43.90, SD = 13.03; MDiff  = -
2.26, 95% CI [-3.59, -.93], t(49) = -3.42, p = .001, dz = -.48).  However, in the Objective 
condition, DOSPERTPost-Task (MSum = 44.12, SD = 13.34) was not significantly lower than 
DOSPERTPre-Task (MSum = 44.92, SD = 12.72; MDiff  = -.80, 95% CI [-1.99, .39], t(49) = -1.35, p = 
.18, dz = -.19, see Figure 2.6a).  An independent samples t-test demonstrated that ΔDOSPERT 
was not significantly different between the Empathy and Objective conditions (MDiff  = -1.46, 
95% CI [-3.22, .30], t(96.79) = -1.65, p = .10, d = .33).  As we had a directional hypothesis 
predicting that participants would experience greater risk-aversion after the task in the Empathy 
condition, we also conducted a one-tailed test, which indicated that participants in the Empathy 
condition had a marginally significant greater decrease in DOSPERT scores than participants in 
the Objective condition (95% CI [-∞, .013], p = .052). 
Performance on the BART task was calculated by assessing the average number of 
pumps made on trials in which the balloon did not explode (Lejuez et al., 2002).  There was no 
difference between conditions on BART performance as indicated by an independent samples t-
test between the Empathy condition (M = 32.69, SD = 14.00) and Objective condition (M = 
34.43, SD = 13.04; MDiff = -1.75, 95% CI [-7.12, 3.63], t(97.51) = -.64, p = .52, d = .13).  As the 
BART measured risk-taking in the context of earning a monetary reward, the lack of difference 
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in performance between groups may be due to empathy facilitating risk-aversion for domain 
specific threats in the environment akin to threats that targets are observed to face.  The effect of 
vicarious anxiety on risk-aversion in the context of observing others facing physical threats may 
be specific to scenarios that present physical threat or harm to oneself, as is assessed by the items 
on the DOSPERT.  
Indirect effect of condition on risk-aversion through experience of anxiety.  To assess a 
causal model in which taking an empathic perspective increases experience of anxiety when 
observing others facing threat, which in turn increases risk-aversion, mean experienced anxiety 
during the task was tested as a mediator in the relationship between condition and ΔDOSPERT.  
There was a significant indirect effect of condition on ΔDOSPERT, through mean experienced 
anxiety (see Figure 2.6b).  This relationship remained significant when controlling for the 
Impulse Strength subscale and ERS (ab = -1.92, SE = .74, 95% CI [-3.53, -.59]; c = -1.37, SE = 
.87, t = -1.58, p = .12; c’ = .54, SE = 1.08, t = .50, p = .62).  In a multiple mediation model with 
mean experienced anxiety and mean sadness as parallel mediators in the relationship between 
condition and ΔDOSPERT, mean anxiety was a significant mediator in this relationship (ab = -
2.33, SE = .84, 95% CI [-4.26, -.88]), whereas mean sadness was not (ab = .35, SE = .36, 95% CI 
[-.23, 1.25]).   
Sleep disruption.  We tested three predictions about the ways that experiencing vicarious 
anxiety could have a protracted impact on experiencing sleep disruption, a symptom of anxiety 
and trauma, after watching the film clips.  First, because taking an empathic perspective led to 
greater experience of vicarious anxiety as compared to taking an objective perspective with 
reappraisal-based strategies, we expected that participants in the Empathic condition would 
experience greater sleep disruption than those in the Objective condition.  We address this 
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prediction with four items adapted from the Trauma Symptom Checklist, which asked 
participants to rate on a 4 pt. Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = A lot, 4 = 
Extremely,) how much they experienced the following during the past night: insomnia, restless 
sleep, nightmares, and early morning awakening.  As expected, participants in the Empathy 
condition reported greater sleep disruption (MSum = 6.02, SD = 2.38) than participants in the 
Objective condition (M Sum = 4.94, SD = 1.41; MDiff  = 1.08, 95% CI [.30, 1.86], t(77.63) = 2.75, p 
= .007, d = .55).   
Second, if decreasing empathy by employing reappraisal-based strategies reduces 
experience of vicarious anxiety, we expect those in the Empathy condition to be able to reduce 
the effects of vicarious anxiety on sleep disruption if they habitually use cognitive reappraisal 
strategies to cope with distressing emotions.  In support of this prediction, we found that the 
condition participants were in significantly moderated the relationship between trait reappraisal, 
as assessed by the Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ prior to watching the film clips, and sleep 
disruption across all subjects (ΔR2 = .042, F(1, 95) = 4.54, p = .036).  For participants in the 
Empathy condition, trait reappraisal was negatively associated with experiencing sleep 
disruption (rs = -.31, 95% CI [-.54, -.034], p = .031).  However, there was no relationship 
between trait reappraisal and sleep disruption for participants in the Objective condition (rs = 
.026, 95% CI [-.25, .30], p = .86).  This may be because participants in the Objective condition 
had been instructed to use reappraisal-based strategies while watching the film clips, and doing 
so at the time of exposure to the stimuli eliminates the impact of trait reappraisal on protracted 
effects of experiencing vicarious anxiety.   
Third, if experience of vicarious anxiety is what leads to experiencing sleep disruption, 
then we would expect that measures of anxiety assessed in the 24 hours after watching the film 
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clips should be associated with the magnitude of sleep disruption reported.  Across all 
participants we found that this was the case.  The degree of sleep disruption reported was 
positively associated with single-item measures on the follow-up questionnaire that assessed how 
much anxiety the participant experienced in the 24 hours after watching the film clips (rs = .34, 
95% CI [.070, .57], p < .001), and how much the participant thought of the images in the film 
clips during this time (rs = .42, 95% CI [.16, .62], p < .001) (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = 
Extremely).  The degree of self-reported sleep disruption was also associated with the STAI-S 
measure administered in the follow-up questionnaire, when controlling for STAI-SPre-Task (r = 
.27, 95% CI [.099, .44], p = .007).  
Replications of findings from Study 3.  Replication analyses indicated that when 
collapsing data across both conditions, DOSPERTPost-Task scores, when controlling for 
DOSPERTPre-Task scores, were negatively associated with the Empathic Concern subscale, STAI-
SPost-Task, and ΔSTAI-S.  DOSPERTPost-Task scores were not associated with the other subscales of 
the IRI or with STAI-SPre-Task (see Appendix A for analyses). 
 
Discussion 
In this study, state empathy was manipulated in a between groups design to establish a 
causal role for empathy in the experience of vicarious anxiety and its sustained effects.  An 
additional aim was to investigate the impact of down-regulating state empathy on the 
relationship between trait empathic concern and vicarious anxiety.  As expected, participants in 
the Empathy condition rated anxiety to be the emotion most strongly experienced.  This was not 
the case in the Objective condition, as experience of anxiety significantly decreased while 





Figure 2.6. Results from Study 4 (n = 100).  a) Bar graph of mean change (Post-task – Pre-task) 
in DOSPERT scores (with lower scores indicating greater risk-aversion) after viewing film clips 
depicting target victims facing threats in the Empathy and Objective conditions.  Paired t-tests 
performed for each condition indicated that DOSPERT scores decreased in the Empathy 
condition after viewing the film clips (MDiff  = -2.26, t(49) = -3.42, p = .001, 95% CI [-3.59, -
.93]), whereas DOSPERT scores in the Objective condition did not (MDiff  = -.80, t(49) = -1.35, p 
= .18, 95% CI [-1.99, .39]).  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the means.  b) 
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Diagram illustrating the indirect effect of mean ratings of experienced anxiety during the task on 
the relationship between condition type and change in DOSPERT scores after the task.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed with the standard error in parentheses. **p 
≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001 
 
 
anxiety to be the greatest emotion experienced by target victims, and as predicted, anxiety was 
perceived to be experienced less by targets in the Objective condition.  Mean perceived anxiety 
partially mediated the relationship between condition and experience of anxiety during the task, 
whereas support was not found for a mediating effect of mean perceived sadness in this 
relationship.  As in Study 3, a serial mediation analysis provided support for a causal model in 
which greater empathy leads to increased perception of anxiety in target victims, which in turn 
leads to greater experience of anxiety during the task and consequently, sustained anxiety after 
the task.   
As with findings from Study 3, trait empathic concern was associated with experiencing 
anxiety during the task in the Empathy condition.  However, this relationship was diminished by 
down-regulating state empathy in the Objective condition.  A moderation analysis indicated a 
differential effect of trait empathic concern on experiencing vicarious anxiety during the task, 
depending on condition.  In addition, there was no significant association between perceiving 
anxiety in others and experiencing anxiety when down-regulating state empathy, a relationship 
that was seen in Study 3 and in the Empathy condition of this study.  These findings indicate that 
regulating state empathy by using reappraisal-based strategies can disrupt the relationships seen 
in the previous studies between dispositional empathy and experiencing vicarious anxiety.  
As predicted, participants in the Empathy condition experienced greater anxiety-related 
defensive responses.  Consistent with the patterns of correlational findings from Study 3, 
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participants in the Empathy condition became more risk-averse after observing target victims, as 
demonstrated by decreased ratings on the DOSPERT subscales after observing targets facing 
threats.  Participants in the Objective condition did not show a change in risk-aversion after 
observing target victims.  A mediation analysis indicated an indirect effect of condition on risk-
aversion, through anxiety experienced during the task.  This effect supports a causal model in 
which increased state empathy leads to greater experience of vicarious anxiety, which in turn 
leads to greater risk-aversion.  Changes in risk-aversion were not seen with the BART task, 
which measures risk-taking in the context of seeking rewards, suggesting that risk-aversion 
experienced from empathy and vicarious anxiety in the context of this study is domain specific 
for activities that pose risk to one’s health and physical safety.  Protracted effects from taking an 
empathic perspective and experiencing vicarious anxiety were seen in a follow-up measure 
assessed the next day.  Participants in the Empathy condition reported greater sleep disruption 
during the night following the lab task as compared to participants in the Objective condition.  
However, a moderation analysis indicated that for those in the Empathy condition, the 
dispositional tendency to use reappraisal strategies to regulate emotions mitigated the effects of 
empathy and experiencing vicarious anxiety on sleep disruption.  
The impact of down-regulating empathy had a stronger effect in reducing experienced 
anxiety during the task than for perceiving anxiety in the target victims.  As our proposed 
mechanistic model for vicarious anxiety involves perceiving anxiety as a cause of experiencing 
anxiety, this pattern is unexpected.  A potential reason for a stronger effect of empathy on 
experienced anxiety than perceived anxiety may be due to the measurement of perceived anxiety 
in our studies.  Throughout our studies, participants consistently perceived target victims in the 
film clips to experience a high degree of anxiety, with mean ratings of perceived anxiety near the 
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ceiling of the scale.  As the actors playing the target victims in the film clips are highly 
expressive, this finding is unsurprising.  It may be that a ceiling effect artificially limits the 
degree to which perceived anxiety is rated in the Empathy condition, and as a consequence, 
seemingly limits the impact of down-regulating empathy on perceived anxiety in the Objective 
condition.  As such, it may be that empathy would demonstrate a stronger relationship with 
perceived anxiety in targets facing threats if the targets’ expressed anxiety were more 
ambiguous, as this would allow more variability in judgments of perceived anxiety. 
 
General Discussion 
 In four studies, we investigated the role of empathy in experiencing vicarious anxiety.  In 
Study 1, we demonstrated that a general measure of trait emotional empathy is associated with 
experiencing anxiety when observing target victims facing threats.  Support was not found for a 
significant relationship between trait anxiety and experience of anxiety from the task.  Trait 
empathy was associated with both ratings of experienced anxiety while watching target victims, 
and with sustained anxiety measured by changes in the STAI-S, a general measure of state 
anxiety, after observing target victims.  Anxiety ratings during the task mediated the relationship 
between trait empathy and experience of sustained anxiety after the task, indicating that anxiety 
is specific to some degree in driving the relationship between trait empathy and sustained 
changes on the STAI-S measure.  Study 2 demonstrated that trait emotional empathy is 
associated with perceiving greater anxiety to be experienced by target victims facing threats.  
This provides some support for interpersonal processes underlying the experience of vicarious 
anxiety.  Study 3 demonstrated that the relationships found in Studies 1 and 2 extended beyond a 
general measure of trait empathy to trait empathic concern, the tendency to feel concern and 
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compassion towards others in distress.  This further supports a model of vicarious anxiety 
involving interpersonal responses where one is attuned to others in distress.  Support was found 
for a mechanistic model in which trait empathy and empathic concern leads to greater perception 
of anxiety in target victims, which in turn leads to greater experience of vicarious anxiety.  In 
beginning to investigate the function and effects of experiencing vicarious anxiety, we 
demonstrated that trait empathic concern and vicarious anxiety is correlated with decreased risk-
taking after observing target victims facing threats.  Study 4 established a causal role for 
empathy in the experience of vicarious anxiety by manipulating state empathy.  We 
demonstrated that taking an empathic perspective increased perception of anxiety in target 
victims, experience of vicarious anxiety, and sustained effects of anxiety such as risk-aversion 
and sleep disruption. Conversely, reducing state empathy by employing a cognitive reappraisal 
strategy diminishes the experience and effects of vicarious anxiety, as well as the impact of trait 
empathy on experience of vicarious anxiety.    
Together, these studies map the phenomenon of vicarious anxiety by delineating a role 
for empathy in the experience of vicarious anxiety, and investigating the functions and protracted 
effects of experiencing vicarious anxiety.  While much prior research has conceptualized anxiety 
as a response to a potential or approaching threat, the association between empathy and vicarious 
anxiety indicates that the role of interpersonal processes and one’s social environment should be 
considered as important factors in experiencing anxiety.  Our research also has implications for 
understanding the role of empathy in social learning.  While the functional role of empathy has 
been commonly thought of as one that facilitates prosocial behaviors (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 
1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), empathy may also have a critical role in facilitating the social 
transmission of emotions that engender defensive responses.  Through facilitating the vicarious 
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experience of defensive emotions such as anxiety, empathy may play an important role in how 
we learn about threats in our environment through the emotions of others.   
While we found some support for trait empathy being specifically associated with the 
experience of anxiety and fear, we were not able to differentiate ratings of experienced and 
perceived anxiety from fear.  As fear was perceived to be the greatest emotion experienced by 
target victims in Studies 2 and 3, the inability to dissociate anxiety from fear may be likely due 
to the fact that targets expressed both anxiety and fear to a high degree.  Importantly, in the 
context of our study, these findings do not contradict a role for empathy in the vicarious 
experience of emotions similar in their functional role of facilitating defensive responses to 
threats.  Empathy and experience of vicarious anxiety were associated with greater risk-aversion, 
a defensive response associated with experiencing anxiety.  As demonstrated in Studies 1 and 2, 
trait empathy was not associated with other high arousal negative emotions, such as anger, which 
is an emotion associated with an opposing functional pattern to fear and anxiety in facilitating 
risk-seeking behavior (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  As we did not find consistent support for a 
confounding role of high arousal negative emotions in the relationships between trait empathy 
and anxiety, the effect of empathy on experiencing vicarious emotions in the context of our 
studies seems to be primarily specific to anxiety and fear, and the possibility of other emotions 
similar to anxiety with respect to having a functional role of avoiding threats.   
It may be the case that if targets were primarily expressing another kind of emotion (e.g., 
sadness), empathy would demonstrate specificity in inducing the same emotion in a perceiver.  
However, as different emotions have different underlying appraisal patterns and functions (Smith 
& Lazarus, 1993), we would expect the vicarious experience of different emotions to result in 
sustained effects that are congruent with the functions of the emotion elicited.  For example, as 
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sadness is associated with appraisals of experiencing loss (Smith & Lazarus, 1993), it may serve 
a specific social function of eliciting emotional support from others.  Thus, a speculative 
hypothesis may be that vicarious experience of sadness is more effective in promoting prosocial 
behaviors in an observer than the vicarious experience of anxiety.  It may also be the case that 
emotions serving defensive functions, such as anxiety, are more prone to being transmitted 
vicariously.  This may be the case, as a selective capacity for vicariously experiencing emotions 
with defensive functions may promote one’s chances for survival in an evolutionary context.  
Future research may investigate the susceptibility and functions of vicariously experiencing a 
wider range of emotions. 
While it is possible that a third variable drives the relationship between trait empathy and 
anxiety, we did not find support for this with perhaps the most probable trait measures to have 
been associated with vicarious anxiety.  We did not find trait emotional reactivity to be a 
confound in our results, indicating that the vicarious experience of anxiety is not due to a 
tendency to generally experience emotions more strongly.  The predisposition to experience 
anxiety and personal distress was not positively associated with the experience of anxiety while 
watching target victims facing threats.  Similarly, state anxiety prior to the task, as measured by 
the STAI-SPre-Task measure, also was not positively associated with experience of vicarious 
anxiety (reported in Appendix A).  These measures were not positively associated with 
perceiving anxiety in the target victims or with sustained anxiety after observing the targets.  A 
potential explanation for this pattern may be that empathy involves controlled processes capable 
of being disrupted by stress or cognitive load (Gu & Han, 2007; Hodges & Wegner, 1997; 
Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012; Zaki, 2014).  As prior work has demonstrated a 
relationship between trait anxiety and dysfunction in regulatory control (Bishop, 2008), trait and 
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state levels of distress may interfere with empathic processes and render one less susceptible to 
experiencing vicarious anxiety in response to witnessing anxiety in others.  Future research will 
be needed to further investigate the systems underlying vicarious anxiety and the role of trait 
anxiety in relationship to it.   
Our findings have implications for many who are commonly exposed to depictions of 
threat in their everyday lives.  Notably, much of the general population faces such exposure from 
popular media sources.  Our stimulus set was constructed to reflect such depictions of threat in 
the media, both fictional and non-fictional in nature.  If highly empathic individuals are more 
susceptible to experiencing vicarious anxiety, such chronic exposure to footage of others facing 
threats may be particularly detrimental to the well being of these individuals.  Awareness of how 
empathy may predispose one to experience vicarious anxiety may encourage those who are most 
affected to adopt effective coping strategies and regulate exposure to such depictions of threat.  
Adapting basic models of anxiety to account for social and empathic processes may inform our 
understanding of different pathways that lead to experiencing anxiety and promote targeted 























SOCIAL EMOTION REGULATION STRATEGIES ARE DIFFERENTIALLY HELPFUL 













How we respond to challenging events and dilemmas is a key determinant of mental and 
physical well-being.  In times of great emotional distress, we often turn to others for their 
perspective and support to help us navigate through such dilemmas, as can be witnessed in daily 
life from various interactions ranging from advice columns to psychotherapeutic practices.  As 
such, understanding the mechanisms by which we can help others in distress to adaptively 
regulate their emotions is essential.  One approach to understanding this issue comes from 
research on the self-regulation of emotion, which studies how individuals can change their 
emotional responses to situations (Buhle et al., 2014; Gross, 1998a; Gross & John, 2003).  
Typically, this work investigates how the consequences of regulation strategies differ, as a 
function of the stage of the emotion generation process they impact (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
However, while the social context of emotion regulation has been considered in terms of how the 
social environment motivates one to regulate and how the strategy used impacts others (Butler et 
al., 2003; English & John, 2013; Gross & John, 2003; Zaki & Williams, 2013), little empirical 
research has investigated social emotion regulation, the process by which emotion regulation 
strategies are used to help others. 
Another approach that informs the issue of how we can help others experiencing distress 
comes from research on social support, which starts with the observation that we don’t always 
bear our emotional burdens alone.  Research in this area often describes how a broad range of 
actions from a support provider can impact another person’s well-being and ability to cope with 
stress (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Thoits, 1986).  Typically, this work asks how different kinds of 
support impact global measures of well-being (e.g., health outcomes) or daily functioning, but 
does not focus on emotional processes, per se.  Although it has been proposed that the benefits of 
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support may derive in part from the interpersonal deployment of emotion regulation strategies 
(Marroquín, 2011), this idea has not been tested directly except in studies of the implicit ways in 
which the presence or touch of a close other lessens pain and anxiety (Beckes & Coan, 2011; 
Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Eisenberger, 2013). 
Here, we bridge these two approaches empirically, building upon recent theoretical work 
broadening models of self-regulation to apply to social contexts (Reeck, Ames, & Ochsner, 
2016; Zaki & Williams, 2013).  These models propose a series of processing steps by which a 
provider regulates another person’s emotions, first by starting with identifying the emotions of 
the target person experiencing distress.  It is proposed that doing so then subsequently guides 
selection and implementation of an appropriate strategy for helping the target to regulate.  In the 
present studies, we recruit targets experiencing anxiety and/or sadness due to personal events in 
their lives, and providers of social emotion regulation, to test the novel hypothesis that the kind 
of emotion experienced by a target affects 1) the type of emotion regulation strategy that targets 
and providers choose to be most helpful, and 2) how effective that strategy will be for the target. 
These hypotheses were formulated by combining two kinds of theoretical perspectives 
and data.  First, appraisal theories posit that emotions arise from the way one interprets, or 
appraises, the motivational relevance of stimuli and events.  For example, anxiety is triggered by 
the appraisal of a potential threat in one’s environment, whereas sadness is triggered by the 
appraisal that one has irrevocably lost something of value (Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  Given this, 
we reasoned that different types of social regulation strategies might be differentially helpful for 
targets experiencing anxiety as opposed to sadness.  Because actively changing one’s situation 
can facilitate avoidance of a potential threat, specifying ways that targets could change their 
situation might be particularly helpful for anxiety.  By contrast, because sadness results from 
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appraisals of irrevocable loss (i.e., a situation that is no longer modifiable), helping targets find 
ways to modify their appraisals and emotional response might be particularly helpful. 
Second, we integrated the literatures on social support and the self-regulation of emotion, 
which draw theoretical and empirical distinctions between situation-focused versus emotion-
focused regulatory strategies.  On the social support side, support strategies have been divided 
into two major categories: 1) problem-focused strategies ⎯ such as advice on what to do ⎯ that 
can help a target actively modify situational aspects of a stressor, and 2) emotion-focused 
strategies ⎯ such as emotional support ⎯ that can help a target modify their emotional response 
to a stressor (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Cutrona & Russell, 1990; Folkman, Lazarus, 
Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; Thoits, 1986).  Likewise, in the self-regulation 
literature, a distinction is made between strategies that actively modify the situation that elicits 
an emotion (e.g. situation modification), as opposed to strategies such as reappraisal, which 
modify the appraisals that generate an emotional response (Gross, 1998b).  To date, however, 
support research has not investigated how a target’s emotions may determine the effectiveness of 
support strategies, and little empirical work on emotion regulation has investigated how 
regulation strategies can be used to help another person in distress.  
 
Overview of the Present Studies 
The present studies test the following prediction in the context of social emotion 
regulation: that situation-focused and emotion-focused strategies are differentially helpful for 
targets experiencing anxiety and sadness.  To test this hypothesis, we developed a novel multi-
phase paradigm that draws on methods used in the social support and self-regulation of emotion 
literatures.  Following the social support literature’s emphasis on ecologically valid studies of 
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support in real-world contexts, this paradigm collected from targets, written descriptions of 
experienced, real-world life dilemmas that primarily elicited either anxiety or sadness.  
Following the self-regulation of emotion literature’s use of controlled laboratory methods, these 
descriptions were then presented to providers while the type of regulatory support provided was 
systematically manipulated.   
Study 1 used this method to provide an initial test of our predictions with strategies 
typically studied in the context of social support.  Here, we compared prospective beliefs, from 
providers and targets, about the helpfulness of advice versus emotional support for targets 
experiencing events causing anxiety and sadness.  To specifically investigate how emotion 
regulation strategies can be best used to support others, Study 2 then replicated and extended 
Study 1 with strategies typically studied in the self-regulation of emotion, namely situation 
modification and reappraisal.  Here, we compared the impact of these strategies, when 
implemented by a provider, on targets experiencing anxiety and sadness.  As beliefs about future 
emotional responses can be inaccurate (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), providers were trained to 
implement the strategies through written responses to targets, so that we could assess how 
helpful the strategies would be judged to be by targets, both upon receiving social regulatory 
support, and retrospectively a month later (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 for layouts of the 






Figure 3.1. Task phases in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
 
Study 1: Helpfulness of Social Support Strategies for Anxiety and Sadness 
 
Phase 1: Do Targets Believe Advice and Emotional Support are Differentially Helpful for 
Anxiety and Sadness? 
Participants.  Participants from all phases of Studies 1 and 2 were recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform for collecting valid responses from a 
demographically diverse population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).  For both studies, targets 
were recruited who wanted to receive support from others.  This is an important criteria as 
wanting support has been proposed to be a boundary condition for when explicit support is 
beneficial to those in distress (Bolger & Amarel, 2007).  For this phase, 103 participants were 
		
91	
recruited with the aim of having 100 targets complete this phase.  This recruitment number was 




Hypotheses for Studies 1 and 2 
Study 1 - Social Support Strategies 
Advice Emotional Support 
1. As anxiety is a response to potential 
threat, advice on what to do should be 
more helpful than emotional support for 
targets experiencing anxiety, as advice 




2. As sadness is a response to irrevocable 
loss, emotional support should be more 
helpful than advice for targets 
experiencing sadness, as emotional 
support can help to modify their 
emotional response to an irrevocable 
situation. 
 
3. Advice should be more helpful for targets 
experiencing anxiety than for targets 
experiencing sadness. 
4. Emotional support should be more 
helpful for targets experiencing sadness 
than for targets experiencing anxiety. 






1. Situation modification should be more 
helpful than reappraisal for targets 
experiencing anxiety, as situation 
modification can help targets to actively 
avoid a potential threat. 
 
 
2. Reappraisal should be more helpful than 
situation modification for targets 
experiencing sadness, as reappraisal can 
help modify the meaning of an 
irrevocable loss and one’s emotional 
response to it. 
 
3. Situation modification should be more 
helpful for targets experiencing anxiety 
than for targets experiencing sadness. 
4. Reappraisal should be more helpful for 
targets experiencing sadness than for 
targets experiencing anxiety.   
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could be recruited within budgetary limitations.  Two participants were excluded from all 
analyses for having an IP address identical to participants in a prior pilot study, and one 
participant was excluded for not indicating completion of the study by submitting the Human 
Intelligence Task (HIT) through the MTurk interface.  The resulting 100 participants had a mean 
age of 35.3 years (SD = 11.08, range = 20-70, 28 male/72 female).   
Methods.  All methods reported in this manuscript were approved by the Columbia 
University Institutional Review Board.  For this phase, a HIT was posted on MTurk to recruit 
targets currently experiencing both a personal event causing anxiety and an event causing 
sadness.  A link was provided through the HIT to the study.  All phases of the reported studies 
were administered with Qualtrics (see Appendix B for recruitment methods, instructions, and all 
items/measures administered).  After clicking the link, targets provided consent and completed 
questionnaires that assessed their emotional state.  Targets were then instructed to write about an 
event in their lives that they would like to receive social support for.  In this phase, all 
participants completed two trials in which they wrote about an event.  In one trial, they wrote 
about an event causing them to experience anxiety, and in another trial they wrote about an event 
causing sadness.  Targets were required to provide written responses describing their events that 
were between 600-1200 characters (approximately 100-200 words, see Figures S1-S3 in 
Appendix B for breakdowns of topics discussed in targets’ events).  The order by which targets 
wrote about an event causing either anxiety or sadness was randomized across participants.  For 
this phase, a within-subjects design was used to compare the effects of anxiety and sadness on 
how helpful different social support strategies are believed to be, as a prior pilot study 
demonstrated that with a between-groups design, participants recruited to report an event causing 
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either anxiety or sadness generally reported events that elicited both of these emotions to similar 
degrees, as opposed to events primarily causing the emotion for the respective condition.  
After writing about an event in each trial, targets rated the greatest amount of each of the 
following emotions they experienced while thinking about the event on a 9-point Likert scale (1 
= Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely): anxiety, sadness, interest, and surprise.  While 
anxiety and sadness were assessed to compare the degree to which targets experienced anxiety as 
opposed to sadness due to their event, surprise and interest were control items administered to 
assess differences in high and mildly arousing emotions of neutral valence.  We had no a priori 
predictions for differences between conditions for surprise and interest.  After these emotion 
ratings, targets indicated their beliefs about how helpful different social support strategies would 
be for their event on the following screen, by rating how helpful they thought it would be to 
receive emotional support and advice on what to do regarding the event (1 = Not helpful at all, 5 
= Somewhat helpful, 9 = Extremely helpful).  To assess the impact of the events on the targets’ 
lives, targets then rated on the following screen how important the event was to them, and how 
complicated the event was (1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely).  The same procedures 
were completed for the second trial, in which targets wrote about another event currently causing 
them to experience either anxiety or sadness (whichever had not been written about in the first 
trial).  After the second trial, targets provided consent regarding whether or not they would like 
to receive written support from another participant for their events, and then completed 
individual differences measures.  Participants took on average 36 minutes to complete this phase 






Manipulation checks. The following analyses were conducted to confirm that targets 
primarily experienced anxiety and sadness in the respective conditions, that the events reported 
were impactful in the targets’ lives (i.e., important and complicated), and that the events causing 
anxiety and sadness are not differentially impactful.  All analyses in this manuscript were 
conducted with R version 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016) and SPSS version 23.  
Emotions induced by events.  To confirm that targets primarily experienced anxiety and 
sadness from the events they reported in the anxiety and sad conditions respectively, separate 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the emotion ratings in each condition.  For the 
anxiety condition, a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a 
significant difference amongst the four emotion categories (F(2.44, 241.93) = 91.06, p < .001) 
and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the 
mean for anxiety ratings (M = 7.77, SD = 1.59) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the 
means for all other emotion categories (sadness: M = 6.00, SD = 2.41; interest: M = 5.09, SD = 
2.56; surprise: M = 2.83, SD = 2.26; see Table 3.2 for comparisons).  For the sad condition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) also indicated a significant 
difference amongst the four emotion categories (F(2.59, 256.72) = 92.95, p < .001), and post-hoc 
tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for 
sadness ratings (M = 7.81, SD = 1.47) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for 
all other emotions (anxiety: M = 6.23, SD = 2.24; interest: M = 4.96, SD = 2.68; surprise: M = 
2.92, SD = 2.62; see Table 3.2 for comparisons).  
Paired t-tests indicated that anxiety was more greatly experienced in the anxiety than in 
the sad condition (MDiff = 1.54, 95% CI [1.11, 1.97], t(99) = 7.17, p < .001), whereas sadness was 
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more greatly experienced in the sad condition than in the anxiety condition (MDiff = 1.81, 95% CI 
[1.33, 2.29], t(99) = 7.46, p < .001).  There were no significant differences between the anxiety 
and sad conditions for ratings on interest (MDiff = .13, 95% CI [-.27, .53], t(99) = .65, p = .52) and 
surprise (MDiff = -.09, 95% CI [-.53, .35], t(99) = -.41, p = .68).  These analyses confirm that 
anxiety was the primary emotion elicited by targets’ events in the anxiety condition, whereas 
sadness was the primary emotion elicited by the events reported in the sad condition. 
 Impact of events.  Overall, targets rated events in both the anxiety and sad conditions to 
be highly important (anxiety: M = 8.24, SD = 1.30; sad: M = 8.33, SD = 1.26) and complicated 
(anxiety: M = 7.47, SD = 1.97; sad: M = 7.56, SD = 1.88).  Paired t-tests indicated that there were 
no significant differences between conditions for ratings of importance (MDiff = -.09, 95% CI [-
.37, .19], t(99) = -.64, p = .53) and complication (MDiff = -.09, 95% CI [-.55, .37], t(99) = -.39, p = 
.70). 
Key finding: Targets believe advice and emotional support to be differentially helpful 
for anxiety and sadness.  The following analyses address the question of whether targets believe 
advice and emotional support to be differentially helpful depending on whether they are 
experiencing anxiety or sadness.  To address this, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to test the interaction between the target’s emotion condition (levels: anxiety, sad) and 
type of social support strategy (levels: advice, emotional support), on how helpful the support 
strategies are believed to be.  This interaction was significant (F(1, 99) = 9.26, p = .003, η2G = 
.008), with no significant main effects for either emotion condition (F(1, 99) = 1.52, p = .22) or 
type of social support strategy (F(1, 99) = 2.89, p = .092, see Figure 3.2).   
Planned comparisons were conducted to test the following simple main effects: 1) 
whether advice is believed to be more helpful than emotional support when targets are 
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experiencing anxiety, 2) whether emotional support is believed to be more helpful than advice 
when targets are experiencing sadness, 3) whether advice is believed to be more helpful when 
targets are experiencing anxiety than when experiencing sadness, and 4) whether emotional 
support is believed to be more helpful when targets are experiencing sadness than when 
experiencing anxiety.  The second and third comparisons were significant, indicating that this 
interaction was driven by differences in how helpful advice was believed to be for anxiety and 
sadness.  Within the anxiety condition, advice (M = 7.05, SD = 1.98) and emotional support (M = 
6.93, SD = 2.35) were not believed to be differentially helpful (MDiff = .12, SE = .21, 95% CI [-
.29, .53], F(1, 99) = .33, p = .57).  Within the sad condition, advice (M = 6.43, SD = 2.38) was 
believed to be significantly less helpful than emotional support (M = 7.11, SD = 2.17; MDiff = -
.68, SE = .21, 95% CI [-1.10, -.26], F(1, 99) = 10.18, p = .002).  Advice was believed to be 
significantly more helpful when experiencing anxiety than when experiencing sadness (MDiff = 
.62, SE = .22, 95% CI [.19, 1.05], F(1, 99) = 8.28, p = .005).  However, emotional support was 
not believed to be differentially helpful when experiencing anxiety and sadness (MDiff = -.18, SE 
= .23, 95% CI [-.63, .27], F(1, 99) = .62, p = .43).   
 
Phase 2: Do Providers Believe Advice and Emotional Support are Differentially Helpful for 
Anxiety and Sadness? 
Participants.  104 providers were recruited in four separate groups for this phase (see 
Methods section below).  Sixteen participants were excluded from analyses for having an 
identical IP address as another participant in a prior phase or pilot study, not submitting the HIT, 
or not following instructions in their written response (i.e., not writing directly to the target, or 
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writing responses unrelated to the target’s event).  The final sample consisted of 88 participants 
(MAge = 35.63, SD = 12.27, range = 20-66, 25 male/63 female). 
Every provider in each of the four groups responded to two events from a target in Phase 
1.  Forty events from 20 targets were selected from Phase 1 (see Methods section below), of 
which providers from all four groups responded to.  The plan for recruiting participants for this 
phase was determined prior to running this phase, with an aim of recruiting at least one 
participant from each of the four groups to respond to each of the 20 target’s events.  Within 
each group, every provider was randomly paired with one of the 20 selected targets, and 
responded to the anxiety and sad inducing events for this target.  Recruitment for each group was 
terminated when at least one participant had responded to each of the 20 targets’ events.   
 Methods.  To select the targets from Phase 1 that providers would respond to in this 
phase, the following criteria were used: 1) the event in the anxiety condition had to be rated by 
the target to be higher on anxiety than sadness by at least two points, 2) the event in the sad 
condition had to be rated by the target to be higher on sadness than anxiety by at least two points, 
and 3) the target must have wanted to receive social support, as indicated by their consent to 
receive written support from other participants.  These criteria were implemented in order to 
have providers respond to events that primarily caused anxiety and sadness for targets in the 
respective conditions, and that were intended by targets to elicit support from providers.  Twenty 
targets from Phase 1 fulfilled all three of these criteria. 
Four groups of providers were recruited to counterbalance the order of the tasks in this 
phase.  Each group was recruited through a separate HIT that provided a link to this phase (see 
Appendix B for recruitment materials and instructions given).  Upon accepting one of these 
HITs, providers clicked the link to provide consent for this study, and were then instructed to 
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read the events written by one of the twenty targets randomly selected for the provider.  
Depending on the group, providers either read the anxiety or sadness-inducing event first.  
After reading the first event, providers rated the greatest amount of each of the following 
emotions (identical to those rated by targets in Phase 1) they thought the target felt in response to 
their event on a 9-point scale (1=Not at all, 5=Somewhat, 9=Extremely): anxiety, sadness, 
interest, and surprise.  Providers then wrote a response to provide support to the target that was 
between 600-1200 characters in length (approximately 100-200 words).  These written responses 
were not analyzed so will not be further discussed.  Depending on the group, participants either 
rated the target’s emotions first, or wrote the response to the target first.  Providers made 
additional ratings (see Appendix B), and then completed the same procedures for a second trial 
in which they read the other event written by the same target.  After completing the second trial, 
providers were shown the event from the first trial.  They were instructed to read the description 
of the event again, and then indicated their beliefs about the helpfulness of different social 
support strategies by rating how helpful they thought emotional support and advice would be for 
the target on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = Not helpful at all, 5 = Somewhat helpful, 9 = Extremely 
helpful.  See Appendix B for additional items assessed).  Providers then completed the same 
procedures for the event presented in the second trial.  After this, individual differences and 
demographics measures were administered.  Participants took on average 42 minutes to complete 
this phase and were compensated $2. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. The following analyses were conducted to confirm that providers 
perceived targets as primarily experiencing anxiety and sadness in the respective conditions.  As 
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with the manipulation checks for Phase 1, this allows us to assess whether different strategies are 
believed to be differentially helpful for different kinds of emotions. 
Emotions perceived in targets. Similar analyses to those performed in Phase 1 confirmed 
that providers perceived anxiety to be the primary emotion experienced by targets in the anxiety 
condition, and sadness to be the primary emotion experienced by targets in the sad condition.  
For the anxiety condition, a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
indicated a significant difference amongst the four emotion categories (F(2.77, 241.07) = 47.84, 
p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated 
that the mean for anxiety ratings (M = 8.08, SD = 1.68) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater 
than the means for all other emotions (sadness: M = 6.13, SD = 2.37; interest: M = 6.14, SD = 
2.50; surprise: M = 4.23, SD = 2.61; see Table 3.2 for comparisons).  For the sad condition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference 
amongst the emotion categories (F(2.60, 226.11) = 54.39, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for sadness ratings 
(M = 7.98, SD = 1.66) was significantly (all ps < .01) greater than the means for all other 
emotions (anxiety: M = 7.14, SD = 2.19; interest: M = 5.76, SD = 2.75; surprise: M = 4.52, SD = 
2.75; see Table 3.2 for comparisons). 
Comparisons between the anxiety and sad conditions with paired t-tests indicated that 
anxiety was rated greater in the anxiety condition than in the sad condition (MDiff = .94, 95% CI 
[.37, 1.52], t(87) = 3.25, p = .002), whereas sadness was rated greater in the sad than in the 
anxiety condition (MDiff = 1.85, 95% CI [1.28, 2.42], t(87) = 6.43, p < .001).  These analyses 
confirm that providers perceived anxiety to be the primary emotion elicited by the target’s event 
in the anxiety condition, and sadness to be the primary emotion elicited in the sad condition.  In 
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this phase, interest was rated to be significantly greater in the anxiety than in the sad condition 
(MDiff = .38, 95% CI [.001, .75], t(87) = 1.99, p = .049).  There was no significant difference 





Emotion Ratings by Targets (Phase 1) and Providers (Phase 2) in Study 1 
 Targets 
Phase 1 (n = 100) 
Providers 















MDiff [95% CI] 
Anxiety Condition 
Anxiety 7.77 (1.59)  8.08 (1.68)  
Sadness 6.00 (2.41) -1.77** [-2.40, -1.14] 6.13 (2.37) -1.96** [-2.66, -1.25] 
Interest 5.09 (2.56) -2.68** [-3.54, -1.82] 6.14 (2.50) -1.94** [-2.80, -1.09] 
Surprise 2.83 (2.26) -4.94** [-5.66, -4.22] 4.23 (2.61) -3.85** [-4.71, -3.00] 
Sadness Condition 
Sadness 7.81 (1.47)  7.98 (1.66)  
Anxiety 6.23 (2.24) -1.58** [-2.15, -1.01] 7.14 (2.19) -.84* [-1.43, -.25] 
Interest 4.96 (2.68) -2.85** [-3.65, -2.05] 5.76 (2.75) -2.22** [-3.06, -1.37] 
Surprise 2.92 (2.62) -4.89** [-5.71, -4.07] 4.52 (2.75) -3.46** [-4.33, -2.58] 
 
Notes. 95% CIs adjusted with Bonferroni correction for pairwise comparisons within the 






Key finding: Providers believe advice and emotional support to be differentially helpful 
for anxiety and sadness.  The following analyses address the main question of whether providers 
believe different types of social support strategies to be differentially helpful for targets 
experiencing anxiety and sadness.  To address this, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to test the interaction between the emotion condition of the target’s event (levels: 
anxiety, sad) and type of social support strategy (levels: advice, emotional support), on how 
helpful the social support strategies are believed to be for the target’s event.  This interaction was 
significant (F(1, 87) = 29.07, p < .001, η2G = .094), with no main effects of either emotion 
condition (F(1, 87) = .008, p = .93) or type of social support strategy (F(1, 87) = .22, p = .64, see 
Figure 3.2).   
As in Phase 1, planned comparisons were conducted to test simple main effects relevant 
to our hypotheses.  All four comparisons were significant. For events causing anxiety, advice 
was believed to be more helpful (M = 7.91, SD = 1.44) than emotional support (M = 6.78, SD = 
2.28; MDiff = 1.13, SE = .31, 95% CI [.52, 1.73], F(1, 87) = 13.58, p < .001), whereas for events 
causing sadness, emotional support was believed to be more helpful (M = 7.99, SD = 1.64) than 
advice (M = 6.68, SD = 2.10; MDiff = 1.31, SE = .29, 95% CI [.73, 1.89], F(1, 87) = 20.16, p < 
.001).  Advice was believed to be more helpful for events causing anxiety than for events causing 
sadness (MDiff = 1.23, SE = .26, 95% CI [.72, 1.74], F(1, 87) = 22.64, p < .001), whereas 
emotional support was believed to be more helpful for events causing sadness than for events 







Figure 3.2. Results from Study 1. In Phase 1, a repeated measures ANOVA indicated that targets 
believe social support strategies (solid line = advice, dashed line = emotional support) to be 
differentially helpful (1 = Not helpful at all, 5 = Somewhat helpful, 9 = Extremely helpful) 
depending on whether they are primarily experiencing anxiety or sadness.  In Phase 2, a repeated 
measures ANOVA indicated that providers believe advice and emotional support to be 
differentially helpful for targets depending on whether targets were perceived to be primarily 
experiencing anxiety or sadness.  Mean ± 1 SEM. **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
 
 
Study 2: Helpfulness of Social Emotion Regulation Strategies for Anxiety and Sadness 
 Study 1 provided initial support for our predictions, demonstrating that both targets and 
providers believe social support strategies to be differentially helpful depending on whether 
targets are experiencing anxiety or sadness.  While targets believed advice to be less helpful for 
events causing sadness, providers believed emotional support and advice to be differentially 
helpful for targets according to our specific hypotheses about these strategies.  These results 
suggest that with strategies conceptualized in the social support literature as either modifying 
another’s situation (i.e., advice) or emotional response (i.e., emotional support), targets and 
providers would choose to elicit and use different kinds of strategies depending on the kind of 





















































F(1, 99) = 9.26, p = .003 F(1, 87) = 29.07, p < .001 
		
103	
However, it is unknown whether this pattern extends to strategies conceptualized in the 
emotion regulation literature.  In addition, it is unclear whether these strategies will actually be 
judged to be differentially helpful by targets when implemented by providers.  It is necessary to 
address these limitations in order to delineate how social emotion regulation may be most 
effectively implemented.  Study 2 addresses these points by first assessing the beliefs that targets 
(Phase 1) and providers (Phase 2) have about the helpfulness of different emotion regulation 
strategies (i.e., situation modification and reappraisal) for targets experiencing events causing 
anxiety and sadness.  To assess how helpful the strategies are when implemented, providers in 
Phase 2 are trained to implement these strategies to help targets with their events, and providers’ 
responses are then sent to targets for them to judge how helpful the responses are (Phase 3).  
Finally, as it may take time for targets to assess how helpful the strategies have been in their 
lives, we re-contacted targets approximately a month later to have them judge how helpful the 
providers’ responses had been for them since they received it (Phase 4). 
 
Participants 
In Phase 1, 245 participants were recruited with the aim of having 100 targets in each of 
the anxiety and sad conditions who 1) provided responses that met inclusionary criteria (see 
below), and 2) consented to being re-contacted to receive responses from a provider.  
Recruitment was terminated when 100 participants fulfilled these criteria in both conditions.  
This recruitment number was determined prior to running this study by doubling the sample size 
used in Phase 1 of Study 1.  To obtain the recruitment number, 120 targets were recruited in the 
anxiety condition.  Out of these participants, one participant was excluded for not following 
instructions in their written response, and one participant was excluded due to having an 
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identical IP address as another participant in the prior study.  Eighteen participants did not 
consent to being re-contacted.  Data from these 20 participants were excluded from analyses.  In 
the sad condition, 125 targets were recruited.  Of these, two targets were excluded for not 
submitting the HIT, and 23 targets did not consent to being re-contacted.  Data from these 25 
participants were excluded from analyses. 
Out of the 200 targets recruited in Phase 1 who consented to being re-contacted, there 
were 20 targets (10 in the anxiety condition, 10 in the sad condition) for whom we were unable 
to recruit providers for in Phase 2 to write responses to that met inclusion criteria (see Methods 
section for Phase 2).  These 20 targets were not re-contacted for Phase 3.  In Phase 3, an 
additional 40 targets were unable to be contacted or did not respond to our request to participate 
in this phase of the study.  In Phase 4, nine participants were unable to be contacted or did not 
respond to our request for participation.   
Analyses reported for targets in Phases 1, 3, and 4 were conducted on the 131 participants 
who completed all four phases of this study (MAge = 34.41 years, SD = 10.21, range = 20-71, 58 
male/73 female).  Out of these 131 participants, there were 70 targets in the anxiety condition (39 
received a response from a provider using situation modification, 31 received a response from a 
provider using reappraisal), and 61 targets in the sad condition (31 received a response using 
situation modification, 30 received a response using reappraisal).  Analyses on the full samples 
of participants with valid responses in Phases 1 and 3 are reported in Appendix B.   
Analyses for Phase 2 with providers’ responses were conducted on all 187 participants 
recruited in Phase 2 (MAge = 33.97 years, SD = 9.56, range = 18-69, 94 male/93 female).  The 
total number of participants recruited for this phase was attained as a result of the coding 
procedures used to determine whether the provider’s written responses for targets met inclusion 
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criteria.  These coding procedures are described in the Methods section for Phase 2 and resulted 
in 86 providers in the situation modification condition and 101 providers in the reappraisal 
condition.   
 
Phase 1: Do Targets Believe Situation Modification and Reappraisal are Differentially 
Helpful for Anxiety and Sadness? 
 Methods.  Two groups of targets were recruited on MTurk.  One group consisted of 
targets who were currently experiencing anxiety due to financial problems, and the other group 
consisted of targets who were currently experiencing sadness due to the loss of an important 
relationship.  Financial problems and the loss of a relationship were the two types of events most 
commonly reported to cause anxiety and sadness respectively in Phase 1 of Study 1 (see Figures 
S1-S3 in Appendix B), and are consistent with the appraisal patterns associated with anxiety as a 
response to potential threat and sadness as a response to irrevocable loss.  In this study, we 
constrained the types of situations reported by targets so that providers could respond to roughly 
consistent types of events in Phase 2.  This procedure also ensured that targets primarily reported 
experiencing anxiety and sadness in the respective conditions with a between-groups design (see 
Methods section for Phase 1 of Study 1 for further discussion). 
Targets were provided a link through MTurk to the study.  Upon clicking the link and 
providing consent for participating in the study, targets were instructed to write about the event 
that was causing either anxiety or sadness (depending on the condition) in a written statement 
between 600-1200 characters (roughly 100-200 words.  See Table 3.3 for examples of events).  
On the following screen, targets indicated the greatest amount of each of the following emotions 
they experienced while thinking about the event on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 4 = 
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Somewhat, 7 = Extremely): anxiety, sadness, surprise, calm, and happiness.  As in Study 1, 
anxiety and sadness were assessed to confirm that these emotions were primarily elicited 
respectively in the anxiety and sad conditions.  Surprise, calm, and happiness were measured as 
control items.  We had no a priori predictions for differences between conditions for these 
emotions.   
After making these ratings, targets rated how helpful they believed situation modification 
would be for their event by rating how much they would like someone to help them leave or 
change the current situation, and how helpful they believed reappraisal would be by rating how 
much they would like someone to help them think about the current situation in a different way 
(7-point Likert scale; 1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely).  To replicate findings from 
Study 1 regarding targets’ beliefs about social support strategies, targets then indicated on the 
next screen how helpful they believed advice and emotional support would be by rating how 
much they would like someone to provide advice on what to do and emotional support regarding 
their event (7-point scale; 1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely).  Items within each set of 
ratings were presented in random order across participants.   
On the following screens, targets made additional ratings regarding the impact of the 
event on their life.  As in Study 1, targets rated both how important and complicated the event 
was (7-point scale; 1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely).  To address potential 
differences in controllability of the events, targets rated how much they were able to change the 
event, as well as how much they were able to think about the event in a different way (7-point 
scale; 1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely).  After completing these ratings, targets 
indicated whether or not they consent to being re-contacted to receive written responses from 
providers regarding their event.   
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Individual differences measures were then administered to assess whether targets’ traits 
are associated with how helpful targets would later judge social emotion regulation to be in 
Phase 3.  Of note, the reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ-R) 
was administered to assess this, as the tendency to reappraise has been associated with more 
adaptive social functioning (Gross & John, 2003) and is likely to impact how one judges the 
helpfulness of social emotion regulation (see Appendix B for all measures administered).  After 
completing these measures, targets provided demographics information and received a debriefing 
statement describing this phase of the study.  The average amount of time taken to complete this 
phase was 25.6 minutes, and participants were compensated $3. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. As with Study 1, the following analyses were conducted as 
manipulation checks.   
Emotions induced by events. In the anxiety condition, a repeated measures ANOVA 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the five emotion 
categories (F(2.44, 168.52) = 109.47, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for anxiety (M = 5.80, SD = 1.28) was 
significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for all other emotions.  In the sad condition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference 
amongst the five emotion categories (F(2.93, 175.81) = 99.98, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for sadness (M = 
5.84, SD = 1.25) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for all other emotions 
(see Table 3.4 for means of all emotion ratings and comparisons).   
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Independent samples t-tests indicated that anxiety was rated greater in the anxiety than in 
the sad condition (MDiff = 1.11, 95% CI [.57, 1.65], t(108.65) = 4.10, p < .001), whereas sadness 
was rated greater in the sad condition than in the anxiety condition (MDiff = 1.47, 95% CI [.90, 
2.03], t(118.96) = 5.16, p < .001).  These analyses confirm that anxiety was the primary emotion 
elicited by targets’ events in the anxiety condition, whereas sadness was the primary emotion 
elicited in the sadness condition.  Surprise was rated less in the anxiety than in the sad condition 
(MDiff = -.61, 95% CI [-1.15, -.069], t(119.85) = -2.23, p = .027), as was calm at trend level (MDiff 
= -.41, 95% CI [-.84, .013], t(122.30) = -1.92, p = .057).  There was no significant difference 
between conditions for happiness (MDiff = .23, 95% CI [-.16, .63], t(128.38) = 1.19, p = .24).   
Impact of events.  Targets in the anxiety and sad conditions rated their events to be highly 
important (anxiety: M = 6.39, SD = .84; sad: M = 5.84, SD = 1.19) and complicated (anxiety: M 
= 5.01, SD = 1.72; sad: M = 5.07, SD = 1.59).  Independent samples t-tests indicated that in this 
study, participants in the anxiety condition rated their events to be more important than 
participants in the sad condition (MDiff = .55, 95% CI [.19, .91], t(106.21) = 3.02, p = .003), but 
there was no significant difference between conditions regarding how complicated the events 
were rated to be (MDiff = -.052, 95% CI [-.62, .52], t(128.49) = -.18, p = .86).   
Targets in the anxiety condition indicated at trend level that they were better able to 
change their events (M = 3.37, SD = 1.47) than targets in the sad condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.51; 
MDiff = .48, 95% CI [-.030, 1.00], t(125.55) = 1.87, p = .064).  There was no significant 
difference between the anxiety (M = 3.96, SD = 1.52) and sad (M = 3.66, SD = 1.57) conditions 
regarding how much targets were able to think differently about the event (MDiff = .30, 95% CI [-
.23, .84], t(125.28) = 1.11, p = .27). 
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 Key finding: Targets believe situation modification and reappraisal to be differentially 
helpful for anxiety and sadness.  The following analyses address the question of whether targets 
believe situation modification and reappraisal to be differentially helpful depending on whether 
they are experiencing anxiety or sadness.  To address this, a mixed-design ANOVA was 
performed to test the interaction between the emotion condition that targets were in (between-
subjects levels: anxiety, sad) and type of emotion regulation strategy (within-subjects levels: 
situation modification, reappraisal), on how helpful the strategies were believed to be.  This 
interaction was significant, demonstrating that targets believe situation modification and 
reappraisal to be differentially helpful for their event depending on whether they are 
experiencing anxiety or sadness (F(1, 129) = 11.14, p = .001, η2G = .035, see Figure 3.3).  In this 
model, there were no significant main effects for either the emotion condition (F(1, 129) = 1.35, 
p = .25), or type of emotion regulation strategy assessed (F(1, 129) = 3.24, p = .074).     
Similar to Study 1, planned comparisons were conducted to test the following simple 
main effects: 1) whether targets experiencing anxiety believe situation modification to be more 
helpful than reappraisal, 2) whether targets experiencing sadness believe reappraisal to be more 
helpful than situation modification, 3) whether targets experiencing anxiety believe situation 
modification to be more helpful than targets experiencing sadness, and 4) whether targets 
experiencing sadness believe reappraisal to be more helpful than targets experiencing anxiety.  
Within the anxiety condition, targets did not believe situation modification (M = 5.06, SD = 1.89) 
to be significantly more helpful than reappraisal (M = 4.74, SD = 1.79; MDiff = .31, SE = .28, 
95% CI [-.24, .87], F(1, 129) = 1.27, p = .26).  However, targets within the sad condition 
believed reappraisal (M = 5.15, SD = 1.66) to be significantly more helpful than situation 
modification (M = 4.10, SD = 1.80; MDiff = 1.05, SE = .30, 95% CI [.46, 1.64], F(1, 129) = 12.34, 
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p = .001).  Targets believed situation modification to be more helpful in the anxiety condition 
than in the sad condition (MDiff = .96, SE = .32, 95% CI [.32, 1.60], F(1, 129) = 8.76, p = .004).  
However, there was no significant difference in how helpful reappraisal was believed to be in the 
anxiety condition as compared to the sad condition (MDiff = -.41, SE = .30, 95% CI [-1.01, .20], 
F(1, 129) = 1.78, p = .19).  
Replication of results from Study 1.  Replicating findings from Phase 1 of Study 1, a 
mixed-design ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between the target’s emotion condition  
(between-subjects levels: anxiety, sadness) and type of social support strategy (within-subjects 
levels: advice, emotional support) on how helpful the support strategies are believed to be (F(1, 
129) = 6.83, p = .01, η2G = .016).  In this model, there were no significant main effects for either 
the emotion condition (F(1, 129) = .88, p = .35) or type of social support strategy assessed (F(1, 
129) = .84, p = .36).  Consistent with our predictions, but unlike the pattern of results in Study 1, 
planned comparisons indicated that within the anxiety condition, targets believed advice (M = 
5.33, SD = 1.74) to be more helpful than emotional support (M = 4.71, SD = 2.04; MDiff = .61, SE 
= .24, 95% CI [.14, 1.08], F(1, 129) = 6.69, p = .011).  Within the sad condition, targets did not 
believe advice (M = 5.11, SD = 1.76) and emotional support (M = 5.41, SD = 1.44) to be 
differentially helpful (MDiff = -.30, SE = .25, 95% CI [-.80, .21], F(1, 129) = 1.35, p = .25).  The 
helpfulness of advice was not believed to be differentially helpful by targets in the anxiety 
condition and targets in the sad condition (MDiff = .21, SE = .31, 95% CI [-.39, .82], F(1, 129) = 
.49, p = .49).  However, emotional support was believed to be less helpful by targets in the 
anxiety condition than by targets in the sad condition (MDiff = -.70, SE = .31, 95% CI [-1.31, -




Phase 2: Do Providers Believe Situation Modification and Reappraisal are Differentially 
Helpful for Anxiety and Sadness? 
 Methods. Four groups of providers were recruited on MTurk for two strategy conditions.  
In one condition, providers were trained to use situation modification to help targets, whereas in 
the other condition, they were trained to use reappraisal.  In both strategy conditions, providers 
wrote responses to two targets from Phase 1: one experiencing anxiety and another experiencing 
sadness from their event.  Providers in two out of the four groups (one in each strategy condition) 
responded to a target experiencing anxiety first, whereas providers in the other two groups 
responded to a target experiencing sadness first.    
Four HITs (one for each group) were posted with identical titles and descriptions.  Each 
HIT provided a link to this study phase.  Upon accepting one of these HITs, providers consented 
to being in the study, and were then trained to use either situation modification or reappraisal to 
help targets.  Providers trained to use situation modification were instructed to help the target 
change or modify their situation so that it causes the target less distress (e.g., suggest actions that 
the target could take to change their situation, or people they could seek who may be able to help 
them directly).  Here, it was noted that providers should avoid telling targets how to think about 
their situation and what it means to them.  Providers trained to use reappraisal were instructed to 
help the target change the way the target thinks about their situation, or reframe what it means to 
them, so that the target’s situation causes them less distress (e.g., help the target look on the 
bright side, or help them understand how some aspect of their situation may not be as bad as it 
seems).  Here, it was noted that providers should avoid telling targets what actions they should 
take to change their situation (see Appendix B for full descriptions of instructions given). 
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After reading the instructions, participants completed a training session in which they 
read an example of an event (which was identical across both conditions) and an example of a 
response to the event.  For providers in the situation modification condition, the example 
response suggested various ways to help the target change or modify their situation.  For 
providers in the reappraisal condition, the example response suggested various ways to help the 
target think about their situation differently (see Appendix B for text and all protocol materials).  
After reading the example event and response, participants completed a practice trial by reading 
another sample event (which was identical across both conditions) and writing a response for the 
event using the emotion regulation strategy they had been instructed to use.   
After this training session, providers completed two trials in which they read and 
responded to an event causing anxiety and an event causing sadness written by two targets from 
Phase 1.  All providers responded to unique events, unless a prior participant had provided 
responses for a set of events that did not meet inclusion criteria (see coding procedures below).  
In each trial, providers were first instructed to read the target’s event and then write a response to 
the target that was between 600-1200 characters (approximately 100-200 words), using the 
emotion regulation strategy they had been trained on (see Table 3.3 for examples of responses 
from providers).  After writing the response, providers read the event again on the next screen 
and made ratings on it.  They were first asked to indicate the extent to which they thought the 
person experiencing the event felt the following emotions in response to their event (1 = Not at 
all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely): anxiety, sadness, surprise, calm, and happiness (these 
emotion categories are identical to those rated by targets in Phase 1).  Providers then indicated 
how helpful they believed situation modification would be for the target by rating how helpful it 
would be to help this person change or leave the current situation, and how helpful reappraisal 
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would be by rating how helpful it would be to help this person think about the current situation 
in a different way (7 pt. Likert scale; 1 = Not helpful at all, 4 = Somewhat helpful, 7 = Extremely 
helpful).  In order to replicate findings from Study 1 regarding the believed helpfulness of social 
support strategies, providers also rated how helpful they believed it would be to provide advice 
on what to do and emotional support (7 pt. Likert scale; 1 = Not helpful at all, 4 = Somewhat 
helpful, 7 = Extremely helpful).  Items within each set of ratings were presented in random order 
across participants.  Following this, providers made additional ratings regarding the event and 
the target (see Appendix B).  They then completed the same procedures for a second trial in 
which they read the other event written by another target either experiencing anxiety or sadness.  
After completion of the second trial, individual differences measures were administered.  The 
average amount of time taken to complete this phase was 52.1 minutes, and participants were 
compensated $6. 
Coding of providers’ responses. To ensure that providers wrote responses using the 
emotion regulation strategy they were trained to use in their condition, three coders (two who 
were blind to the hypothesis of the study and the providers’ condition, and one who was only 
blind to the providers’ condition) coded all responses written by providers.  For each response 
written by a provider, coders indicated whether the response helps the target to a) think about the 
situation differently, b) change or modify the situation, c) neither, or d) both equally.  In addition 
to other ratings, coders also indicated a binary response indicating whether or not the response 
was rude or hurtful.  A provider’s responses were excluded if one of their responses to an anxiety 
or sad event met at least one of the following exclusion criteria: 1) two out of three coders did 
not correctly identify the type of strategy that the provider was trained to use (“think about the 
situation differently” for the reappraisal condition, and “change or modify the situation” for the 
		
114	
situation modification condition), or 2) one of the coders classified the response as rude or 
hurtful.  If a participant’s responses were excluded, another provider was recruited on MTurk to 
respond to the same targets’ events.  This procedure was repeated until a participant provided 
responses to the targets’ events that met inclusion criteria.  If valid responses to a set of events 
could not be obtained after three rounds of the coding procedures, the targets who provided those 
events were excluded from Phase 3.  As a result of this, 20 targets from Phase 1 (ten from each 
of the anxiety and sad conditions) were not re-contacted in Phase 3. 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. As with Study 1, the following manipulation checks were 
conducted to confirm that providers perceived targets as primarily experiencing anxiety in the 
anxiety condition, and sadness in the sad condition.   
Emotions perceived in targets. For the anxiety condition, a repeated measures ANOVA 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the five emotion 
categories (F(2.98, 554.39) = 377.74, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for anxiety ratings (M = 6.12, SD = 1.11) was 
significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for all other emotions.  For the sad condition, 
a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference 
amongst the five emotion categories (F(3.15, 585.33) = 316.88, p < .001) and post-hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated that the mean for sadness ratings 
(M = 5.96, SD = 1.11) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means of all other 




















“I have had a lot more bills than I did before 
and have been using credit cards and running 




“There are a few steps you can 
take to dig yourself out of this 
hole. To help you get ahead, you 
need to create a careful budget of 
only your necessities. Once that 
is figured out you should know 
how much extra money you have 
each month that must go toward 




“Right now I'm experiencing some financial 
issues thanks to the burden of years of 
student loans that have piled up since 
graduate school.” 
Reappraisal 
“Consider this, being in all that 
debt now has put you in a 
position to be more stable later. 
There are people in a similar 
amount of debt who didn't get 
anything so useful as an 




“About five years ago my mother was 
diagnosed with melanoma skin cancer; it is 
the most deadly kind. She struggled to 
survive during those five years and just late 





“Another thing you can do to 
make your situation even better is 
to seek out a therapist…In our 
darkest times we often seclude 
ourselves from others, but in 
times like this it is best to reach 
out to people who can help us.” 
Sadness 
“I recently ended a long term relationship 
that I really did not want to see end. While 
things could have been better, I did not think 
that they were at a critical point that 
necessitated a break up.” 
 
Reappraisal 
“I know regret is something that 
is hard to shake when these 
things happen, but keep in mind 
that you made a bold, thoughtful 





























Key finding: Providers believe situation modification and reappraisal to be 
differentially helpful for anxiety and sadness.  The following analyses address the main 
question of whether providers believe emotion regulation strategies to be differentially helpful 
for targets primarily experiencing either anxiety or sadness.  A repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to test the interaction between the emotion condition of the target’s event (levels: 
anxiety, sadness) and the type of emotion regulation strategy (levels: situation modification, 
Emotion Ratings by Targets (Phase 1) and Providers (Phase 2) in Study 2 
 Targets 
Phase 1 (n = 100/condition) 
Providers 















MDiff [95% CI] 
Anxiety Condition 
Anxiety 5.80 (1.28)  6.12 (1.11)  
Sadness 4.37 (1.96) -1.43* [-1.95, -.91] 4.74 (1.58) -1.38* [-1.71, -1.05] 
Calm 2.03 (1.17) -3.77* [-4.51, -3.03] 2.19 (1.25) -3.93* [-4.35, -3.52] 
Surprise 1.80 (1.44) -4.00* [-4.60, -3.40] 2.44 (1.52) -3.68* [-4.10, -3.26] 
Happiness 1.84 (1.26) -3.96* [-4.70, -3.21] 1.78 (1.05) -4.34* [-4.71, -3.97] 
Sadness Condition 
Sadness 5.84 (1.25)  5.96 (1.11)  
Anxiety 4.69 (1.75) -1.15* [-1.79, -.51] 4.94 (1.49) -1.02* [-1.37, -.66] 
Calm 2.44 (1.28) -3.39* [-4.17, -2.62] 2.45 (1.32) -3.50* [-3.89, -3.12] 
Surprise 2.41 (1.66) -3.43* [-4.16, -2.70] 3.42 (1.72) -2.54* [-2.93, -2.15] 
Happiness 1.61 (1.02) -4.32* [-4.86, -3.60] 1.65 (.95) -4.31* [-4.66, -3.96] 
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reappraisal), on how helpful the strategies were believed to be for targets.  This interaction was 
significant (F(1, 186) = 24.43, p < .001, η2G = .033, see Figure 3.3), with no main effects of 
either emotion condition (F(1, 186) = 1.27, p = .26) or type of emotion regulation strategy (F(1, 
186) = 1.69, p = .20).   
Planned comparisons indicated that for targets experiencing anxiety, situation 
modification was believed to be significantly more helpful (M = 5.30, SD = 1.64) than 
reappraisal (M = 4.87, SD = 1.81; MDiff = .43, SE = .20, 95% CI [.037, .83], F(1, 186) = 4.66, p = 
.032).  For targets experiencing sadness, reappraisal was believed to be significantly more 
helpful (M = 5.42, SD = 1.49) than situation modification (M = 4.60, SD = 1.80; MDiff = .82, SE = 
.19, 95% CI [.45, 1.19], F(1, 186) = 18.78, p < .001).  Situation modification was believed to be 
significantly more helpful for targets experiencing anxiety than for targets experiencing sadness 
(MDiff = .71, SE = .16, 95% CI [.40, 1.02], F(1, 186) = 20.13, p < .001).  Conversely, reappraisal 
was believed to be significantly more helpful for targets experiencing sadness than for targets 
experiencing anxiety (MDiff = .55, SE = .13, 95% CI [.29, .81], F(1, 186) = 17.07, p < .001).  
Replication of results from Study 1.  Replicating findings from Phase 2 of Study 1, a 
repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant interaction in the predicted directions 
between the target’s emotion condition (levels: anxiety, sadness) and type of social support 
strategy (levels: advice, emotional support), on how helpful these strategies were believed to be 
for the target (F(1, 186) = 44.35, p < .001, η2G = .040).  Unlike Study 1, there were significant 
main effects for both the emotion condition and type of support strategy.  Support strategies were 
perceived to be more helpful for sad events (F(1, 186) = 4.51, p = .035, η2G = .003) regardless of 
type of strategy.  Advice was believed to be more helpful than emotional support (F(1, 186) = 
6.14, p = .014, η2G = .013) regardless of type of emotion.     
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Planned comparisons indicated that providers believed advice to be significantly more 
helpful (M = 5.80, SD = 1.26) than emotional support for targets experiencing anxiety (M = 4.89, 
SD = 1.61; MDiff = .91, SE = .15, 95% CI [.61, 1.21], F(1, 186) = 34.82, p < .001).  However, 
providers believed emotional support to be more helpful (M = 5.62, SD = 1.48) than advice for 
targets experiencing sadness at near trend level (M = 5.36, SD = 1.35; MDiff = .26, SE = .16, 95% 
CI [-.063, .58], F(1, 186) = 2.51, p = .12).  Advice was believed to be significantly more helpful 
for targets experiencing anxiety than for targets experiencing sadness (MDiff = .43, SE = .11, 95% 
CI [.23, .64], F(1, 186) = 17.18, p < .001).  Conversely, emotional support was believed to be 
more helpful for targets experiencing sadness than for targets experiencing anxiety (MDiff = .73, 
SE = .12, 95% CI [.50, .97], F(1, 186) = 37.44, p < .001).  
 
Phase 3: Do Targets Judge Situation Modification and Reappraisal to be Differentially 
Helpful When Implemented? 
 Methods.  For this phase, a message was sent through MTurk to targets from Phase 1 
with a link to a follow-up study (see Appendix B).  Upon clicking the link and providing 
consent, targets entered a personalized 3-digit code provided in the message.  This code directed 
Qualtrics to run a customized version of the study that presented targets with the event they had 
written about in Phase 1, and the response from a provider implementing social emotion 
regulation to help the target.  Targets were first instructed to read the description of their event 
provided in Phase 1, and then to rate the greatest amount of each of the following emotions they 
were experiencing at the moment after reading about the event (all ratings made on a 7 pt. Likert 
scale; 1=Not at all, 4=Somewhat, 7=Extremely): anxiety, sadness, surprise, calm, happiness.  
These emotion categories are identical to those assessed in prior phases of this study.  Targets 
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provided additional ratings about their event (see Appendix B), and then were instructed to read 
the response written to them by a provider.  Targets rated their emotions on the same categories 
again, indicating the greatest amount of each emotion they were currently experiencing after 
reading the response from the provider.  On the next screen, targets were instructed to read the 
response from the provider again, and then rated how helpful they thought the response was 
(1=Not at all, 4=Somewhat, 7=Extremely).  To assess the degree to which targets judged the 
response as implementing situation modification and reappraisal, targets rated how much the 
response helped them to leave or change the current situation and think about the situation in a 
different way.  Targets also rated the degree to which the response provided advice on what to do 
and emotional support.  Targets made other ratings before completing this phase of the study 
(see Appendix B).  The average amount of time taken to complete this phase was 12.2 minutes, 
and participants were compensated $5. 
 Results 
Manipulation checks.  The following analyses were conducted to confirm that social 
emotion regulation from providers led to decreased negative affect for targets. 
 Emotion ratings before receiving social emotion regulation. For targets in the anxiety 
condition, a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated a significant 
difference amongst the five emotion categories (F(1.94, 133.60) = 32.56, p < .001), and post-hoc 
tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons indicated that the mean for anxiety 
ratings (M = 4.89, SD = 1.78) was significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for all 
other emotions.  For targets in the sad condition, a repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected) indicated a significant difference amongst the five emotion categories (F(1.95, 
116.69) = 56.85, p < .001), and post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple 
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comparisons demonstrated that the mean for sadness ratings (M = 5.46, SD = 1.54) was 
significantly (all ps ≤ .001) greater than the means for all other emotions (see Table 3.5 for 
means of all emotion ratings and comparisons). 
Emotion ratings after receiving social emotion regulation.  After reading the response 
from a provider, targets in both the anxiety and sad conditions reported decreases in negative 
emotions and increases in positive emotions.  There were no differences between conditions in 
these changes.  In the anxiety condition, the mean of anxiety ratings (M = 3.20, SD = 1.69) was 
significantly lower than the mean rating for calm, and no longer significantly greater than the 
mean ratings for happiness and surprise.  In the sad condition, the mean for sadness (M = 4.05, 
SD = 1.77) was no longer significantly different from mean ratings of calm and happiness.  See 
Table 3.5 for means of all emotion ratings and comparisons).  
Key finding: Targets judge situation modification and reappraisal to be differentially 
helpful when implemented.  The following analyses address the main question of whether 
targets judge social emotion regulation using situation modification and reappraisal to be 
differentially helpful for anxiety and sadness when implemented.  A between-groups ANOVA 
was performed to test the interaction between the target’s emotion condition (levels: anxiety, 
sadness) and the type of social emotion regulation strategy implemented by the provider (levels: 
reappraisal, situation modification), on how helpful the provider’s response was judged to be by 
the target.  The ANOVA indicated an interaction effect in the predicted directions at trend level 
(F(1, 127) = 2.87, p = .092, η2P = .022), with no main effects of either targets’ emotion condition 
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We subsequently used an ANCOVA to test this interaction while adjusting for individual 
differences in targets’ traits associated with how helpful they judged the provider’s response to 
be.  As expected, the ERQ-R was associated with how helpful targets judged providers’ 
responses to be, indicating that targets with higher ERQ-R scores judged social emotion 
regulation to be more helpful.  As this was the only trait measure significantly associated with 
judgments of helpfulness both upon receiving social emotion regulation in this phase (r = .17, 
95% CI [.001, .33], p = .048) as well as when retrospectively assessing the helpfulness of the 
response one month later in Phase 4 (r = .20, 95% CI [.03, .36]), p = .022; see Table S1 in 
Appendix B for correlations between all targets’ trait measures and ratings of judged 
helpfulness), an ANCOVA was performed to adjust for ERQ-R scores in the interaction between 
targets’ emotion condition and type of regulation strategy used by providers, on how helpful the 
provider’s response was judged to be.  When adjusting for ERQ-R scores, this interaction was 
significant (F(1, 126) = 4.87, p = .029, η2P = .037, see Figure 3.3), as was the effect of ERQ-R 
on judged helpfulness in this model (F(1, 126) = 6.15, p = .014, η2P = .047).  Planned 
comparisons in this model indicated that for targets experiencing anxiety, situation modification 
was judged to be more helpful (estimated marginal mean (EMM) = 5.02, SE = .25) than 
reappraisal at trend level (EMM = 4.41, SE = .28; MDiff = .61, SE = .37, 95% CI [-.12, 1.35], F(1, 
126) = 2.71, p = .10).  Conversely, for targets experiencing sadness, reappraisal was judged to be 
more helpful (EMM = 5.31, SE = .29) than situation modification at near trend level (EMM = 
4.70, SE = .28; MDiff = .61, SE = .40, 95% CI [-.19, 1.41], F(1, 126) = 2.28, p = .13).  Situation 
modification was not judged to be significantly more helpful by targets experiencing anxiety 
than by targets experiencing sadness (MDiff = .32, SE = .37, 95% CI [-.42, 1.05], F(1, 126) = .74, 
p = .39).  However, reappraisal was judged to be significantly more helpful by targets 
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experiencing sadness than by targets experiencing anxiety (MDiff = .90, SE = .40, 95% CI [.10, 
1.70], F(1, 126) = 4.99, p = .027).  Estimated marginal means for both the ANOVA (without 
adjusting for ERQ-R) and ANCOVA are listed in Table S2 (Appendix B).  Adjusting for 
additional trait variables significantly associated with judged helpfulness in this phase (STAI-T 
and IRI were entered as covariates in addition to ERQ-R.  CES-D scores were not included due 
to its high correlation with STAI-T) likewise yielded a significant interaction between targets’ 
emotion condition and type of regulation strategy used by providers, on how helpful the 
provider’s response was judged to be (F(1, 124) = 6.42, p = .013). 
Are the results driven by how controllable and important targets perceived their events to 
be?  To assess whether controllability and importance of the events (as rated by targets in Phase 
1) were confounds, separate ANCOVAs were conducted to adjust for these variables along with 
ERQ-R.  The interaction remained significant when adjusting for the degree to which targets 
rated they were able to change their event (F(1, 125) = 4.42, p = .037).  This was also the case 
when adjusting for how important targets rated their event to be (F(1, 125) = 4.85, p = .029).   
Are the results driven by how helpful targets believed different strategies would be for 
their event?  It may be the case that the degree to which targets judge provider’s responses to be 
helpful is driven by how much targets’ believe the type of emotion regulation strategy 
implemented by the provider would be helpful for their event.  To determine whether this is the 
case, we first assessed whether target’s perceived the response they received from providers to 
map onto the situation modification and reappraisal constructs.  While independent coders had 
identified provider’s responses as either implementing situation modification or reappraisal, 
depending on the provider’s condition, targets themselves did not strongly differentiate 
providers’ responses based on these categories.  Independent samples t-tests indicated that 
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targets who received responses from providers implementing situation modification rated these 
responses as helping them to leave or change their situation (M = 3.66, SD = 1.81) more than 
targets who received responses from providers implementing reappraisal at near trend level (M = 
3.18, SD = 1.71; MDiff = .48, 95% CI [-.13, 1.09], t(128.15) = 1.55, p = .12).  Targets who 
received responses from providers implementing reappraisal did not rate these responses as 
helping them to think about their situation in a different way (M = 4.82, SD = 1.55) significantly 
more than targets who received responses from providers implementing situation modification 
(M = 4.56, SD = 1.85; MDiff = .26, 95% CI [-.33, .85], t(128.82) = .88, p = .38).  Thus, it does not 
seem that beliefs about situation modification and reappraisal account for how helpful provider’s 
responses were judged to be as target’s themselves did not clearly differentiate providers’ 
responses by these categories. 
Next, we performed a correlation to test the relationship between targets’ beliefs from 
Phase 1 and judgments from Phase 3.  Here, we correlated ratings assessed in Phase 1, of how 
helpful they believed either situation modification (i.e., how much they would like someone to 
help them leave or change the situation) or reappraisal (i.e., how much they would like someone 
to help them think about their situation in a different way) would be for their event (using 
whichever strategy was subsequently implemented for them by a provider), and ratings of how 
helpful they judged the response from the provider to be.  Across all targets, there was no 
relationship between how helpful targets believed either situation modification or reappraisal to 
be, and how helpful they judged the response they received from a provider implementing either 
situation modification or reappraisal to be (r = -.010, 95% CI [-.18, .16], p = .91).  
However, additional analyses indicated that targets perceived provider’s responses to 
contain different levels of advice and emotional support, depending on whether the provider used 
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situation modification or reappraisal.  Responses implementing situation modification were 
judged by targets to provide more advice (M = 5.66, SD = 1.38) as compared to responses 
implementing reappraisal (M = 4.57, SD = 1.58; MDiff = 1.09, 95% CI [.57, 1.60], t(120.38) = 
4.16, p < .001).  Conversely, responses implementing reappraisal were judged to provide more 
emotional support (M = 5.11, SD = 1.62) as compared to responses implementing situation 
modification (M = 4.11, SD = 1.66; MDiff = 1.00, 95% CI [.43, 1.57], t(127.18) = 3.49, p < .001).  
As providers’ responses were judged to differ on these variables, we then conducted exploratory 
analyses to assess whether targets’ beliefs about the helpfulness of advice and emotional support 
for their events drove how helpful they judged providers’ responses to be.  We performed a 
correlation to assess the relationship between how helpful advice (for targets who received 
responses implementing situation modification) or emotional support (for targets who received 
responses implementing reappraisal) was believed to be, as assessed in Phase 1, with how helpful 
targets judged the provider’s response to be.  This correlation was significant at trend level (r = 
.15, 95% CI [-.027, .31], p  = .098).  We then performed an ANCOVA to test the interaction 
between the targets’ emotion condition with the type of regulation strategy implemented by the 
provider, on judged helpfulness, while adjusting for ERQ-R and believed helpfulness of advice 
or emotional support (for targets who received responses implementing situation modification 
and reappraisal respectively).  When adjusting for target’s beliefs about the helpfulness of social 
support strategies, this interaction was significant at trend level (F(1, 125) = 3.85, p = .052).  
Overall, these analyses did not demonstrate strong support for the possibility that targets’ beliefs 
about social emotion regulation and social support strategies drove how helpful they judged the 




Phase 4: Do Targets Judge Situation Modification and Reappraisal to be Differentially 
Helpful After a Month? 
  Methods.  Targets who completed Phase 3 were contacted through MTurk 
approximately one month later to participate in this phase of the study.  A message was sent 
through MTurk with a link to this phase (see Appendix B for materials).  As in Phase 3, targets 
were instructed to read the description of the event they had written about in Phase 1, and then to 
rate their emotions, as well as other aspects of the event (see Appendix B).  Targets then read the 
response they had received from a provider approximately one month ago in Phase 3, and rated 
their emotions again.  Then, they read the response again and judged how helpful the response 
had been for them since they received it (7-point Likert scale; 1=Not at all, 4=Somewhat, 
7=Extremely).  Targets provided additional ratings before completing this study.  The average 
amount of time taken to complete this phase was 7.3 minutes, and participants were compensated 
$5. 
 Results 
 Key finding: Targets judge situation modification and reappraisal to have been 
differentially helpful after a month. A between-subjects ANCOVA was conducted to assess the 
interaction between the target’s emotion condition (levels: anxiety, sadness) and the strategy 
used by the provider (levels: situation modification, reappraisal), on how helpful the provider’s 
response was judged to have been since the target received it.  As in Phase 3, target’s ERQ-R 
scores (assessed in Phase 1) were entered as a covariate.  This interaction was significant (F(1, 
126) = 4.08, p = .046, η2P = .031, see Figure 3.3), as was the effect of ERQ-R on judged 
helpfulness in this model (F(1, 126) = 7.44, p = .007, η2P = .056).  There were no main effects of 
either targets’ emotion condition (F(1, 126) = .16, p = .69) or type of strategy used by providers 
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(F(1, 126) = .26, p = .61).  An ANOVA conducted without ERQ-R as a covariate indicated that 
the interaction was at a near trend level (F(1, 127) = 2.10, p = .15). 
Planned comparisons for the ANCOVA indicated that for targets experiencing anxiety, 
situation modification was not judged to be significantly more helpful (EMM = 4.61, SE = .26) 
than reappraisal (EMM = 4.18, SE = .29; MDiff = .44, SE = .39, 95% CI [-.33, 1.20], F(1, 126) = 
1.28, p = .26).  For targets experiencing sadness, reappraisal was judged to be more helpful 
(EMM = 4.87, SE = .30) than situation modification at trend level (EMM = 4.15, SE = .29; MDiff 
= .72, SE = .42, 95% CI [-.11, 1.55], F(1, 126) = 2.97, p = .087).  Situation modification was not 
judged to be significantly more helpful by targets experiencing anxiety than by targets 
experiencing sadness (MDiff = .47, SE = .38, 95% CI [-.30, 1.23], F(1, 126) = 1.47, p = .23).  
Reappraisal was judged to be more helpful at trend level by targets experiencing sadness than by 
targets experiencing anxiety (MDiff = .69, SE = .42, 95% CI [-.14, 1.52], F(1, 126) = 2.73, p = 
.10).  Estimated marginal means for the ANCOVA as well as for an ANOVA model without 
ERQ-R as a covariate are listed in Table S2 (Appendix B).    
Are the results driven by how helpful targets believed different strategies would be for 
their event?  As in Phase 3, we performed a correlation to assess the relationship between how 
helpful advice (for targets who received responses implementing situation modification) or 
emotional support (for targets who received responses implementing reappraisal) was believed to 
be, as assessed in Phase 1, with how helpful targets judged provider’s responses to be in this 
phase.  This correlation was significant (r = .23, 95% CI [.060, .39], p  = .009).  We then 
performed an ANCOVA to test the effect of the interaction between the targets’ emotion 
condition with the type of regulation strategy implemented by the provider for judged 
helpfulness, while adjusting for ERQ-R and believed helpfulness of advice or emotional support 
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(for targets who received responses implementing situation modification and reappraisal 
respectively).  This interaction was significant at trend level (F(1, 125) = 2.63, p = .11), 
indicating that targets’ beliefs about the helpfulness of social support strategies may account for 
some of the variability in how helpful providers’ responses are judged to be.   
 
Discussion 
The current studies began with the question of how social emotion regulation may be 
effectively implemented.  Bridging research on appraisal, social support, and emotion regulation, 
we hypothesized that social regulation strategies would be helpful for targets as a function of 
their fit with the emotion experienced by a target, such that strategies helping targets to actively 
modify their situations would be more helpful for anxiety, whereas strategies that modify targets’ 
emotional responses would be more helpful for sadness.  Three key findings supported our 
hypotheses.  First, with social support strategies in Study 1, targets and providers believed advice 
(a problem-focused strategy) and emotional support (an emotion-focused strategy) to be 
differentially helpful depending on whether the target was experiencing anxiety or sadness.  
Second, in Study 2 this pattern was demonstrated with strategies drawn from studies on the self-
regulation of emotion, with situation modification and reappraisal being differentially helpful for 
targets experiencing anxiety and sadness.  Third, this pattern was present when targets judged the 
helpfulness of responses from providers, both upon initial receipt of providers’ responses and 
approximately one month later, when adjusting for targets’ trait reappraisal.  To our knowledge, 
these studies are the first to demonstrate that social support and emotion regulation strategies are 






Figure 3.3. Results from Study 2. In Phase 1, a mixed-design ANOVA indicated that social 
emotion regulation strategies (solid line = situation modification, dashed line = reappraisal) are 
believed by targets experiencing anxiety or sadness to be differentially helpful (1 = Not at all, 5 
= Somewhat, 7 = Extremely).  In Phase 2, a repeated measures ANOVA indicated that providers 
believed these strategies to be differentially helpful for targets.  In Phase 3, a between-subjects 
ANCOVA (adjusting for target’s trait reappraisal) indicated that targets judged providers’ 
responses using situation modification or reappraisal to be differentially helpful.  In Phase 4, the 
same analysis as that in Phase 3 demonstrated that these strategies were retrospectively judged to 














































































Phase 3: Targets' Judgments















Phase 4: Targets' Judgments





F(1, 129) = 11.14, p = .001 F(1, 186) = 24.43, p < .001 








estimated marginal means are displayed for Phases 3 and 4.  Error bars represent SEM. † ≤ .10, 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
 
 
Implications For Research on Social Support and Emotion Regulation   
Our findings have theoretical and methodological implications for the study of social 
support and emotion regulation.  Methodologically, research on social support often investigates 
interpersonal processes in close relationships (e.g., romantic couples).  While it is important for 
future work to ask whether our results generalize to such relationships, our studies offer a 
method for understanding processes within dyads that isolates the effect of support from factors 
that may be present for dyads with a preexisting relationship, such as relationship quality and 
variation in how strategies are communicated.  
Theoretical and empirical research on social support has bolstered a strategy-situation fit 
framework that proposes problem-focused support to be more effective for controllable stressors, 
and emotion-focused support to be more effective for uncontrollable stressors (Cheng, 2001; 
Cheng, Hui, & Lam, 1999; Cheng, Lau, & Chan, 2014; Cutrona & Russell, 1990; Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980).  Applying this framework to the self-regulation of emotion, recent research has 
also demonstrated that as with emotion-focused support, reappraisal is more adaptive for 
uncontrollable contexts than controllable ones (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Doré, Silvers, & 
Ochsner, 2016; Haines et al., 2016; Troy, Ford, McRae, Zarolia, & Mauss, 2017; Troy, 
Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013).  However, prior research has not yet clearly demonstrated the 
effectiveness of situation modification for certain types of situations or emotions.  	
While targets in Study 2 perceived anxiety-inducing events to be marginally more 
controllable than sad events, differential judgments of strategy helpfulness were not driven by 
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perceived controllability.  This suggests that targets’ emotions may be a stronger predictor than 
judgments of controllability for the type of regulatory strategy that would be most effective for 
them.  It may be that emotions, resulting from overall appraisals of one’s situation (e.g., as a 
threat or loss), encapsulate and convey more information to others about one’s situation than 
judged controllability.  Our findings, situated within a “strategy-emotion fit” framework, 
demonstrate that situation modification may be particularly effective as a regulatory strategy 
when experiencing anxiety. 
 
Implications for Studying Development Across the Lifespan and Clinical Populations 
Research over the past few decades has delineated the mechanisms and neural substrates 
of intrapersonal emotion regulation, particularly reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 2008), and 
applied these findings to understand regulatory processes during development (Silvers, Shu, 
Hubbard, Weber, & Ochsner, 2015) and in mental health disorders (Berking & Wupperman, 
2012; Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Silvers et al., 2016).  Building on this foundation, research on 
social emotion regulation can delineate how such mechanisms may underlie provision and 
receipt of social emotion regulation in developmental and clinical populations (Hofmann, 2014; 
Marroquín, 2011; Reeck et al., 2016).  Future work may identify factors that preclude providers 
from implementing effective social emotion regulation, and investigate how these factors impact 
development across the lifespan and clinical outcomes in therapeutic settings.   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The stimuli in the current studies were obtained from participants experiencing important 
life events eliciting anxiety and sadness.  The high ecological validity of this design allows us to 
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investigate social emotion regulation in the context of meaningful events that elicit potent 
emotions, and to generalize our findings to everyday life.  However, such stimuli are emotionally 
complex.  Targets’ events in the anxiety and sadness conditions primarily elicited these emotions 
respectively, but nevertheless elicited a high degree of other negative emotions.  While our 
results consistently demonstrated that social support and emotion regulation strategies are 
believed and judged to be differentially helpful for anxiety and sadness, the emotionally mixed 
nature of the stimuli may have contributed to the fact that pairwise comparisons within these 
interactions did not consistently show significant differences predicted for targets’ responses.  
Controlled laboratory studies that induce targeted emotions may demonstrate clearer differences 
between the effects of different regulatory strategies.  In addition, further research will need to 
assess whether our results generalize to dynamic in-person interactions.  However, our findings 
dovetail with those indicating that people maintain relationships with different individuals who 
are effective at regulating specific kinds of emotions (Cheung, Gardner, & Anderson, 2015). 
Another issue was that events causing targets to experience anxiety and sadness were 
somewhat confounded with situations involving either financial worries or the loss of a 
relationship.  While in Study 1, targets were free to report any kind of event primarily causing 
either anxiety or sadness, Study 2 constrained the types of situations reported.  These types of 
situations are consistent with appraisal theories of emotion that posit anxiety to be a response to 
potential threat and sadness to be a response to irrevocable loss.  However, future work will be 





























We often help others to manage their emotions when they experience turbulent events in 
their lives, a process referred to as social emotion regulation.  The ability to socially regulate the 
emotions of others is thought to be an important component of providing social support and 
maintaining relationships with others (Marroquín, 2011).  Understanding how we regulate the 
emotions of others may also have implications for better understanding intrapersonal emotion 
regulation, or how we regulate our own emotions.  Much research over the past three decades has 
been conducted to understand the neural mechanisms of intrapersonal emotion regulation, in 
particular reappraisal.  This work has delineated the neural circuitry underlying the self-
regulation of negative emotions (Buhle et al., 2014), and has created a valuable foundation for 
understanding how this circuitry is modulated across development and is impacted in affective 
disorders (Silvers et al., 2016; Silvers, Shu, Hubbard, Weber, & Ochsner, 2015). Yet, while the 
neural mechanisms underlying reappraisal for regulating one’s emotions is relatively well 
understood, little research has investigated the neural mechanisms that underlie provision of 
social emotion regulation. 
 Studies on reappraisal have delineated the neural circuitry recruited when using 
reappraisal to regulate one’s own emotional responses to aversive stimuli.  The neural regions 
implicated in reappraisal consist of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and the posterior temporal 
cortex (Buhle et al., 2014).  These regions are thought to subserve domain general functions that 
are recruited during reappraisal.  The vlPFC has been implicated in the controlled retrieval and 
selection of semantic knowledge (Badre & Wagner, 2007), whereas the dlPFC has been 
implicated in maintaining and manipulation of this information in working memory (MacDonald, 
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Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).  The dmPFC is implicated in processing social information 
(Eickhoff, Laird, Fox, Bzdok, & Hensel, 2014).  Recruitment of the posterior temporal cortex is 
thought to reflect changes in the representations of emotional stimuli during reappraisal (Buhle et 
al., 2014).  
Research on how social emotion regulation can be effectively implemented has just 
recently started to come to the forefront, with much of the current literature being theoretical in 
nature (Hofmann, 2014; Marroquín, 2011; Reeck et al., 2016; Zaki & Williams, 2013).  Social 
emotion regulation has been conceptualized to be a process consisting of a series of steps that is 
initiated when a provider of social emotion regulation identifies the emotions of a target person 
in distress.  This is proposed to then guide the provider in selecting and implementing an 
appropriate strategy for the target (Reeck et al., 2016; Shu et al., under review; Zaki & Williams, 
2013).  To date, one exploratory study has been published that investigates the neural correlates 
of providing social emotion regulation.  This study demonstrated both overlapping and non-
overlapping regions of neural activity for regulating one’s own emotions as compared to 
regulating another person’s emotions (Hallam et al., 2014).  However, the results are difficult to 
interpret due to the use of uncorrected thresholds (Poldrack, 2012) and other methodological 
issues.   
The current study investigates the neural mechanisms of providing social emotion 
regulation when helping a target person reappraise negative autobiographical memories.  As 
social emotion regulation often occurs in the context of helping others to reinterpret personal 
events in their lives, we sought to overcome some of the limitations in prior findings by 
implementing a naturalistic paradigm in which participants are either regulating emotional 
responses to their own negative autobiographical memories, or ostensibly helping another 
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participant to regulate their memories of aversive events.  Prior research on the regulation of 
negative autobiographical memories is limited to studies on the self-regulation of emotion.  
These studies have demonstrated recruitment of somewhat similar neural regions when 
regulating memories as when regulating responses to standardized stimuli, such as negative 
photos (Holland & Kensinger, 2013; Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 2009).  However, no 
prior studies have investigated the neural mechanisms of providing social emotion regulation in 
response to autobiographical memories.   
We had different predictions as to how the neural mechanisms underlying social emotion 
regulation may relate to those underlying the self-regulation of emotion.  First, it may be that the 
same neural mechanisms underlying intrapersonal emotion regulation also underlie social 
emotion regulation.  This finding would imply that the capacity to self-regulate should be 
strongly related to the ability to help others to regulate.  However, as some regions implicated in 
emotion regulation are also implicated in social processing (e.g., dlPFC, dmPFC), it may be that 
some regions within this network perform different computations to code for differences when 
regulating for oneself as compared to when regulating others.  Alternatively, it may be that 
during social emotion regulation, regions implicated in processing social information are 
recruited more strongly during social regulation as compared to self-regulation.  Such a finding 
would imply that the ability to regulate one’s own emotions may not necessarily have a direct 
association with the capacity for regulating the emotions of others, as these abilities may rely on 
differentiable neural processes.  Behaviorally, some evidence suggests that this may be the case.  
For example, it has been demonstrated that when reasoning about social dilemmas, people 
perform better when reasoning about other peoples’ dilemmas than when reasoning about their 
own dilemmas (Grossmann & Kross, 2014).  Different neural processes may underlie these 
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qualitative differences.  Understanding which of these hypotheses is supported would lead to 
critical insights into the mechanisms of how people provide emotional and regulatory support to 
others, and potentially inform how affective disorders and impairments to self-regulation impact 
one’s social relationships. 
 
Methods 
The study involved an initial behavioral session in which participants provided 
descriptions of negative and neutral autobiographical memories.  Participants eligible for MRI 
scanning were invited to participate in the second session in which they underwent fMRI 
scanning while reappraising their own memories and ostensibly those of another participant’s.   
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Columbia University community through flyers 
posted on campus.  Sixty-two participants were recruited for the initial behavioral session to 
obtain the target number of 40 participants who completed the second session involving fMRI 
scanning.  Of these 40 participants, data from four participants were excluded from analyses due 
to excessive movement during scanning, and data from two participants were removed from 
analyses due to their failure to respond to over half of the trial ratings.  Analyses were conducted 
on the remaining 34 participants (15 M/19 F, MAge = 23.8, range = 18-38). 
 
Behavioral Session  
Participants answered questions through email prior to participating in the behavioral 
session that screened for those eligible to undergo MRI scanning.  To be eligible for this session, 
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participants had to fulfill the following criteria: be at least 18 years of age, identify themselves as 
either female or male, have normal or corrected to normal vision, be able to perform computer 
tasks, be fluent in English, have no current or past history of neurological or psychiatric illness, 
not be currently on psychoactive drugs, have no metal devices or implants that are ferromagnetic 
and not removable, have no tattoos that are larger than two inches or were acquired in the past 6 
months, not be pregnant or possibly pregnant, and not have participated in a similar study at the 
lab involving the use of reappraisal.   
Upon arriving at the lab, an experimenter explained the procedures for the study and as 
part of the cover story for the study, told the participant that they would be writing about 
negative events from their lives and would also be providing support to another participant who 
has written about events from their life, and who would like to receive support.  As part of the 
cover story, participants were informed that they likewise would be asked at the end of the study 
whether or not they consent to potentially share their memories with other participants who could 
provide them support.  However, it was made clear that their decision would not impact any part 
of this study, and that providing consent did not necessarily ensure that their memories would be 
shared with others.  Participants provided written consent for the session, and then completed an 
fMRI safety screening form to ensure that they did not have any metals on them that would be a 
contraindication for MRI scanning.   
The experimenter then explained to the participant that they would be writing about 
personal events during this session on a computer, and would be asked to provide brief 
descriptions of 9 negative and 9 neutral events that they have experienced.  Prior to starting this 
task, participants were asked to practice writing out one negative and one neutral memory on 
paper so that the experimenter could ensure that the participant understood the directions.  
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Participants were told to think of different events to write about during this practice session and 
the main task.  For the negative memories, participants were instructed to write about an event 
that had occurred to them within the past 5 years, and that still makes them feel bad when 
recalling it.  They were instructed to report as concrete an event as possible that had happened 
during a specific time and place (as opposed to recalling a habitual task, general event, or 
protracted event such as a relationship that occurred over an extended period of time).  They 
were instructed to use 2-3 sentences to describe what happened during the event and the emotion 
it made them feel.  For the neutral memory, participants were given the same instructions, except 
they were told to write about an event that didn’t make them feel strongly at the time or when 
they recalled it.  In their description of the memory, they were asked to describe how the event 
made them feel (e.g., calm) or to state that it didn’t make them feel anything in particular, if that 
was the case.  To make these instructions more concrete, participants were given examples of the 
types of neutral events they could write about, such as when they were brushing their teeth 
earlier in the morning, or out for a run on a specific day.  After the experimenter confirmed that 
the participant provided examples of memories that fulfilled these requirements, participants 
were seated in front of a computer in a booth, where they completed the main task through a  
Qualtrics survey.  During the task, participants wrote about 9 negative memories in a row, and 9 
neutral memories in a row.  The order in which participants wrote about negative or neutral 
memories first was randomized across participants.  The instructions for these memories were 
the same as when they practiced writing them, except a word limit for each memory was set at 
200-300 characters (approximately 50-60 words).  After providing descriptions of the negative 
and neutral memories, participants were shown the descriptions of the memories again.  The 
negative memories were shown consecutively, as were the neutral memories.  The order in which 
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negative or neutral memories were displayed first was randomized across participants.  
Participants were instructed to read each of the memories they had written about, and to make 
ratings about each memory (e.g., emotion and vividness ratings. See Table 4.1 for examples of 
autobiographical memories). 
After rating all of the memories, the participant completed a battery of individual 
differences measures administered through another Qualtrics survey, which included the Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977) and the trait scale from the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  Following 
this, participants were told that they would then read the memories provided by a participant that 
they had been paired with, for whom they would be providing support to if they continued on to 
the second session involving MRI scanning.   
Participants were told that they were being asked to read these events so that they could 
start to get a sense of the other participant’s personality.  They were told that the other participant 
would be referred to as either Emily (if the participant identified as female) or Mark (if the 
participant identified as male), but that this was not the other person’s real name as their identity 
needed to be protected (this was done so that participants would not suspect their own identity 
would be revealed if they agreed to share their events with others).  Participants were then 
administered another Qualtrics survey, in which they read 8 negative and 8 neutral memories 
ostensibly described by the other participant (whom will be referred to as the target), and 
provided ratings for each memory similar to those they had rated for their own memories.  After 
reading and rating these events, participants made judgments about the target’s personality and 
rated how similar they perceived themselves to be to the target.  This was done to ensure that 






Upon completing these ratings, participants were asked to provide consent regarding whether or 
not they would be willing to share their events with other participants.  This session took about 
2.5 hours to complete, and participants were compensated $30. 
Participants were invited to complete the second session involving MRI scanning if they 
did not score above cutoff criteria on the depression and trait anxiety measures (> 16 on the 
CES-D, or > 60 on the STAI-T), and if they provided written responses that adhered to the 
instructions given.  Participants were not invited to complete the second session if they described 
memories deemed by the research team to be potentially traumatizing or that described acts or 
thoughts of self-injury.  Participants were also not invited to complete the second session if the 
negative and neutral memories were indistinguishable in emotional content. 
Examples of autobiographical memories 
 








“I did not get an interview for a position I 
really wanted, after having applied to the same 
position twice before. I knew that I met all of the 
qualifications they listed, and I was confused as 
to why I didn't seem like an ideal candidate to 







“I sat at my computer, going through a list of 
emails that I proceeded to answer one by one. I 
took my time to address each email, write a 
thoughtful response, and end with a proper 





fMRI Session  
 Participants eligible for the second session completed it within three weeks of the initial 
behavioral session.  Upon arriving for this session, participants provided written consent and 
were screened again to ensure they could be safely scanned.  Participants read the 
autobiographical memories they had described in the first session, as well as the target’s 
(presented as Emily or Mark) memories, and confirmed that they remembered the events 
described.  The experimenter then guided the participant through a practice session that 
instructed the participant on how to complete the task in the scanner.   
Participants were trained to take either an immerse or reframe perspective for their 
memories, or for the target’s memories.  For the immerse perspective, participants were 
instructed to imagine themselves in the scene described in their memory or the target’s memory.  
For their own memories, they were asked to imagine what they would see, hear, and feel if the 
events described were happening in the moment, with the emphasis being on experiencing the 
emotions they feel while immersing themselves in the memory.  For the target’s memories, 
participants were instructed to imagine how Emily or Mark would feel in the scene described in 
their event, with the emphasis being on imagining how the target would feel.  For the reframe 
perspective, participants were instructed to change the way they think about the situation 
described in their memory so that it causes them less distress.  They were told to take a 
distanced, more objective, and neutral perspective, or to try to think about positive aspects of the 
situation.  These instructions are similar to those used in prior studies on reappraisal (Doré et al., 
2018).  For the target’s memories, participants were instructed to imagine telling Emily or Mark 
how they could think about their memory differently.  As with their own memories, participants 
were told to help the target take a more distanced, or objective perspective, or to help 
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Emily/Mark understand that some aspect of their situation may not be as bad as it seems.  
Participants were told that they should imagine speaking directly to the target when reappraising 
for them in the scanner, and that they would be asked to write out their thoughts after the scan, 
which would then be provided to the other participant.  The targets’ memories are described in 
Tables S1 and S2, Appendix C).  
 Participants completed a 2 hour scan.  Eye-tracking data was collected during the scan, 
but this data is not analyzed or reported here.  Scout and anatomical scans were collected first.  
Along with the current task, participants completed another task involving similar instructions, in 
which they regulated their own emotions or helped the target to regulate in response to aversive 
images.  This task was presented in counterbalanced order with the current task, and will not be 
discussed in this manuscript.  A field map scan was collected in between tasks.  The current task 
took 40 m to complete, and consisted of two 20 m runs.  The task consisted of six conditions in 
which participants reflected on their own memories (Self), or the target’s memories (Other) 
(Self: Reframe negative, Immerse negative, Immerse neutral; Other: Reframe negative, Immerse 
negative, Immerse neutral).  There were eight trials in each condition, for a total of 48 trials in 
the entire task.  Participants completed one version out of four in which the target’s events were 
presented in different orders. 
During the task, participants were presented with 8 of their negative memories, 8 of their 
neutral memories, 8 of the target’s negative memories, and 8 of the target’s neutral memories.  
The first run presented the 8 negative memories from both the Self and Other conditions (half of 
the memories from each condition were presented for the Reframe perspective and half for the 
Immerse perspective), and 4 of the neutral memories from both the Self and Other conditions, in 
which only the Immerse perspective was taken.  In the second run, participants saw the same 
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negative memories again from the Self/Other conditions (but took the Immerse/Reframe 
perspective for the memory that had not been taken in the first run), and the other four neutral 
memories from the Self/Other conditions.  Trials were blocked together such that three trials 
were presented consecutively for the Self/Other conditions.  Each of these blocks consisted of 
one Reframe Negative, Immerse Negative, and Immerse Neutral trial, and the order of these 
trials within each block was presented randomly.  Random assignment determined whether 
participants started the task with a block of trials from the Self or Other condition.  
Stimuli were presented with E-Prime 3 via projections to a screen positioned behind the 
participant, which were observed from a mirror on the participant’s head coil.  Stimuli consisted 
of white text on a black background.  The trial layout consisted of a 2 s cue at the beginning of 
each block of three trials that indicated whether the next three trials were in the Self or Other 
condition.  This 2 s cue indicated Self for the Self condition, and Emily for the Other condition 
for female participants, or Mark for male participants.  Participants were then presented with the 
description of either their memory or the target’s memory for 15 s.  They were instructed to read 
the description during this period, which is referred to as the Recall period.  Following this, 
participants were presented with an instruction to take either the immerse or reframe perspective.  
For the Self condition, participants were instructed to “Immerse for Self” or “Reframe for Self”, 
whereas for the Other condition, participants were instructed to “Immerse for Emily/Mark”, or 
“Reframe for Emily/Mark”.  This screen was presented for 15 s, followed by a 1-3s jittered ISI.  
On the next screen, participants used a five button response pad to rate on a 5-point Likert scale 
either how bad they felt at the moment after taking the Immerse or Reframe perspective for the 
Self condition, or how bad they think target would feel for the Other condition (1 = Not at all, 5 
= Very much).  For the Other condition, participants were asked to rate how the target would feel 
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in their situation for the Immerse condition, or how the target would feel after receiving their 
help with reframing the memory (according to what they had thought of when instructed to 
reframe for the target).  This rating screen appeared for 3 s.  Following this, a 2 s cue appeared to 
indicate that an arrows task would appear soon.  The arrows task served as an active baseline 
task in which participants indicated the direction that an arrow on the screen was pointing.  This 
active baseline task was performed for 8.5 s, and then followed by a 3-7 s ITI (see Figure 4.1 for 
trial layout). 
After the scan, participants were asked to write out a selection of what they had thought 
about when reframing the memories for the Self and Other conditions, and to make ratings about 




Figure 4.1. Trial layout for Self and Other conditions. 
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fMRI Image Acquisition 
 Imaging data were collected with a 3T Siemens Prisma MRI scanner with a 64-channel 
head/neck coil.  Structural volumes were acquired using a high-resolution T1-weighted sagittal 
3D MPRAGE sequence yielding 1-mm3 isotropic voxels.  Functional volumes were acquired 
using a T2*-sensitive multiband echo-planar imaging sequence with the following parameters: 
repetition time = 2000 ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 77°, field of view = 204 mm.  Each 
volume consisted of 66 interleaved 2-mm slices with a multiband factor of 3, acquired near 
parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure axis.  Two runs of 625 volumes were 
collected.   
 
Behavioral Analyses 
 Analysis of behavioral data was conducted with R version 3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2018) 
and RStudio version1.1.453 (RStudio Team, 2016). 
 
fMRI Analyses 
Preprocessing.  Data preprocessing was conducted with fmriprep 1.2.2 (Esteban et al., 
2019), which is based on Nipype 1.1.5 (Gorgolewski et al., 2011; Gorgolewski et al., 2019), and 
consisted of motion correction, co-registration of functional and structural data that accounted 
for estimated susceptibility distortion from a field map, and normalization to the standard 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain template (see Appendix C for details).  Four 
participants with excessive head movements were excluded from further analyses, with the 
criteria for exclusion being at least 20% of volumes in either run with at least a .5 mm change in 
spatial location as estimated by the framewise displacement. 
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First-level analyses.  First-level analyses consisted of fitting an ordinary least squares 
general linear model (GLM) for each subject, and were implemented with NeuroElf version 1.1 
(neuroelf.net) (Doré et al., 2018; Silvers et al., 2015).  The period during which participants 
performed the arrows task was pooled into the implicit baseline of the model.  This active 
baseline was used to prevent participants from engaging in autobiographical memory recall 
during the implicit baseline period (Doré et al., 2018; Kross et al., 2009).  The following periods 
were modeled as boxcar functions convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function: self/other condition cue, recall, immerse/reframe, rating, and the cue prior to the arrows 
task.  Except for the cue prior to the arrows task, separate regressors were entered for all other 
task periods for the Self and Other conditions.  Separate regressors were entered for the Immerse 
and Reframe periods.  In addition, separate regressors were entered for the negative and neutral 
memory conditions for the recall and immerse/reframe periods (e.g., during the immerse/reframe 
period, for the Self and Other conditions, separate regressors were entered for the Immerse 
Negative, Reframe Negative, and Immerse Neutral conditions).  In addition to temporal filtering 
regressors accounting for frequencies below 0.003Hz (328-second cutoff DCT basis set), six 
rigid-body motion-correction parameters, estimated by fmriprep, as well as their discrete 
derivatives, together with six additional global signal parameters, estimated from a principle 
components analysis of all white matter voxels, were entered as nuisance regressors to account 
for variability in the signal (e.g. from head movement and BOLD-unrelated variability). The 
parameter estimate (beta) maps obtained from these analyses were used for the subsequent 
second-level group analyses.  The critical analyses focused on the Immerse/Reframe period, 
during which participants were instructed to immerse or reappraise either their own, or the 
target’s, autobiographical memories.   
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 Mass univariate analyses. Second-level random-effects analyses at the group level were 
implemented in NeuroElf, using spatial smoothing with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel.  Whole-brain 
analyses were thresholded at a voxel-wise level of p < .001, combined with a cluster-size 
requirement determined using a non-parametric permutation-based approach.  Alphasim-based 
thresholding at the same p < .001 voxel-wise level was used as a more relaxed criterion if the 
permutation-based threshold did not yield any significant activations, and for conjunction 
analyses.  Thresholding was implemented in NeuroElf with a whole-brain familywise error-
corrected value of p < .05.  All activation peaks are reported in MNI space. 
 Pattern similarity analyses. To assess effects of pattern similarity (PS) independent of 
the main effects of regulation condition (Reframe Negative vs. Immerse Negative) and 
perspective (Self vs. Other), the functional data used for PS analyses were residuals of data from 
the first-level mass univariate GLM, which had the main effects removed.  PS analyses were 
conducted on voxels extracted from 8 ROIs defined by a conjunction analysis of the Self and 
Other conditions, for the contrast Reframe Negative > Immerse Negative (p = .01, ka = 167.  A 
more liberal threshold was used to define ROIs than that used to assess significant activations to 
ensure that relevant voxels would be included in the ROIs).  PS analyses were conducted on the 
4 s window within the range of 8-12 s into the recall and immerse/reframe periods to account for 
the hemodynamic delay as well as to avoid activation reflecting boundary effects from the 
preceding stimulus cue.  Functional data collected from the two volumes within this window 
were averaged separately for each trial to obtain a measure of activity for each voxel during the 
trial. 
 For each ROI, PS was estimated by storing the voxel values as a one-dimensional vector 
per trial, followed by computing Pearson’s correlations between vectors that represented trials 
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across runs.  In other words, correlations were not run between trials occurring in the same run.  
This was done to avoid spurious correlations introduced by unexplained residual variance from 
the first-level.  To correctly account for different errors along the distribution, correlation values 
were transformed using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, and then averaged within each subject.  
Mean correlation values were obtained from correlations computed between the following 
conditions: Self reframe negative/Self reframe negative, Other reframe negative/Other reframe 
negative, Self reframe negative/Other reframe negative.  To assess whether PS effects are 
specific to the reappraisal condition, mean correlation values were also obtained from 
correlations performed between the following conditions as control measures: Self recall/Self 
recall, Other recall/Other recall, Self recall/Other recall, Self immerse negative/Self immerse 
negative, Other immerse negative/Other immerse negative, Self immerse negative/Other 
immerse negative.  These values were input into one-tailed t-tests to determine if a significant 
degree of pattern similarity was present in a condition. Paired t-tests were performed to assess 
whether correlations run within the Self and Other conditions exhibited a greater degree of 




 As expected, in both the Self and Other conditions, emotion ratings were highest in the 
Immerse Negative condition (Self: M = 3.80, SD = .56; Other: M = 3.73, SD = .60), lower in the 
Reframe Negative condition (Self: M = 2.47, SD = .64; Other: M = 2.60, SD = .61), and lowest in 
the Immerse Neutral condition (Self: M = 1.21, SD = .29; Other: M = 1.60, SD = .32).  Paired t-
tests indicated that for both conditions, the mean for ratings in the Reframe Negative condition 
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was significantly lower than the mean for ratings in the Immerse Negative condition (Self: MDiff 
= -1.33, 95% CI [-1.60, -1.06], t(33) = -9.96, p < .001; Other: MDiff = -1.13, 95% CI [-1.38, -.88], 
t(33) = -9.30, p < .001), indicating that participants were able to successfully use reappraisal to 
regulate their emotional responses to negative memories, and also perceived to successfully help 
the target to regulate their emotions.  Paired t-tests also indicated that as expected, the mean for 
ratings in the Immerse Neutral condition was significantly lower than the mean for ratings in the 
Reframe Negative condition (Self: MDiff = -1.26, 95% CI [-1.49, -1.04], t(33) = -11.39, p < .001; 
Other: MDiff = -1.00, 95% CI [-1.19, -.80], t(33) = -10.52, p < .001). 
 As the set of negative memories for the target had been selected to approximate the level 
of negative affect induced on average by participants’ own memories, as expected, a paired 
samples t-test indicated that there was no significant difference in the means for the Immerse 
Negative ratings for the Self and Other condition (MDiff = .07, 95% CI [-.084, .22], t(33) = .93, p 
= .36).  However, there was a trend level difference in emotion ratings between the Self and 
Other conditions for the Reframe Negative condition (MDiff = -.13, 95% CI [-.28, .027], t(33) = -
1.67, p = .10), and a significant difference for the Immerse Neutral condition (MDiff = -.39, 95% 
CI [-.51, -.27], t(33) = -6.56, p < .001; see Figure 4.2). 
To assess whether the capacity for self and social regulation are associated with each 
other, we first calculated emotion regulation success scores by subtracting the mean of reframe 
ratings from the mean of the immerse ratings, separately for the Self and Other conditions, and 
then performed a correlation between the success scores.  Regulation success for self and social 
regulation was highly correlated (rs = .64, p < .001, see Figure 4.3), indicating that these two 





Figure 4.2. Mean emotion ratings across trials indicating how bad the participant feels (Self 





Main effects of reflecting on autobiographical memories for Self vs. Other.  As a replication 
of findings in the prior literature on neural processes underlying self-reflection and mentalizing, 
we first compared the main effect of reflecting on one’s own autobiographical memories as 
compared to reflecting on another person’s memories.  For this analysis, the Immerse Negative, 
Reframe Negative, and Immerse Neutral periods were collapsed for the Self and Other 
conditions.  In line with prior findings (Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012), reflecting on 
one’s own memories elicited activation in the vmPFC, as compared to reflecting on another 




Figure 4.3. Correlation between the Self and Other conditions for regulation success (Immerse 
negative – Reframe negative).  Band represents 95% confidence interval for the regression line. 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient is displayed. 
 
 
and theory of mind (Carter et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012; Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), reflecting on another person’s memories elicited activation in areas 
including the dmPFC, dlPFC, temporo-parietal junction, and temporal pole (p < .001, ka = 79; 
see Figure 4.4).  These findings demonstrate predicted differences as a function of reflecting on 





Figure 4.4. Activity for Self > Other (orange) and Other > Self (blue). Immerse negative, 
Reframe negative, and Immerse neutral trials were collapsed for the Self and Other conditions.  
Clusters were thresholded with alphasim at p = .001, k = 79, which corresponded to a whole-
brain familywise error corrected value of p < .05. 
 
 
Does regulating for self and others recruit similar neural regions?  Separate analyses 
for the self and other conditions indicated that neural regions recruited when reframing negative 
memories, as compared to immersing in negative memories, were largely overlapping when 
regulating one’s own emotions and when helping another person to regulate (see Tables S3 and 
S4 in Appendix C for regions recruited during self and social regulation).  A conjunction analysis 
for the Self and Other maps indicated that Reframing as compared to Immersing in negative 
memories elicited activation in the dlPFC, vlPFC, dmPFC, caudate, inferior parietal lobule (IPL), 
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and anterior temporal lobe (p < .001, ka = 61).  No regions were significantly more active when 
immersing in negative events than when reframing negative events (see Figure 4.5). An ANOVA 
conducted to assess differences between the Self vs. Other, and Reframe Negative vs. Immerse 
Negative conditions, did not yield any significant activations at an alphasim-based threshold of p 
< .001, ka = 113. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Conjunction map of Self and Other conditions for Reframe negative > Immerse 
negative.  Clusters were thresholded with alphasim at p = .001, k = 61, which corresponded to a 
whole-brain familywise error corrected value of p < .05. 
 
Do regions implicated in reappraisal code for self vs. social regulation? While similar 
neural regions were recruited during self and social regulation, it may be that these regions 
perform different computations when reappraising for oneself as opposed to when regulating 
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others.  If this is the case, these regions should contain different patterns of voxel activity during 
the reframing period for the Self and Other conditions.  This may be particularly the case for 
regions implicated in processing social information, such as the dmPFC and anterior temporal 
pole (Denny et al., 2012; Olson et al., 2007; Ross & Olson, 2010).   
To assess whether neural regions involved in reappraisal contain different patterns of 
activity when regulating for self and others, we assessed pattern similarity (PS) within the 
regions jointly recruited during reappraisal in these conditions.  If these regions are performing 
different computations during self and social regulation, patterns within these regions should 
show differential levels of similarity during the reframe period, when trials in the Self and Other 
conditions are correlated within condition, as compared to across conditions.  
PS was assessed between the following conditions in Run 1 and Run 2 (Self/Self, 
Self/Other, Other/Other) in the following 8 ROIs obtained from a conjunction analysis for Self 
and Other, for Reframe negative > Immerse negative: dlPFC, IFG, vlPFC, dmPFC, caudate, IPL, 
middle temporal gyrus, and the temporal pole.  To establish that patterns of voxel activity in 
these regions were present in either the Self Reframe or Other Reframe conditions, ROIs were 
selected that demonstrated a mean correlation value for either the Self/Self or Other/Other 
condition that was significant when using Bonferroni correction for 16 comparisons (t ≥  3.19, p 
≤ .003).  The dlPFC, dmPFC, IPL, and temporal pole met this criteria.  For the dlPFC, dmPFC, 
and IPL, the mean correlation for Self/Self met this criteria, whereas the mean correlation for 
Other/Other did not, indicating the presence of a voxel pattern for self regulation in these 
regions.  For the temporal pole, the mean correlation for Other/Other met this criteria, whereas 
the mean correlation for Self/Self did not, indicating the presence of a voxel pattern for social 

































Notes. Means of r-to-z transformed correlation coefficients for correlations between Reframe 
negative trials within the Self and Other conditions.  t-scores were obtained from one-tailed t-
tests that determined whether the means of correlations within the Self and Other conditions 
were significantly greater than 0.  Significance (indicated by *) was determined by Bonferonni 
correction for 16 comparisons (t ≥  3.19, p ≤ .003).  The ROIs consisted of the following MNI 
peak coordinates and voxel sizes: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (-40, 14, 51, 574 voxels); inferior 
frontal gyrus (-53, 21, 11, 224 voxels); ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (-47, 40, -7, 247 voxels); 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (-11, 33, 52, 1586 voxels); caudate (-16, 6, 13, 527 voxels); 
inferior parietal lobule (-49, -61, 32, 768 voxels); temporal pole (-53, 1, -28, 1048 voxels); 
middle temporal gyrus (-52, -36, 0, 216 voxels).  
 
 
Similarity of voxel patterns when reframing negative memories (n = 34) 
ROI Self Condition Other Condition 
 M (SD) t p M (SD) t p 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
.04 (.05) 4.66 < .001* .02 (.04) 2.20 .035 
Inferior frontal gyrus .03 (.05) 3.11 .004 .02 (.05) 2.54 .016 
Ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
.02 (.06) 1.96 .058 .01 (.06) 1.09 .28 
Dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex 
.03 (.04) 4.94 < .001* .01 (.04) 1.87 .070 
Caudate .01 (.04) 2.07 .046 .007 (.03) 1.47 .15 
Inferior parietal lobule .09 (.10) 5.34 < .001* .04 (.08) 2.93 .006 
Temporal pole .01 (.04) 1.88 .069 .02 (.03) 3.61 .001* 
Middle temporal gyrus .03 (.06) 2.44 .020 .009 (.05) 1.13 .27 
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To ensure that in these four regions, patterns were specific to self or social regulation, we 
compared the mean correlation value of either Self/Self or Other/Other with the mean correlation 
value for Self/Other obtained from the region.  Paired t-tests were used, with Bonferroni 
correction for 4 comparisons to test whether Self/Self exhibited greater similarity than Self/Other 
in the dlPFC, dmPFC, and IPL, and whether Other/Other exhibited greater similarity than 
Self/Other in the temporal pole (significance at t ≥  2.64, p ≤ .013).  These comparisons indicated 
that the IPL differentiated between Self/Self and Self/Other (t =  2.74, p = .010), whereas the 
temporal pole differentiated between Other/Other and Self/Other (t =  2.89, p = .007) at a 
significant level. 
To assess whether the similarity differences in IPL and the temporal pole are specific to 
using reappraisal, as opposed to more general processes that may differentiate between the Self 
and Other conditions, the same comparisons were made for the Immerse and Recall periods.  
These comparisons were not significant for the IPL when comparing Self/Self to Self/Other 
(Immerse: t =  .14, p = .89; Recall; t =  .73, p = .47), or for the temporal pole when comparing 
Other/Other to Self/Other (Immerse: t =  .73, p = .47; Recall; t =  1.62, p = .11).  These findings 
indicate that the IPL and temporal pole contained patterns that differentiated between self-









Figure 4.6. Plots display the difference between mean correlation values for voxel patterns 
within either the Self or Other conditions, and the mean correlation values between the Self and 
Other conditions.  a) The mean of correlations within the Self condition was greater than the 
mean of correlations between the Self/Other conditions in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL).  This 
was the case when participants reframed their negative memories (t =  2.74, p = .010), but not 
when immersing in the negative memories (t =  .14, p = .89) or recalling the memories (t =  .73, 
p = .47).  b) The mean of correlations within the Other condition was greater than the mean of 
correlations between the Self/Other conditions in the temporal pole.  This was the case when 
participants reframed negative memories for the target (t =  2.89, p = .007), but not when 
immersing in the target’s negative memories (t =  .73, p = .47) or recalling them (t =  1.62, p = 





 The aim of this study was to investigate the neural mechanisms of providing social 
emotion regulation, specifically when helping others to reappraise negative autobiographical 
memories.  To accomplish this, we compared social regulation to self-regulation while 
participants reappraised or immersed in negative autobiographical memories that described 
events either from their own lives, or ostensibly experienced by another participant.  We 
hypothesized that while similar neural structures would be recruited for self and social 
regulation, some regions may distinguish between regulating for self as compared to others. 
Our findings inform how the capacity to regulate one’s own emotions is related to the 
capacity to help others to regulate.  Behavioral results indicated that participants were able to 
successfully regulate their own emotions, and perceived to successfully regulate the target’s 
emotions.  The capacity for self and social regulation were highly correlated.  fMRI results 
indicated that largely overlapping neural regions were recruited during self and social regulation.  
These regions consisted of the dlPFC, vlPFC, dmPFC, and IPL ⎯ areas commonly implicated in 
prior research on the neural mechanisms of reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014).  In addition, the 
temporal pole, which is implicated in autobiographical memories and processing of social 
information, was recruited for both self and social regulation.   
Multivariate pattern similarity analyses indicated that within this “reappraisal network” 
for autobiographical memories, the IPL and temporal pole contained patterns of activity that 
distinguished between self and social regulation.  Specifically, self-regulation was associated 
with patterns of activity in the IPL that were similar to each other, whereas social regulation was 
associated with patterns of activity in the temporal pole that were similar to each other.  These 
results suggest that the IPL and temporal pole may be regions in which regulatory and social 
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processes interact when reappraising autobiographical memories.  While both of these regions 
show greater activation when reframing for both self and others, as well as greater activation 
when reflecting on others’ memories as compared to one’s own memories, the differential 
patterns of activity for self and social regulation were independent of these main effects.   
Speculatively, pattern similarity for self-regulation in the IPL may reflect the kinds of 
attentional processes employed when regulating for the self as opposed to others.  On the other 
hand, social emotion regulation was associated with similar patterns of activity in the temporal 
pole.  The temporal pole is implicated in inferring the mental and emotional states of others, and 
is also implicated in empathy.  The left temporal pole, which was activated during reappraisal for 
self and others, is associated with retrieving semantic social knowledge and associating such 
knowledge (e.g., names and traits) to other people.  Intriguingly, the temporal pole is thought to 
be a region responsible for drawing information from autobiographical memories to infer the 
mental states of others (Olson et al., 2007).  Damage to the temporal pole has been documented 
to result in impaired social behaviors, deficits in the ability to maintain social relationships, and 
decreased motivation for affiliative behaviors (Olson et al., 2007; Ross & Olson, 2010).  As 
social regulation utilizes mentalizing processes to infer what would be most helpful for the target 
of social regulation, it is likely to require a greater degree of semantic social knowledge than 
self-regulation.  The temporal pole may code for social regulation, in order to facilitate the use of 
semantic social knowledge and integration of autobiographical memories for formulating 
strategies best suited for helping others to reappraise distressing memories. 
Much research has been conducted on the neural mechanisms of reappraisal in the 
context of intrapersonal emotion regulation.  This research has delineated how the neural 
mechanisms underlying emotion regulation are impacted in affective and psychiatric disorders.  
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Much emphasis in this work has been on the role of prefrontal regions, such as the dlPFC, 
vlPFC, and dmPFC, in down-regulating structures involved in affective responding such as the 
amygdala and ventral striatum (Buhle et al., 2014).  Our findings highlight the role of the IPL 
and temporal pole in emotion regulation, but further research will be needed to understand how 
these regions contribute to self and social regulation.  This study is one of the first to investigate 
the neural mechanisms of providing social emotion regulation, and to our knowledge, the first 
study to investigate social emotion regulation in the context of regulating autobiographical 
memories.  Our results have implications for future research, which may seek to understand how 
disorders that impact self-regulation may also impact the ability to socially regulate others and to 




















Theoretical models of emotion and emotion regulation in psychology have predominantly 
considered these processes to be intrapersonal in nature.  This dissertation sought to formulate 
how social processes are implicated in experiencing and regulating emotions.  The first body of 
research investigated this in the context of understanding how empathy is involved in 
experiencing anxiety.  In four studies, we demonstrated that trait empathy and empathic concern, 
but not trait anxiety, were associated with perceiving greater anxiety to be experienced by target 
victims facing threats, and with experiencing greater vicarious anxiety when observing the 
victims.  Empathy was also associated with greater risk-aversion after observing target victims, a 
behavioral outcome associated with experiencing anxiety.  In addition, inducing greater state 
empathy when observing target victims facing threats led to a greater degree of sleep disruption 
to be reported during the following night, a symptom implicated in experiencing trauma.  
Anxiety is an emotion of particular importance as anxiety disorders are the most commonly 
experienced affective disorders (Kessler & Greenberg, 2002).  The concept of anxiety is also 
theoretically significant.  As a response to threat and uncertainty, it is considered by many to be a 
primary source of motivation.  As noted by Richard Lazarus, “One cannot help but be struck by 
the tendency in psychology to regard anxiety as the key emotion in both healthy adaptation and 
psychopathology, especially the latter.” (Lazarus, 1991a, p. 234).  Understanding how anxiety 
may be experienced via social processes is likely to lead to a better understanding of how to 
manage it in everyday life and in therapeutic contexts. 
 The second body of research investigated how perception of emotions in others can guide 
selection of social emotion regulation strategies to help others manage their emotions.  In two 
multi-phase studies, we addressed the question of how social emotion regulation can be best 
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implemented by first drawing from the social support literature.  In the first study, we 
demonstrated that different social support strategies delineated to either modulate another’s 
emotional response (i.e., emotional support), or help another to actively change their situation 
(i.e., advice) were believed to be differentially helpful for targets experiencing events in their 
lives causing anxiety or sadness.  As hypothesized, providers of support believed emotional 
support to be more helpful for those experiencing sadness, and advice to be more helpful for 
those experiencing anxiety.  In the second study, we demonstrated a similar predicted pattern 
when investigating what kinds of emotion regulation strategies would be most helpful when 
socially implemented for people experiencing anxiety and sadness.  We demonstrated that 
situation modification and reappraisal, when implemented as social emotion regulation 
strategies, are perceived and judged to be differentially helpful for those experiencing anxiety 
and sadness.  This was the case when targets received written responses from providers 
implementing these strategies, as well as when targets retrospectively reflected on how helpful 
the provider’s response had been for them a month after receiving it. 
 The third body of research investigated the neural mechanisms of social emotion 
regulation in the context of helping others reappraise negative autobiographical memories.  In 
this study, we demonstrate that the capacity for self and social regulation, as indicated through 
self-reported ratings of emotion regulation success, are strongly related.  Congruently, the neural 
structures recruited during self and social regulation are largely overlapping and recruit neural 
structures commonly implicated in reappraisal during intrapersonal emotion regulation.  
However, patterns of activity in the IPL and temporal pole differentiate between self and social 
regulation, suggesting that these regions may perform different computations when regulating for 
oneself as opposed to others.   
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 These three bodies of research used naturalistic and ecologically valid stimuli to 
investigate how social processes are involved in emotions and emotion regulation.  These stimuli 
ranged from horror movie clips, to autobiographical memories.  The use of such naturalistic 
stimuli is important for inducing and representing the social and affective phenomena under 
investigation.  However, stimuli that are less complex in nature and that can isolate more specific 
variables may elucidate more clearly how social and affective processes interact in future work. 
 
Implications and further research 
Implications for clinical disorders 
 Considering the role of interpersonal processes in the experience and regulation of 
emotions has implications for understanding basic models of emotion as well as affective 
disorders.  While the role of social processes in affective disorders has been documented in prior 
literature, the mechanisms for this are not well understood.  For example, it has been documented 
that symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can occur as a consequence of being 
exposed to others who have experienced trauma.  This has been documented to occur frequently 
in those who work in professions that involve caring for others who have experienced trauma 
(e.g., nurses, therapists, social workers) (Beck, 2011; Bride, 2007; Hesse, 2002).  While this 
phenomenon has been attributed to empathic processes (Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2014), there 
does not seem to be a systematic framework for understanding the mechanisms by which it 
occurs.  Formulating a role for social processes in models of emotion and emotion regulation 
may allow one to make better predictions as to how one’s social environment, and social 
appraisals, may lead to maladaptive emotional responses.  Doing so may also inform how social 
appraisals may contribute to the development and maintenance of other affective disorders such 
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as social anxiety, or depression, which has been observed to at times be triggered by social 
outcomes such as rejection (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992).  
 
Implications for decision-making 
The research in this dissertation highlights how the emotions of others may guide our 
decisions.  In the first body of work, we observed that empathy and experiencing vicarious 
anxiety is associated with greater risk-aversion when exposed to others facing threats.  In the 
second body of work, we find that the emotions of others can guide us in determining optimal 
ways for helping them.  Being able to utilize the informational content of others’ emotions, in 
conjunction with the ability to regulate one’s responses to them, may allow one to better navigate 
complex environments.  While lay conceptions of emotions have often considered emotions to be 
disruptive to reasoning, modern psychology has taken a less dualistic view of emotion and 
cognition.  As discussed, appraisal theories of emotion have proposed these two constructs to be 
interlinked.  However, shifting away from this dualistic view has also informed understanding of 
decision-making.  Classic studies in psychology have demonstrated that optimal decision-making 
often involves recruitment of affective processes, and that decision-making can be detrimentally 
impacted when affective processes are impaired (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Lerner, 
Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006).  In a separate line of research, 
wisdom has been proposed to reflect optimal decision-making in complex scenarios that are 
affective and social in nature (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Grossmann et al., 2010).   
 Understanding how social and affective systems interact may elucidate the mechanisms by 
which we make wise decisions in complex scenarios, an important ability in a world that at times 




The research in this dissertation sought to investigate how social processes are involved 
in experiencing and regulating emotions.  Understanding how the way we interact with others 
may be interconnected with how we experience our emotions may enable us to better regulate 
our own and others’ emotions, and to build stronger relationships with others.  Fostering 
knowledge about how emotions interact with our social environment may also help to tackle 
broader societal issues that pertain to improving mental health services and treatments.  Perhaps, 
such research may also elucidate the processes by which we can make wiser decisions when 
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Trait and state anxiety measures: 
STAI – State and Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STAI-T – Trait measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STAI-S – State measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STAI-SPre-Task – STAI-S administered prior to watching the film clips 
STAI-SPost-Task – STAI-S administered after watching the film clips 
ΔSTAI-S – Change in STAI-S scores after the task (STAI-SPost-Task − STAI-SPre-Task) 
 
Trait empathy measures: 
General Empathy Scale 
IRI – Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
IRI (EC) – Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI 
IRI (PD) – Personal Distress subscale of the IRI 
IRI (Fa) – Fantasy subscale of the IRI 
IRI (PT) – Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI 
 
Trait emotional reactivity measures: 
BEQ – Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
IS – Impulse Strength subscale of the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
ERS – Emotion Reactivity Scale 
 
Risk-taking measures: 
DOSPERT – Domain Specific Risk Attitude Scale (Health/Safety and Recreational subscales) 
ΔDOSPERT – Change in DOSPERT scores (DOSPERTPost-Task − DOSPERTPre-Task) 
 
Other measures: 
AQ – Autism Quotient 
DW – Belief in a Dangerous World Scale 
ERQ – Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
PB – Paranormal Beliefs Scale 
RRS – Rumination Response Scale 




Correlations involving continuous variables that are normally distributed are tested with 
Pearson’s r.  Correlations involving continuous variables with at least one variable that has a 
non-normal distribution are tested with Spearman’s rho (rs) (see Table S1).  Correlations 
involving a continuous and categorical variable are tested with point biserial correlations (rpb). 








Study 1 (n = 47)   
Mean Amusement .13* .92** 
Mean Anger .15** .89*** 
Mean Anxiety .11 .97 
Mean Anxiety (Composite) .09 .97 
Mean Confusion .08 .97 
Mean Contempt .16** .91** 
Mean Disgust .09 .98 
Mean Fear .11 .96 
Mean Interest .06 .98 
Mean Sadness .13* .93** 
Mean Surprise .09 .98 
Mean Unhappiness .08 .97 
Mean Audio Intensity .14* .97 
Mean Affective Valence .12 .91** 
Mean Seen Film .25*** .76*** 
Mean Looked Away .24*** .74*** 
Mean Startle .14* .89*** 
Mean Event Likelihood .10 .94* 
Mean Event Likelihood - Self  .13* .93** 
Mean Escape Likelihood  .10 .96 
Age .28*** .72*** 
General Empathy Scale .10 .98 
STAI-SPre-Task .10 .96 
STAI-SPost-Task .13 .95* 
ΔSTAI-S .07 .97 
STAI-T .06 .98 
Study 2 (n = 60)   
Mean Amusement .21*** .76*** 
Mean Anger .13* .95* 
Mean Anxiety .13* .94** 
Mean Anxiety (Composite) .12* .95* 
Mean Confusion .12* .96 
Mean Contempt .14** .92*** 
Mean Disgust .07 .99 
Mean Fear .13* .90*** 
Mean Interest .11 .98 
Mean Sadness .10 .96* 
Mean Surprise .11 .87*** 
Mean Unhappiness .08 .97 
Mean Escape Likelihood .16*** .97 
Mean Identified Victim .14** .93** 
Mean Audio Intensity .13* .96 
Mean Affective Valence .12* .94** 
Mean Seen Film .22*** .78*** 
Mean Looked Away .25*** .73*** 
Mean Startle .19*** .87*** 
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Mean Event Likelihood .12* .93*** 
Mean Event Likelihood - Self  .16*** .88*** 
Age .29*** .67*** 
General Empathy Scale .07 .98 
STAI-T .12* .96 
STAI-SPre-Task .15** .94** 
STAI-SPost-Task .09 .97 
ΔSTAI-S .13* .96* 
Study 3 (n = 60)   
Mean Amusement - Self .14** .91*** 
Mean Anxiety - Self .10 .96 
Mean Anxiety (Composite) - Self .13* .96 
Mean Fear - Self .12* .96 
Mean Sadness - Self .18*** .88*** 
Mean Amusement - Victim .25*** .73*** 
Mean Anxiety - Victim .16*** .91*** 
Mean Anxiety (Composite) - Victim .13* .92*** 
Mean Fear - Victim .17*** .90*** 
Mean Sadness - Victim .18*** .92*** 
Age .23*** .77*** 
General Empathy Scale .06 .99 
BEQ (Total) .09 .98 
BEQ (IS subscale) .08 .98 
IRI (Total) .09 .97 
IRI (EC) .13* .96* 
IRI (Fa) .08 .98 
IRI (PD) .08 .99 
IRI (PT) .08 .98 
STAI-SPre-Task .09 .96 
STAI-SPost-Task .08 .98 
ΔSTAI-S .14** .95* 
STAI-T .08 .98 
Study 4 – Empathy Condition (n = 50) 
Mean Amusement - Self .22*** .75*** 
Mean Anxiety - Self .12 .89*** 
Mean Calm - Self .18*** .93** 
Mean Sadness - Self .16** .89*** 
Mean Amusement - Victim .31*** .57*** 
Mean Anxiety - Victim .14* .88*** 
Mean Calm - Victim .12 .93** 
Mean Sadness - Victim .15** .94** 
Mean Perspective Ability .12 .91*** 
Age .36*** .45*** 
BEQ (Total) .06 .99 
BEQ (IS subscale) .09 .98 
DOSPERTPre-Task .10 .97 
DOSPERTPost-Task .08 .97 
ΔDOSPERT .12 .95* 
ERQ (Reappraisal) .06 .99 
ERS (Total) .09 .98 
IRI (Total) .11 .93** 
IRI (EC) .17*** .85*** 
IRI (Fa) .08 .94* 
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IRI (PD) .09 .98 
IRI (PT) .17*** .94* 
STAI-SPre-Task .11 .94* 
STAI-SPost-Task .07 .99 
ΔSTAI-S .09 .98 
Experienced Anxiety in past 
24 hrs (follow-up item)  
(n = 49) 
.20*** .90*** 
Thought of images in past 24 
hours (follow-up item)  
(n = 49) 
.20*** .93** 
Sleep disruption (follow-up) 
(n = 49) 
.24*** .82*** 
STAI-S (follow-up) (n = 49) .11 .96 
Study 4 – Objective Condition (n = 50) 
Mean Amusement - Self .11 .94* 
Mean Anxiety - Self .06 .98 
Mean Calm - Self .13* .98 
Mean Sadness - Self .27*** .75*** 
Mean Amusement - Victim .32*** .54*** 
Mean Anxiety - Victim .23*** .70*** 
Mean Calm - Victim .15** .89*** 
Mean Sadness - Victim .12 .95* 
Mean Perspective Ability .07 .97 
Age .31*** .69*** 
BEQ (Total) .06 .995 
BEQ (IS subscale) .06 .98 
DOSPERTPre-Task .12 .95* 
DOSPERTPost-Task .10 .96 
ΔDOSPERT .12 .95* 
ERQ (Reappraisal) .09 .98 
ERS (Total) .10 .97 
IRI (Total) .08 .98 
IRI (EC) .10 .97 
IRI (Fa) .10 .96 
IRI (PD) .11 .97 
IRI (PT) .10 .98 
STAI-SPre-Task .14* .94* 
STAI-SPost-Task .12 .97 
ΔSTAI-S .09 .99 
Experienced Anxiety in past 
24 hrs (follow-up item) 
.25*** .81*** 
Thought of images in past 24 
hours (follow-up item) 
.25*** .89*** 
Sleep disruption (follow-up) .27*** .70*** 
STAI-S (follow-up) .14* .95* 
Study 4 – Both Conditions (n = 99) 
Experienced Anxiety in past 
24 hrs (follow-up item) 
.22*** .86*** 
Thought of images in past 24 
hours (follow-up item) 
.19*** .91*** 
Sleep disruption (follow-up) .27*** .75*** 
STAI-S (follow-up) .09 .97* 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table S2. Questionnaires Administered 
 
Questionnaire Scale # Items MSum (SD) Cronbach’s a 
Study 1 (n = 47)     
Pre-Task 
General Empathy  
Scale 
9 pt. 30 191.32 (26.46) .89 
DW 5 pt. 12 30.40 (6.24) .81 
PB 7 pt. 26 59.38 (22.74) .92 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 34.09 (8.30) .88 
STAI-T 4 pt. 20 40.94 (9.81) .91 
Post-Task 
DW 5 pt. 12 30.96 (8.15) .89 
PB 7 pt. 26 55.79 (22.85) .93 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 49.17 (13.89) .95 
Study 2 (n = 60)     
Pre-Task 
General Empathy  
Scale 
9 pt. 30 195.03 (27.80) .89 
DW 5 pt. 12 31.23 (6.79) .80 
PB 7 pt. 26 69.43 (26.29) .92 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 34.80 (10.74) .93 
STAI-T 4 pt. 20 41.80 (10.65) .91 
Post-Task 
DW 5 pt. 12 30.88 (7.18) .81 
PB 7 pt. 26 67.22 (27.36) .93 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 43.08 (13.13) .94 
Study 3 (n = 60)     
Pre-Task 
AQ 0,1* 50 17.23 (5.99) .75 
General Empathy  
Scale 
9 pt. 30 198.03 (30.82) .92 
BEQ 7 pt. 16 71.75 (17.39) .91 
BEQ (IS Subscale) 7 pt. 6 28.32 (7.53) .81 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 46.13 (13.20) .76 
IRI (Total) 5 pt. (0-4) 28 69.98 (10.87) .80 
IRI (EC) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 20.62 (4.02) .78 
IRI (Fa) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 18.85 (5.09) .82 
IRI (PD) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 12.20 (4.83) .78 
IRI (PT)  5 pt. (0-4) 7 18.32 (4.32) .74 
RRS 4 pt. 22 49.20 (11.61) .89 
SRPS 4 pt. 26 48.32 (9.67) .84 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 35.98 (10.13) .93 
STAI-T 4 pt. 20 42.13 (9.80) .91 
Post-Task 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 44.65 (12.65) .75 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 48.35 (12.55) .94 
Study 4 – Empathy Condition (n = 50) 
Pre-Task 
BEQ (Total) 7 pt. 16 73.18 (14.13) .83 
BEQ (IS Subscale) 7 pt. 6 28.69 (6.19) .67 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 43.90 (13.03) .76 
ERQ (Total) 7 pt. 10 44.46 (7.43) .64 
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ERQ (Reappraisal) 7 pt. 6 31.08 (5.81) .77 
ERS (Total) 5 pt. (0-4) 21 38.12 (16.94) .93 
IRI (Total) 5 pt. (0-4) 28 69.41 (11.61) .78 
IRI (EC) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 20.54 (5.62) .86 
IRI (PD) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 10.28 (5.30) .79 
IRI (Fa) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 19.96 (5.16) .81 
IRI (PT)  5 pt. (0-4) 7 18.64 (4.78) .79 
RRS 4 pt. 22 50.92 (11.97) .90 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 39.42 (11.71) .94 
STAI-T 4 pt. 20 44.68 (10.05) .91 
Post-Task 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 41.64 (13.82) .79 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 46.18 (10.09) .91 
Follow-up (n = 49) 
Companionship 4 pt. 6 16.31 (4.64) .93 
Optimism 5 pt. 8 27.43 (6.02) .85 
Sleep disruption 4 pt. 4 6.02 (2.38) .76 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 38.06 (10.38) .92 
Study 4 – Objective Condition (n = 50) 
Pre-Task 
BEQ (Total) 7 pt. 16 71.96 (15.73) .87 
BEQ (IS Subscale) 7 pt. 6 28.52 (7.15) .80 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 44.92 (12.72) .73 
ERQ (Total) 7 pt. 10 44.90 (7.73) .69 
ERQ (Reappraisal) 7 pt. 6 30.44 (6.33) .83 
ERS (Total) 5 pt. (0-4) 21 36.50 (15.00) .91 
IRI (Total) 5 pt. (0-4) 28 68.60 (13.22) .84 
IRI (EC) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 19.98 (5.08) .82 
IRI (PD) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 10.14 (5.23) .79 
IRI (Fa) 5 pt. (0-4) 7 19.80 (5.28) .81 
IRI (PT)  5 pt. (0-4) 7 18.68 (4.77) .78 
RRS 4 pt. 22 49.88 (12.35) .89 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 37.62 (11.05) .93 
STAI-T 4 pt. 20 44.36 (10.30) .91 
Post-Task 
DOSPERT 7 pt. 12 44.12 (13.34) .74 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 41.46 (10.88) .92 
Follow-up 
Companionship 4 pt. 6 15.12 (4.64) .90 
Optimism 5 pt. 8 26.78 (5.67) .81 
Sleep disruption 4 pt. 4 4.94 (1.41) .62 
STAI-S 4 pt. 20 38.74 (10.85) .93 
 
Notes. *The AQ is administered with a 4 pt. scale on responses that are coded either as 0 or 1.  The 






























2000 A woman is being chased by a 
man with a chainsaw and 
encounters several dead bodies 
that have been killed by her 
attacker. 





2005 A woman is locked inside of a 
closet and is trying to get out. 
She turns around and a dead 
child with a bullet hole in her 
head speaks to her and pulls 
her finger into the wound. 
37:00 37:40 	 	
 
3 
Audition 1999 A man is startled by a moving 
bag. A mutilated man crawls out 
of the bag towards him. 






1999 Scenes with a first person 
perspective are shown through 
a video recorder as a man and 
woman wander through a dark 
house. A woman is screaming 
in the background and they find 
a man standing by himself with 
his back facing towards them. 
1:16:42 1:17:22 	 	
 
5 
Carrie 1976 A woman with a knife is 
approaching a girl. The attacker 
is getting ready to stab the girl 
and appears to enjoy doing so. 




Chucky 1988 A woman approaches a doll, 
picks it up, and opens the 
battery compartment to find that 
the doll does not have batteries 
in it. The doll's head turns 
around and speaks to the 
woman. The woman screams 
and tosses the doll away. 
43:18 43:58 X	 	
 
7 
The Exorcist 1973 Three men watch a possessed 
girl speak with a man's voice. 
The girl's head turns 180 
degrees and she levitates 
above her bed. 
1:42:13 1:42:53 	 	
 
8 
The Grudge  2004 A man approaches a woman 
with her back turned towards 
him in a dark staircase. The 
man notices that she is dripping 
with blood and screams as she 
turns around and reveals her 
mutilated face. 
58:32 59:12 	 	
9 The Grudge 
2 
2006 A man in a darkroom watches 
as a woman crawls out of the 
photo bath towards him.  
1:10:58 1:11:38 X	 X	
  10 Halloween 1978 A woman tries to get into a 
house frantically as a man 
wearing a mask approaches 
her. 





It 1990 A girl is in the bathroom and 
hears a voice coming from the 
sink. As she peers into the sink, 
a red balloon comes out of it 
and explodes with blood. 
41:38 42:18 X	 X	
 
12 
It 1990 A clown inside a gutter tries to 
convince a boy to join him. As 
the boy reaches his hand into 
the gutter, the clown grabs his 
arm and shows his teeth. 
11:47 12:27 X	 	
 
13 
Mirrors 2008 A woman is taking a bath while 
an image of her in a mirror 
shows her mutilating her own 
face. The woman appears to be 
attacked by an invisible force as 
she dies in the bathtub. 






1984 A woman is being attacked in 
bed by an invisible force. She 
experiences slash wounds and 
levitates to the ceiling. 
16:57 17:37 X	 	
 
15 
The Omen  1976 A mother and child sit in a car 
surrounded by baboons. The 
baboons attack the car and the 
mother drives away. 
33:58 34:38 X	 	
  16 The Omen  1976 A woman hangs herself in front 
of children playing. The 
witnesses run away screaming. 
12:54 13:34 	 	
17 Open Water 2003 A woman is floating in the 
ocean surrounded by sharks. 
1:15:44 1:16:24 X	 	
 
18 
Psycho 1960 A man walks up a staircase and 
is attacked by a man with a 
knife. The victim falls down the 
stairs and the attacker stabs 
him. 
1:16:59 1:17:39 X	 	
 
19 
Psycho  1960 A woman walks towards a 
seated figure that is facing away 
from her. As the woman 
approaches the figure, it turns 
around and reveals that it is a 
skeleton.  
1:40:43 1:41:23 X	 	
20 The Ring 2002 A monster crawls out of a TV 
and approaches a man. 
1:41:36 1:42:16 X	 X	
 
21 
The Shining 1980 A boy rides on a bicycle and 
stops when he sees two girls in 
the hallway. They speak to him 
as images of dead bodies 
appear. 
49:38 50:18 X	 	
 
  22 
Shutter  2008 A man wakes up in bed and a 
woman's face suddenly appears 
next to him. He runs out and a 
woman walks upside down on 
the ceiling towards him. 
1:10:15 1:10:55 X	 X	
23 Shutter  2008 A man climbs down a fire 
escape ladder while a woman 
who looks like a monster crawls 
towards him. 
1:12:26 1:13:06 X	 X	
 
24 
Shutter  2008 A man looks at a photo 
developing in the darkroom. As 
he leans into the photo, a face 
suddenly appears in the photo 
and turns towards him. 






















the Lambs  
1991 A man is locked to the bars of 
his prison as guards bring him 
food. The man picks his lock 
open and attacks the guards, 
biting one of the guard's face. 




the Lambs  
1991 A woman wandering in a dark 
basement is seen through night 
vision goggles. She is holding a 
gun and is being approached by 
the man wearing the goggles. 





1999 A headless man on a horse 
approaches a man and 
beheads him. The head rolls 
towards another man and the 
headless horseman rides away 
with it. 
38:33 39:13 	 	
  28 Tale of Two 
Sisters 
2003 A girl wakes up and sees a 
woman crawling around in her 
room. The woman is a ghost 
and approaches the girl. 






2003 A woman is hiding in a locker as 
a man with a chainsaw walks 
past the locker. 






2003 An attacker with a chainsaw is 
chasing a man. The attacker 
cuts off his leg with the 
chainsaw. 





1998 A woman is driving alone at 
night in bad weather. A man in 
the back seat comes up from 
behind her and attacks her with 
an axe. 








1994 A woman approaches a child 
who is saying words repetitively. 
The phone rings and the 
woman answers it. A tongue 
comes out of the phone and the 
woman screams. Foam comes 
out of the child's mouth and the 
child becomes hysterical. 






Table S4.  Ratings Made After Each Film Clip for Every Trial in Study 1 (32 Trials) 
 
Rating Type Instructions/Question Scale/Labels 
1. Emotion Categoriesa  Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion you experienced 
while watching the film. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
2. Audio Intensity Using the following scale, how 
much did the music/audio add to 
the emotional intensity of the 
scene? 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
3. Affective Valence Please use the following 
pleasantness scale to rate the 
feelings you had during the film. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Unpleasant, 9 = Pleasant 
4. Seen Film Have you seen this film before? 1 = No, 2 = Yes 
5. Seen Film If so, about how many times 
have you seen it?  (If you have 
not seen it before, press “1” to 
indicate 0) 
1 = 0, 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, 5 = 4+ 
6. Looked Away Did you close your eyes or look 
away during this scene? 
1 = No, 2 = Yes 
7. Startle Response Did this scene cause you to have 
a startle response? (In other 
words, did it make you jump?) 
1 = No, 2 = Yes 
8. Likelihood of Event How likely do you think the event 
in this scene could occur in real 
life to someone? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
9. Likelihood of Event How likely do you think the event 
in this scene could occur in real 
life TO YOU? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
10. Likelihood of Escape If this event were to happen to 
you, how likely do you think you 
could escape from the threat? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
 
Notes. Ratings were presented after each film clip in the order listed in the table and were self-paced in 
duration.  a The following 11 emotion categories were rated in random order after each film clip: 








Table S5.  Ratings Made After Each Film Clip for Every Trial in Study 2 (32 Trials) 
 
Rating Type Instructions/Question Scale/Labels 
1. Emotion Categoriesa  Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion you feel that the 
victim experienced during the 
scene. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
2. Likelihood of Victim’s 
Escape 
How likely do you think the victim 
could have escaped from the 
threat? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
3. Identifed Victim Did you easily identify a victim in 
the scene? 
1 = No, it was ambiguous or 
there was no victim, 2 = Yes, 
there was clearly a victim 
4. Audio Intensity Using the following scale, how 
much did the music/audio add to 
the emotional intensity of the 
scene? 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
5. Affective Valence Please use the following 
pleasantness scale to rate the 
feelings you had during the film. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Unpleasant, 9 = Pleasant 
6. Seen Film Have you seen this film before? 1 = No, 2 = Yes 
7. Seen Film If so, about how many times 
have you seen it?  (If you have 
not seen it before, press “1” to 
indicate 0) 
1 = 0, 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, 5 = 4+ 
8. Looked Away Did you close your eyes or look 
away during this scene? 
1 = No, 2 = Yes 
9. Startle Response Did this scene cause you to have 
a startle response? (In other 
words, did it make you jump?) 
1 = No, 2 = Yes 
10. Likelihood of Event How likely do you think the event 
in this scene could occur in real 
life to someone? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
11. Likelihood of Event How likely do you think the event 
in this scene could occur in real 
life TO YOU? 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Impossible, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Somewhat unlikely, 4 = 
Neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = 
Somewhat likely, 6 = Very likely, 
7 = Definitely possible 
 
Notes. Ratings were presented after each film clip in the order listed in the table and were self-paced in 
duration.  a The following 11 emotion categories were rated in random order after each film clip: 
Amusement, Anger, Anxiety, Confusion, Contempt, Disgust, Fear, Interest, Sadness, Surprise, and 






Table S6.  Ratings Made After Each Film Clip for Every Trial in Study 3 (24 Trials) 
 





Fear, and Sadness  
 
Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion YOU experienced 
during the scene. 
9 point Likert Scale:  






Fear, and Sadness 
Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion you feel the 
VICTIM experienced during the 
scene. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
 
Notes. Ratings made for own emotions and for the victim’s emotions were blocked and the blocks were 
presented in random order after each film clip for every trial such that for some trials, participants 
sequentially rated the four emotion categories for their own emotions first, followed by the victim’s 
emotions afterward.  These blocks were completed in reverse order for the other trials.  The block for own 
emotions was preceded by an instruction screen for 3s stating “Rate your OWN Emotions” and the block 
for the victim’s emotions was preceded by an instruction screen for 3s stating “Rate the VICTIM’s 
Emotions”. The emotion categories were presented in random order within blocks.  Ratings were self-






























Table S7.  Ratings Made After Each Film Clip for Every Trial in Study 4 (15 Trials) 
 





Anxiety, Calm, and 
Sadness 
 
Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion YOU experienced 
during the scene. 
9 point Likert Scale:  






Anxiety, Calm, and 
Sadness 
Using the following scale, please 
indicate the greatest amount of 
EACH emotion you feel the 
VICTIM experienced during the 
scene. 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
Perspective Ability Empathy Condition: 
How much were you able to 
empathize with the victim or main 
character depicted in the scene? 
 
Objective Condition: 
How much were you able to be 
objective while viewing the 
scene? 
9 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = 
Extremely 
 
Notes. Ratings made for own emotions and for the victim’s emotions were blocked and the blocks were 
presented in random order after each film clip for every trial such that for some trials, participants 
sequentially rated the four emotion categories for their own emotions first, followed by the victim’s 
emotions afterward.  These blocks were completed in reverse order for the other trials.  The block for own 
emotions was preceded by an instruction screen for 3s stating “Rate your OWN Emotions” and the block 
for the victim’s emotions was preceded by an instruction screen for 3s stating “Rate the VICTIM’s 
Emotions”. The emotion categories were presented in random order within blocks.  Ratings were self-






Table S8.  Measures Administered in the Follow-up Questionnaire in Study 4  
	
	
Measure Items/Instructions Scale/Labels 
STAI-S  20 items 4 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = 
Moderately so, 4 = 
Very much so 
Sleep 
disruption 
4 items adapted from the Trauma Symptom 
Checklist: 
 
How much did you experience the following when 
sleeping last night? 
4 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = A lot, 





2. Restless sleep 
3. Nightmares 
4. Early morning awakening 
Optimism 8 items adapted from the Life Orientation Test by 
Scheier & Carver: 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the 
following statements, according to how you have 
felt in the past 24 hours:  
 
1. When I feel uncertain, I have expected 
the best. 
2. If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
3. I look on the bright side of things. 
4. I’m optimistic about my future. 
5. I hardly expect things to go my way. 
6. Things never work out the way I want 
them to. 
7. I’m a believer in the idea that “every cloud 
has a silver lining”. 
8. I rarely count on the good things 
happening to me. 
 
5 point Likert Scale: 
1=Strongly disagree, 
5 = Strongly agree 
Companionship 6 items adapted from the UCLA Loneliness scale: 
 
How much have you desired the following in the 
past 24 hours? 
 
1. To be “in tune” with the people around 
you. 
2. To feel part of a group of friends. 
3. To feel that you have a lot in common 
with the people around you. 
4. To feel close to people. 
5. To feel you can find companionship when 
you want it. 
6. To feel that there are people you can turn 
to. 
4 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = A lot, 




Please answer the following regarding your 
responses to the video clips in Part 1 after you 
saw them at the lab. 
 
1. How much did you experience anxiety in 
the past 24 hours after watching the video 
clips? 
2. How much have you thought about the 
images depicted in the video clips in the 
past 24 hours? 
3. Have you changed your behaviors at all 
in the past 24 hours due to watching the 
video clips (for example, not walking 
alone at night, or keeping the lights on)? 
 
7 point Likert Scale:  
1 = Not at all, 4 = 


























Study 1 (n = 47) 
Mean Emotion Ratings (1) 
Amusement −.24 −.04 −.23 −.24 −.17 −.33* −.37* 
Anger .09 .17 .13 .38** .31* .54*** .58*** 
Anxiety .31* .09 .16 .60*** .57*** — .99*** 
Confusion .03 .22 .18 .45** .38** .49*** .49*** 
Contempt −.09 −.16 .06 .18 .26 .43** .43** 
Disgust .28 .29 .21 .55*** .48*** .78*** .78*** 
Fear .28 .14 .25 .61*** .51*** .98*** .99*** 
Interest −.08 .00 −.20 −.04 −.01 .00 -.02 
Sadness .17 .14 .16 .47*** .41** .64*** .66*** 
Surprise .29* .11 .22 .50*** .46*** .82*** .83*** 
Unhappiness .28 .12 .33* .56*** .39** .83*** .85*** 
Mean of Other Ratings 
Audio 
Intensity (2) 
.11 .11 .10 .48*** .45*** .59*** .56*** 
Affective 
Valence (3) 
−.42** −.14 −.22 −.61*** −.54*** −.64*** −.67*** 
Seen Film (4) −.19 −.09 −.24 −.18 −.15 −.18 −.23 
Looked Away 
(6) 
.14 .11 .21 .42** .31* .46*** .48*** 
Startle (7) .31* −.03 .03 .50*** .50*** .68*** .64*** 
Event 
Likelihood (8) 








−.31* −.18 −.15 −.32* −.23 −.30* -.32* 
Demographics/Questionnaires 
Gender .20 .08 .38** .42** .22 .26 .29* 




- .21 .10 .46*** .40** .32* .30* 
STAI-T - - .57*** .42** .14 .09 .12 
STAI-SPre-Task - - - .35* −.18 .16 .21 
STAI-SPost-
Task 
- - - - .83*** .60*** .60*** 
ΔSTAI-S - - - - - .57*** .54*** 
Study 2 (n = 60)  
Mean Emotion Ratings (1) 
Amusement −.27* .14 .22 .13 −.08 −.26* −.33* 
Anger −.10 .17 .17 .20 .07 .30* .30* 
Anxiety .31* .20 .08 .14 .06 — .98*** 
Confusion .17 .19 −.02 .01 .06 .65*** .66*** 
Contempt −.18 .13 .14 .10 −.05 .19 .21 
		
201	
Disgust .11 .14 .01 .06 −.04 .42*** .44*** 
Fear .30* .08 .02 .02 −.02 .79*** .90*** 
Interest −.11 .40*** .09 −.02 −.08 .13 .11 
Sadness .00 .15 .10 .15 .11 .38** .37** 
Surprise .16 .27* −.03 −.05 −.04 .67*** .72*** 
Unhappiness .10 .10 .16 .05 −.10 .58*** .60*** 
Mean of Other Ratings 
Likelihood of 
Escape (2) 
−.06 −.03 −.12 −.12 −.06 −.49*** −.47*** 
Identified 
Victim (3) 
−.13 −.03 −.08 −.14 −.05 .15 .16 
Audio 
Intensity (4) 
.21 .09 .16 .22 .03 .14 .17 
Affective 
Valence (5) 
−.25 −.07 −.12 −.48*** −.42*** −.28* −.28* 
Seen Film (6) .07 .15 −.08 −.20 −.10 .15 .12 
Looked Away 
(8) 
.26* .26* .17 .43*** .42*** .02 -.03 








−.06 .09 .09 .22 .22 −.14 −.18 
Demographics/Questionnaires 
Gender .16 .30* .14 .29* .24 −.08 −.06 




- .08 −.21 .05 .33* .31* .34** 
STAI-T - - .46*** .31* −.03 .20 .17 
STAI-SPre-Task - - - .63*** −.22 .08 .07 
STAI-SPost-
Task 
- - - - .55*** .14 .12 
ΔSTAI-S - - - - - .06 .04 
 
Notes. Numbers in parentheses refer to the rating type listed in Table S4 for Study 1 and Table S5 for 
Study 2.  The mean composite anxiety rating is calculated from taking the mean of anxiety and fear 
ratings during the task.  Items in bold represent significance at trend level (p ≤ .10). *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table S15. Correlations Between Mean Emotion Ratings for Film Clips in Study 4 in 
the Objective Condition (n = 50) 
 
 Own Emotions Victims’ Emotions 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Amusement (Self) −.03 .04 .23 .50*** −.04 −.02 .29* 
2. Anxiety (Self) - -.87*** .58*** .10 .10 -.04 .07 
3. Calm (Self) - - -.59*** −.18 -.09 .15 -.14 
4. Sadness (Self) - - - .51*** .05 -.03 .41** 
5. Amusement 
(Victim) 
- - - - −.27 .16 .34* 
6. Anxiety (Victim) - - - - - -.58*** .27 
7. Calm (Victim) - - - - - - -.15 
8. Sadness (Victim) - - - - - - - 
 
Notes. Gray cells indicate correlations between corresponding emotions for self and victim.  Items 
in bold represent correlation coefficients significant at trend level (p ≤ .10). *p ≤ .05,**p ≤ .01,***p ≤ 





Table S14. Correlations Between Mean Emotion Ratings for Film Clips in 
Study 4 in the Empathy Condition (n = 50) 
 
 Own Emotions Victims’ Emotions 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Amusement 
(Self) 
−.58*** .59*** .16 .60*** −.32* .25 .44*** 
2. Anxiety (Self) - -.83*** .13 -.34* .51*** -.54*** -.17 
3. Calm (Self) - - -.03 .33* -.53*** .62*** .20 
4. Sadness (Self) - - - .31* .10 -.15 .80*** 
5. Amusement 
(Victim) 
- - - - −.34* .35* .40** 
6. Anxiety (Victim) - - - - - -.73*** -.01 
7. Calm (Victim) - - - - - - -.06 
8. Sadness 
(Victim) 
- - - - - - - 
 
Notes. Gray cells indicate correlations between corresponding emotions for self and 
victim.  Items in bold represent correlation coefficients significant at trend level (p ≤ .10). 






Meta-Analyses of Correlations Between Trait Empathy and Mean Emotion 
Ratings Across Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 General Empathy Scale 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Own Emotions: Study 1 (n = 47) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety .45*** [.29, .59] .44** [.18, .65] 
Fear .43*** [.26, .57] .42** [.15, .63] 
Sadness .24* [.048, .41] .24* [.048, .41] 
Amusement -.31** [-.48, -.13] -.31** [-.48, -.13] 
Target Victims’ Emotions: Study 2 (n = 60) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety .34*** [.16, .49] .34*** [.16, .49] 
Fear .33*** [.15, .48] .33*** [.15, .48] 
Sadness .11 [-.076, .29] .11 [-.10, .31] 
Amusement -.32*** [-.47, -.15] -.32*** [-.47, -.15] 
 


























Meta-Analyses of Correlations Between Trait/State Anxiety (Pre-Task) and Mean Emotion 
Ratings Across Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 STAI-T STAI-SPre-Task 
 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Own Emotions: Study 1 (n = 47) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety -.093 [-.28, .10] -.080 [-.38, .23] -.17 [-.35, .026] -.13 [-.61, .41] 
Fear -.083 [-.27, .11] -.064 [-.42, .31] -.15 [-.33, .047] -.11 [-.67, .53] 
Sadness -.13 [-.32, .063] -.11 [-.52, .35] -.14 [-.32, .059] -.11 [-.55, .39] 
Amusement -.014 [-.21, .18] -.014 [-.21, .18] -.034 [-.23, .16] -.050 [-.38, .29] 
Target Victims’ Emotions: Study 2 (n = 60) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety -.042 [-.22, .14] -.042 [-.48, .41] -.10 [-.28, .080] -.10 [-.43, .25] 
Fear -.20* [-.37, -.020] -.20 [-.43, .048] -.17 [-.34, .015] -.17 [-.49, .19] 
Sadness -.15 [-.33, .029] -.15 [-.64, .42] -.16 [-.33, .021] -.16 [-.59, .34] 
Amusement .005 [-.18, .19] -.005 [-.26, .26] .11 [-.071, .29] .11 [-.11, -.32] 
 
Notes. STAI-T = Trait measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-S = State measure of the State 

















Meta-Analyses of Correlations Between ΔSTAI-S, Questionnaire Measures, and Mean 
Emotion Ratings in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 ΔSTAI-S 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Questionnaires: Study 1 (n = 47), Study 2 (n = 60), and Study 3 (n = 60) 
General Empathy Scale .43*** [.30, .55] .43*** [.28, .56] 
STAI-T -.029 [-.18, .13] -.027 [-.19, .14] 
STAI-SPre-Task -.33*** [-.46, .18] -.32** [-.52, -.083] 
Own Emotions: Study 1 (n = 47) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety .61*** [.47, .72] .61*** [.47, .72] 
Fear .58*** [.44, .70] .58*** [.44, .70] 
Sadness .41*** [.24, .56] .41*** [.24, .56] 
Amusement -.26** [-.43, -.067] -.26** [-.43, -.067] 
Target Victims’ Emotions: Study 2 (n = 60) and Study 3 (n = 60) 
Anxiety .17 [-.016, .34] .17 [-.047, .36] 
Fear .14 [-.045, .31] .14 [-.17, .42] 
Sadness .21* [.032, .38] .21* [.010, .40] 
Amusement -.15 [-.32, .033] -.15 [-.32, .033] 
 
Notes. STAI-T = Trait measure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-S = State measure of the State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory, ΔSTAI-S = Change in STAI-S after the task.  Coefficients in bold are significant at 


































Independent Samples t-tests for Emotion Ratings During the Task Between Empathy and 
Objective Conditions in Study 4 (n = 100) 




Empathy Objective MDiff [95% CI] t (df) p d 
Own Emotions   
Anxiety 6.69 (1.38) 4.25 (1.70) 2.43 [1.82, 3.05] 7.85 (94.05) < .001 1.58 
Sadness 2.94 (1.79) 1.96 (1.26) .98 [36, 1.59] 3.15 (87.83) .002 .63 
Calm 3.04 (1.52) 5.49 (1.65) -2.46 [-3.09, -1.83] -7.74 (97.28) < .001 1.54 
Amusement 2.10 (1.41) 3.55 (1.82) -1.45 [-2.09, -.80] -4.44 (92.36) < .001 .89 
Perceived Emotions   
Anxiety 8.15 (.59) 7.57 (1.41) .57 [.14, 1.01] 2.66 (65.39) .010 .54 
Sadness 3.84 (1.84) 3.84 (1.66) -.001 [-.70, .69] -.004 (96.97) .997 .00 
Calm 2.04 (.77) 2.55 (1.27) -.51 [-.93, -.093] -2.43 (81.16) .017 .49 









Notes. Film clips are designated by the clip numbers listed in Table S3.  Ratings of experienced anxiety 



















































Stimulus Set.  Digital files of the selected movies were edited to 40 s clips in Windows Movie 
Maker and Avidemux 2.6.  The audio files of the clips were normalized to be similar in volume 
through the following steps: 1) audio files were first extracted from the video clips with an online 
audio extractor (www.audio-extractor.net), 2) the audio files were then normalized through 
MP3Gain ⎯ a program for audio normalization ⎯ to an average target volume of 89 decibels 
(dB) (MdB = 85.90, SDdB = 6.50).  Some audio files were also normalized with Audacity ⎯ a 
program for audio editing ⎯ to a maximum peak amplitude of −1.0 decibels relative to full scale 
(dBFS) to ensure similar peak volumes across all the audio clips (MdBFS = −3.97, SDdBFS = 1.88).  
All normalized audio clips for the stimulus set were within three standard deviations of the mean 
dB for average volume and mean dBFS for peak volume.  The normalized audio files were then 
re-attached to the film clips with Windows Movie Maker.   
 
Relationship between audio intensity during the scenes and anxiety.  A potential confound 
associated with the experience of anxiety may be the facilitating effect of music and other audio 
effects during the scenes depicted in the film clips.  After watching each film clip, participants 
were asked to rate how much they perceived the music/audio to add to the emotional intensity of 
the scene (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely, see Table S4).  While audio intensity ratings were 
correlated with mean anxiety ratings during the task (rs = .59, 95% CI [.36, .75], p < .001) and 
with ΔSTAI-S (rs = .45, 95% CI [.19, .65], p = .001), ratings of audio intensity were not 
associated with the General Empathy Scale scores (rs = .11, 95% CI [-.18, .39], p = .46).  Thus, 
the experience of vicarious anxiety may be differentiable from the anxiety associated with audio 
intensity.  To investigate this, we used multiple linear regressions.  Ratings on audio intensity 
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and the General Empathy Scale scores accounted for 40.1% of the variance in mean experienced 
anxiety ratings (Adjusted R2 = .37, F(2, 44) = 14.75, p < .001).  The General Empathy Scale 
scores were at near significant level for predicting mean ratings of experienced anxiety (β = .23, t 
= 1.98, p = .053) independently from audio intensity (β = .56, t = 4.71, p < .001).  Ratings on 
audio intensity and the General Empathy Scale scores accounted for 27.6% of the variance in 
ΔSTAI-S (Adjusted R2 = .24, F(2, 44) = 8.39, p = .001).  The General Empathy Scale scores 
independently predicted ΔSTAI-S (β = .35, t = 2.67, p = .011), as did ratings of music intensity 
(β = .35, t = 2.68, p = .010).    
 
Relationships between STAI-SPre-Task with anxiety experienced during and after the task.  
STAI-SPre-Task was not significantly associated with mean anxiety during the task (r = .16, 95% 
CI [-.13, .43], p = .30) or with ΔSTAI-S (r = -.18, 95% CI [-.44, .11], p = .23).  STAI-SPre-Task 
was associated with STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .35, 95% CI [.070, .58], p = .015). 
 
Relationships between trait empathy and experience of anxiety when controlling for STAI-
SPre-Task, age, and gender.  The relationship between the General Empathy Scale and mean 
anxiety ratings during the task remained significant when controlling for STAI-SPre-Task (r = .31, 
95% CI [.022, .55], p = .039), and when controlling for age and gender (r = .34, 95% CI [.052, 
.58], p = .021).  The relationships between the General Empathy Scale and sustained anxiety 
after the task remained significant when controlling for STAI-SPre-Task (STAI-SPost-Task: r = .42, 
95% CI [.15, .63], p = .003; ΔSTAI-S: r = .42, 95% CI [.15, .63], p = .003), and when controlling 
for age and gender (STAI-SPost-Task: r = .43, 95% CI [.16, .64], p = .004; ΔSTAI-S: r = .42, 95% 




STAI-SPre-Task and perception of anxiety in target victims.  STAI-SPre-Task was not associated 
with mean perceived anxiety (rs = .078, 95% CI [-.18, .33], p = .55).  
Relationship between perceived anxiety in target victims and experienced anxiety across 
film clips. To establish support for an association between perceiving anxiety in others and 
experiencing anxiety, a correlation was performed between the mean anxiety ratings on each film 
clip (N = 32 clips) from Studies 1 and 2.  Experienced anxiety from Study 1 for each clip was 
calculated by taking the average of experienced anxiety ratings across participants (n = 47) for 
each clip.  Mean ratings of perceived anxiety for the victim depicted in each film clip from Study 
2 was calculated by taking the average of perceived anxiety ratings across all participants (n = 
60) for each clip.  Across the 32 film clips, ratings of experienced anxiety by participants from 
Study 1 were associated with greater ratings of perceived anxiety in target victims by participants 
in Study 2 (rs = .53, 95% CI [.22, .74], p = .002).   
 
Replications of findings from Study 1. 
 
Sustained anxiety after the task.  A paired t-test demonstrated that mean STAI-SPost-Task 
(MSum = 43.08, SD = 13.13) was greater than mean STAI-SPre-Task (MSum = 34.80, SD = 10.74; 
MΔSTAI-S  = 8.28, 95% CI [5.72, 10.84], t(59) = 6.47, p < .001, dz = .84).   
Relationships between STAI-SPre-Task and STAI-T with sustained anxiety after the task.  
STAI-SPre-Task was associated with STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .63, 95% CI [.45, .76], p < .001), but was 
negatively associated with ΔSTAI-S at trend level (rs = -.22, 95% CI [-.45, .036], p = .091).  
STAI-T was associated with STAI-SPost-Task (rs = .31, 95% CI [.058, .52], p = .017), but was not 
associated with ΔSTAI-S (rs = -.027, 95% CI [-.28, .23], p = .84).  
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Relationships between trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the task.  The 
General Empathy Scale was not associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = .052, 95% CI [-.20, .30], p = 
.69), but was associated with ΔSTAI-S (rs = .33, 95% CI [.077, .53], p = .011).  The relationship 
between trait empathy and ΔSTAI-S remained significant when controlling for STAI-T (r = .29, 
95% CI [.037, .51], p = .024). 
Relationships between trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the task when 
controlling for STAI-SPre-Task, age, and gender.  The relationship between the General Empathy 
Scale and ΔSTAI-S remained significant when controlling for STAI-SPre-Task (r = .26, 95% CI 





Mediating effect of perceived anxiety on the relationship between trait empathy/trait 
empathic concern and experienced anxiety, when controlling for STAI-SPre-Task, age, and 
gender.  The mediating effect of mean perceived anxiety in the relationship between the General 
Empathy Scale and mean experienced anxiety remained significant when controlling for STAI-
SPre-Task (ab = .004, SE = .003, 95% CI [.0003, .012]; c = .025, SE = .006, t = 4.20, p < .001; c’ = 
.021, SE = .006, t = 3.55, p < .001), STAI-T (ab = .004, SE = .003, 95% CI [.0003, .013]; c = 
.027, SE = .006, t = 4.64, p < .001; c’ = .024, SE = .006, t = 3.99, p < .001), and age and gender 
(ab = .005, SE = .003, 95% CI [.0005, .015]; c = .030, SE = .006, t = 4.64, p < .001; c’ = .024, SE 
= .006, t = 3.79, p < .001). 
The mediating effect of mean perceived anxiety in the relationship between the Empathic 
Concern subscale and mean experienced anxiety remained significant when controlling for 
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STAI-SPre-Task (ab = .031, SE = .020, 95% CI [.004, .089]; c = .16, SE = .046, t = 3.45, p = .001; 
c’ = .13, SE = .046, t = 2.78, p = .007), STAI-T (ab = .032, SE = .020, 95% CI [.005, .089]; c = 
.18, SE = .048, t = 3.73, p < .001; c’ = .15, SE = .047, t = 3.07, p = .003), and age and gender (ab 
= .043, SE = .025, 95% CI [.008, .11]; c = .19, SE = .051, t = 3.68, p < .001; c’ = .15, SE = .051, t 
= 2.85, p = .006).   
 
Assessing trait emotional reactivity as a confound in the relationships between trait 
empathy/empathic concern and experience of anxiety.  Semi-partial correlations were 
conducted to assess the relationships between experience of anxiety with the General Empathy 
Scale, Empathic Concern subscale, and the Impulse Strength subscale of the BEQ, with shared 
variability between these trait measures partialed out.  With shared variance with the Impulse 
Strength subscale partialed out, residual General Empathy Scale scores were associated with 
mean experienced anxiety (r = .50, 95% CI [.28, .67], p < .001) and with ΔSTAI-S (r = .50, 95% 
CI [.28, .67], p < .001).  Likewise, residual Empathic Concern subscale scores were associated 
with mean experienced anxiety (r = .40, 95% CI [.16, .59], p = .002) and with ΔSTAI-S (r = .39, 
95% CI [.15, .59], p = .002).  On the other hand, with shared variance from the General Empathy 
Scale scores partialed out, residual Impulse Strength scores were not significantly associated 
with mean experienced anxiety (r = -.10, 95% CI [-.35, .16], p = .45) or with ΔSTAI-S (r = -
.059, 95% CI [-.31, .20], p = .66).  Similarly, with shared variance from the Empathic Concern 
subscale scores partialed out, residual Impulse Strength scores were not significantly associated 
with mean experienced anxiety (r = .037, 95% CI [-.22, .29], p = .78) or with ΔSTAI-S (r = .090, 




Replications of findings from Study 1 and Study 2.   
Trait empathy and experience of anxiety during the task.  Replicating findings from 
Study 1, the General Empathy Scale was associated with mean ratings of experienced anxiety (rs 
= .54, 95% CI [.33, .70], p < .001).  In this study, the General Empathy Scale was also associated 
with mean ratings of experienced sadness (rs = .29, 95% CI [.040, .51], p = .024) and negatively 
associated with amusement (rs = −.37, 95% CI [-.57, -.13], p = .003).  To test the specificity of 
mean experienced anxiety in its relationship to trait empathy, a partial correlation was conducted 
between the General Empathy Scale and mean ratings of experienced anxiety while controlling 
for mean ratings of experienced sadness.  This correlation was significant (r = .49, 95% CI [.27, 
.66], p < .001).  Conversely, a partial correlation between the General Empathy Scale and mean 
experienced sadness was not significant when controlling for mean experienced anxiety (r = -
.062, 95% CI [-.31, .20], p = .64).   
Sustained anxiety after the task. A paired t-test demonstrated that mean STAI-SPost-Task 
(MSum = 48.35, SD = 12.55) was greater than mean STAI-SPre-Task (MSum = 35.98, SD = 10.13; 
MΔSTAI-S  = 12.37, 95% CI [8.59, 16.14], t(59) = 6.56, p < .001, dz = .85).   
Relationships between STAI-SPre-Task and STAI-T with sustained anxiety after the task.  
STAI-SPre-Task was not significantly associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = .18, 95% CI [-.077, .41], 
p = .16), and was negatively associated with ΔSTAI-S (rs = -.52, 95% CI [-.68, -.31], p < .001).  
STAI-T was associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = .30, 95% CI [.045, .51], p = .022) and was not 
associated with ΔSTAI-S (rs = −.16, 95% CI [-.40, .010], p = .23).   
 Trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the task.  The General Empathy Scale 
scores were associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = .43, 95% CI [.20, .62], p < .001) and with 
ΔSTAI-S (rs = .55, 95% CI [.34, .71], p < .001).   
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These relationships were significant when controlling for STAI-T (STAI-SPost-Task: r = 
.53, 95% CI [.32, .69], p < .001; ΔSTAI-S: r = .57, 95% CI [.37, .72], p < .001).  When 
controlling for STAI-SPre-Task, the relationships between the General Empathy Scale scores with 
STAI-SPost-Task (r = .52, 95% CI [.30, .68], p < .001) and with ΔSTAI-S (r = .52, 95% CI [.30, 
.68], p < .001) remained significant, as was the case when controlling for age and gender (STAI-
SPost-Task: r = .39, 95% CI [.15, .59], p = .002; ΔSTAI-S: r = .55, 95% CI [.34, .71], p < .001). 
Anxiety during the task mediates the relationship between trait empathy and 
sustained anxiety after the task.  Mean experienced anxiety during the task mediated the 
relationship between the General Empathy Scale and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .10, SE = .031, 95% CI 
[.049, .17]; c = .28, SE = .050, t = 5.52, p < .001; c’ = .18, SE = .056, t = 3.19, p = .002).  Similar 
to Study 1, we conducted a multiple mediation analysis to determine whether the mean anxiety 
score specifically drives the relationship between trait empathy and sustained anxiety after the 
task, with participants’ mean anxiety and sadness ratings as parallel mediators.  Mean anxiety 
mediated the relationship between the General Empathy Scale and ΔSTAI-S (ab = .10, SE = 
.032, 95% CI [.046, .18]), whereas mean sadness did not (ab = -.002, SE = .019, 95% CI [-.034, 
.043]; c’ = .18, SE = .056, t = 3.15, p = .003).   
Trait empathy and perception of anxiety in target victims.  Replicating findings from 
Study 2, the General Empathy Scale was associated with mean ratings of anxiety perceived to be 
experienced by target victims (rs = .37, 95% CI [.12, .57], p = .004).  In this study, the General 
Empathy Scale was also associated with mean ratings of perceived amusement (rs = −.37, 95% 








Effects of age and gender.  Across all participants, gender was associated with the IRI total 
score (rpb = .24, 95% CI [.049, .42], p = .015), the BEQ total score (rpb = .37, 95% CI [.19, .53], 
p < .001), the IS subscale of the BEQ (rpb = .40, 95% CI [.22, .55], p < .001), and marginally 
associated with scores on the DOSPERTPre-Task (rpb = -.19, 95% CI [-.38, .002], p = .052).   
In the Empathy condition, age was marginally associated with mean ratings of 
experienced anxiety (rs = -.28, 95% CI [-.52, .001], p = .052) and calm (rs = .26, 95% CI [-.020, 
.50], p = .069).  Age was also marginally associated with mean ratings of perceived calm in 
target victims (rs = .25, 95% CI [-.030, .49], p = .086).  Gender was associated with STAI-SPost-
Task (rpb = .28, 95% CI [.0008, .52], p = .050) and DOSPERTPost-Task (rpb = -.35, 95% CI [-.57, -
.075], p = .014).  In the Objective condition, age was associated with mean ratings of perceived 
calm in target victims (rs = -.28, 95% CI [-.52, -.002], p = .049) and marginally associated with 
ΔDOSPERT (rs = -.26, 95% CI [-.50, .020], p = .064).  Gender was marginally associated with 
mean ratings of experienced anxiety (rpb = .28, 95% CI [-.003, .51], p = .053). 
 
Relationships with trait emotional reactivity. The Impulse Strength (IS) subscale of the BEQ 
and the total score on the Emotional Reactivity Scale (ERS) were positively associated across all 
participants with the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI (IS: rs = .35, 95% CI [.16, .51], p < 
.001; ERS: rs = .22, 95% CI [.025, .40], p = .029) and negatively associated with ΔDOSPERT 
(IS: rs = -.24, 95% CI [-.42, -.046], p = .017; ERS: rs = -.31, 95% CI [-.48, -.12], p = .002).  
These measures of emotional reactivity were also associated with STAI-SPre-task (rs = .22, 95% CI 
[.025, .40], p = .028).   
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In the Empathy condition, ERS was marginally associated with mean ratings of perceived 
anxiety (rs = -.24, 95% CI [-.49, .041], p = .087) and significantly so with mean ratings of 
perceived sadness (rs = .31, 95% CI [.035, .54], p = .028) in target victims.  IS was associated 
with STAI-SPost-Task (r = .32, 95% CI [.046, .55], p = .024).  ERS was associated with 
DOSPERTPost-Task (r = .28, 95% CI [.002, .52], p = .048) and STAI-S in the follow-up (r = .37, 
95% CI [.10, .59], p = .009). 
In the Objective condition, ERS was associated with mean ratings of experienced anxiety 
(r = .29, 95% CI [.013, .53], p = .039) and calm (rs = -.29, 95% CI [-.53, -.013], p = .038).  IS 
was marginally associated with mean ratings of experienced calm (rs = -.24, 95% CI [-.49, .041], 
p = .094).  Both measures of emotional reactivity were associated with ΔDOSPERT (ERS: rs = -
.48, 95% CI [-.67, -.23], p < .001; IS: rs = -.31, 95% CI [-.54, -.035], p = .028) and STAI-SPost-
Task (ERS: r = .50, 95% CI [.26, .68], p < .001; IS: r = .32, 95% CI [.046, .55], p = .025).	
	
Relationships between trait empathy and perceived emotions in victims.  In the Empathy 
condition, the Empathic Concern subscale was marginally associated with mean ratings of 
perceived anxiety in target victims (rs = .27, 95% CI [-.005, .51], p = .054).  However, this 
relationship was not significant in a partial correlation controlling for ERS and IS (r = .14, 95% 
CI [-.15, .41], p = .33), or in a partial correlation controlling for age and gender (r = .17, 95% CI 
[-.12, .43], p = .25).   
In the Empathy condition, the Empathic Concern subscale was also negatively associated 
with mean ratings of perceived calm (rs = -.30, 95% CI [-.53, -.018], p = .037), and was not 
significantly associated with mean ratings of perceived sadness (rs = -.086, 95% CI [-.36, .20], p 
= .55) or amusement (rs = -.23, 95% CI [-.48, .052], p = .11).  No other subscales of the IRI were 
significantly associated with mean ratings of perceived anxiety in the target victims.  In the 
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Objective condition, the Empathic Concern subscale was not significantly associated with mean 
ratings of perceived anxiety (rs = -.093, 95% CI [-.36, .19], p = .52) or any of the other perceived 
emotion categories.  
 
Indirect effect of state empathy on sustained anxiety after the task.  Although there was no 
significant difference between conditions in ΔSTAI-S, we conducted a mediation analysis to test 
for an indirect relationship between condition and ΔSTAI-S (Hayes, 2009, Shrout & Bolger, 
2002).  As with prior studies in this manuscript, we tested mean experienced anxiety and sadness 
as parallel mediators in the relationship between state empathy and sustained anxiety in a 
multiple mediation model.   
Consistent with prior findings, there was a significant indirect effect of mean experienced 
anxiety on the relationship between condition and ΔSTAI-S (ab = 7.07, SE = 1.78, 95% CI [3.98, 
10.96]), such that those in the Empathy condition experienced greater anxiety during the task, 
which in turn led to greater sustained anxiety after the task.  However, in contrast to prior 
findings, mean experienced sadness had a significantly negative indirect effect on the 
relationship between condition and ΔSTAI-S (ab = -2.06, SE = .88, 95% CI [-4.30, -.69]; c = 
2.92, SE = 2.22, t = 1.32, p = .19; c’ = -2.09, SE = 2.60, t = -.80, p = .42), such that those in the 
Empathy condition experienced greater sadness during the task, which was associated with 
decreases in ΔSTAI-S.  The presence of indirect effects in the opposite direction may explain the 
lack of a significant total effect between condition and ΔSTAI-S.  These relationships were 





Replications of findings from Study 3. 
Effect of trait empathic concern and vicarious anxiety on risk-aversion.  To assess 
the impact of empathic concern and vicarious anxiety on risk-aversion after the task, partial 
correlations were conducted on empathy and anxiety measures with DOSPERTPost-Task scores, 
controlling for DOSPERTPre-Task scores.  Across all participants, DOSPERTPost-Task was 
negatively correlated with the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI (r = -.20, 95% CI [-.38, -
.006], p = .043) when controlling for DOSPERTPre-Task, but was not significantly correlated with 
the other subscales of the IRI (Personal Distress: r = -.066, 95% CI [-.26, .13], p = .52; Fantasy: r 
= -.041, 95% CI [-.24, .16], p = .69; Perspective Taking: r = -.12, 95% CI [-.31, .079], p = .24).  
These patterns replicate findings from Study 3, and indicate that risk-aversion to threatening 
activities after viewing targets facing threats is specifically associated with the Empathic 
Concern subscale, but not with the other subscales of the IRI.   
Also replicating findings from Study 3, partial correlations indicated that DOSPERTPost-
Task was negatively associated with both STAI-SPost-Task (r = -.43, 95% CI [-.58, -.26], p < .001) 
and ΔSTAI-S (r = -.34, 95% CI [-.51, -.16], p < .001), but was not significantly associated with 
STAI-SPre-Task (r = -.070, 95% CI [-.26, .13], p = .49).  In this study, DOSPERTPost-Task was 
correlated with STAI-T (r = -.21, 95% CI [-.39, -.016], p = .034).  When controlling for STAI-T, 
DOSPERTPost-Task remained significantly associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = -.39, 95% CI [-.55, -
.21], p < .001) and ΔSTAI-S (r = -.38, 95% CI [-.54, -.20], p < .001).   
In this study, DOSPERTPost-Task was correlated with mean ratings of experienced anxiety 
during the task (r = -.33, 95% CI [-.50, -.14], p = .001) as well as with mean ratings of perceived 
anxiety in target victims (r = -.22, 95% CI [-.40, -.019], p = .032).  DOSPERTPost-Task was not 
significantly correlated with mean ratings of experienced sadness (r = -.033, 95% CI [-.23, .17], 
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p = .75) or perceived sadness (r = .087, 95% CI [-.11, .28], p = .39), but was correlated at trend 
level with mean ratings of experienced amusement (r = .18, 95% CI [-.020, .36], p = .078), and 
significantly correlated with mean ratings of perceived amusement (r = .24, 95% CI [.047, .42], p 
= .016), mean ratings of experienced calm (r = .37, 95% CI [.18, .53], p < .001), and mean 
ratings of perceived calm (r = .33, 95% CI [.14, .49], p = .001).   
When controlling for DOSPERTPre-Task and trait emotional reactivity (IS and ERS scales), 
DOSPERTPost-Task was associated with the Empathic Concern subscale at trend level (r = -.17, 
95% CI [-.36, .030], p = .10), but remained significantly associated with STAI-SPost-Task (r = -.38, 
95% CI [-.54, -.20], p < .001), ΔSTAI-S (r = -.34, 95% CI [-.51, -.15], p = .001), mean ratings of 
experienced anxiety (r = -.31, 95% CI [-.48, -.12], p = .002), and mean ratings of perceived 
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Questionnaire Measures Administered 
AQ  ⎯ Autism Quotient 
BEQ  ⎯ Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
BDI  ⎯ Beck Depression Inventory 
BWSS  ⎯  Brief Wisdom Screening Scale 
CES-D  ⎯  Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
ERQ  ⎯  Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
ERQ-R  ⎯  Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ 
IRI  ⎯  Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
PANAS  ⎯  Positive and Negative Affective Schedule 
STAI  ⎯  Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STAI-S  ⎯  State Anxiety scale of the STAI 








































Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficients displayed.  BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire, CES-D 
= Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, ERQ-R = Reappraisal subscale of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire, ERQ-S = Suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, IRI 
= Interpersonal Reactivity Index, STAI-T = Trait measure of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.  




















Correlations Between Targets’ Trait Measures and Judged Helpfulness Ratings in 
Study 2 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. BEQ        
2. CES-D .033       
3. ERQ-R .064 -.26**      
4. ERQ-S -.65*** .35*** -.15     
5. IRI .43*** -.012 .29*** -.37***    













Judged Helpfulness of Provider’s Response By Targets in Study 2 









 Phase 3   
ANOVA Situation modification 5.03 (.25) 4.77 (.28) 
Reappraisal 4.48 (.28) 5.17 (.29) 
 
ANCOVA Situation modification 5.02 (.25) 4.70 (.28) 
Reappraisal 4.41 (.28) 5.31 (.29) 
 Phase 4   
ANOVA Situation modification 4.62 (.26) 4.23 (.29) 
Reappraisal 4.26 (.29) 4.70 (.30) 
 
ANCOVA Situation modification 4.61 (.26) 4.15 (.29) 
Reappraisal 4.18 (.29) 4.87 (.30) 
 
Notes. ANCOVAs adjust for targets’ ERQ-R scores assessed in Phase 1.  Targets judged the helpfulness 
of the provider’s response upon receiving it in Phase 3, and how helpful the response had been for them 











Figure S1. Counts of topics reported by targets in the anxiety condition for Phase 1 of 
Study 1 (n = 100) 
 
Notes. *”Loss of a Relationship” category consists of one event involving the death of a loved one, and 













Figure S2. Counts of topics reported by targets in the sad condition for Phase 1 of Study 1  
(n = 100) 
 












Figure S3. Counts of topics reported by targets in the “Loss of a Relationship” category for 
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Analyses with full samples for Study 2 (Phase 1) 
Participants.  245 participants were recruited (120 for the anxiety condition, 125 for the sad 
condition).  One participant was excluded for not following instructions for the written response, 
one for participating in the prior study (as inferred from their IP address), and two for not 
submitting the HIT.  The following analyses were conducted on the remaining 241 participants. 
 
Believed helpfulness of emotion regulation strategies.  A mixed-design ANOVA was 
conducted to test the interaction between the targets’ emotion condition (between-subjects levels: 
anxiety, sad) and type of emotion regulation strategy (within-subjects levels: situation 
modification, reappraisal), on how helpful the strategies were believed to be.  This interaction 
was significant (F(1, 239) = 10.20, p = .002, η2G = .017), with a main effect of emotion condition 
(F(1, 239) = 4.26, p = .040), such that targets in the anxiety condition reported the regulation 
strategies to be more helpful than targets in the sad condition.  There was no main effect of 
regulation strategy (F(1, 239) = 2.35, p = .13).     
Planned comparisons indicated that within the anxiety condition, targets did not believe 
situation modification to be significantly more helpful (M = 4.99, SD = 1.92) than reappraisal (M 
= 4.75, SD = 1.71; MDiff = .25, SE = .21, F(1, 239) = 1.35, p = .25).  However, targets within the 
sad condition believed reappraisal to be significantly more helpful (M = 4.85, SD = 1.66) than 
situation modification (M = 4.15, SD = 1.94; MDiff = .70, SE = .21, F(1, 239) = 11.41, p = .001).  
Situation modification was believed to be more helpful by targets in the anxiety condition than 
targets in the sad condition (MDiff = .85, SE = .25, F(1, 239) = 11.55, p = .001).  However, 
reappraisal was not believed to be significantly more helpful by targets in the sad condition than 




Replication of findings from Study 1.  As in Phase 1 of Study 1, there was a significant 
interaction in the predicted directions between the target’s emotion condition (anxiety, sadness) 
and believed helpfulness of support (advice, emotional support; F(1, 239) = 4.88, p = .028, η2G = 
.006). 
 
Analyses with full samples for Study 2 (Phase 3) 
Participants.  The following analyses were conducted on all 140 participants who completed 
Phase 3 of this study. 
 
Relationships between judged helpfulness and targets’ trait variables.  Correlations 
conducted between trait variables assessed in Phase 1 and judged helpfulness ratings indicated 
that unlike the sample for which analyses were reported for in the main article, ERQ-R was not 
significantly correlated with judging providers’ responses to be more helpful (r = .13, p = .13).  
However, judgments of helpfulness were significantly correlated with scores on the STAI-T (r = 
-.23, p = .007), CES-D (r = -.18, p = .033), and IRI (r = .17, p = .047). 
 
Judged helpfulness of social emotion regulation strategies.  A between-groups ANOVA was 
performed to test the interaction between the target’s emotion condition (levels: anxiety, sadness) 
and type of social emotion regulation strategy implemented by the provider (levels: reappraisal, 
situation modification), on how helpful the provider’s response was judged to be by the target.  
This indicated an interaction effect in the predicted directions, but not at a significant level (F(1, 
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136) = 1.89, p = .17), with no main effects for either targets’ emotion condition (F(1, 136) = .43, 
p = .52) or type of strategy used by providers (F(1, 136) = .22, p = .64). 
As in the main analyses, an ANCOVA was conducted to adjust for targets’ ERQ-R 
scores.  This interaction was significant at trend level (F(1, 135) = 3.18, p = .077), with a trend 
level effect of ERQ-R in this model (F(1, 135) = 3.58, p = .061).  An ANCOVA assessing the 
effect of the interaction when adjusting for targets’ individual differences significantly associated 
with judged helpfulness (STAI-T and IRI scores from Phase 1) resulted in a significant 
interaction (F(1, 134) = 3.90, p = .050), with significant effects of STAI-T (F(1, 134) = 8.26, p = 































Study 1 (Phase 1) Instructions and Materials 
 
MTurk setup for Study 1 (Phase 1) 
1. HIT Title:  
Write about two dilemmas in your life that are causing you to feel anxiety and to 
feel sad, answer questions, and make ratings. 
 
2. HIT Description:  
Write about two different dilemmas that you are currently experiencing, 
answer questions, and make ratings.  Please note that your written 
responses may be shown to other people in future studies, but will not be 
accompanied by identifying information. 
 
3. HIT Keywords: survey, demographics, psychology 
 
4. Reward Per Assignment: $2 
 
5. Time Allotted Per Assignment: 2 hours 
 
6. Worker Requirements:  
a. Location: United States 
b. HIT Approval Rate (%) for All Requesters’ HITs: Greater than or equal to 95% 
c. Number of HITs Approved: Greater than 0 
d. Study Completion: Has not been granted (set to exclude participants in prior pilot 
studies) 
e. Project Contains Adult Content: Checked (set to exclude participants under 18 
years of age) 
 
7. HIT Preview Description:  
Are you currently experiencing dilemmas in your life that are causing you 
to feel anxiety and sadness? 
This is a psychology study being conducted at Columbia University.  We 
are seeking to understand the dilemmas that people have in their lives and 
would like to receive social support from others on.  In this study, you will 
be asked to write about two different dilemmas you are currently 
experiencing in your life: one that is causing you to feel sadness and one 
that is causing you to feel anxiety.  You will describe these dilemmas in 
two essays that are around 100-200 words each.  You will also be asked to 
make ratings regarding the nature of these dilemmas and to answer 
questionnaires about your personality and emotional experiences.  Please 
note that your written responses may be shown to other people in future 
studies, but will not be accompanied by any identifying information.   
 
This study is expected to take 60-120 minutes to complete.  The time it 
takes to complete this study will depend on how fast you naturally write 
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and complete questionnaires.  Due to differences that people may have 
with this, you will have up to 2 hours to complete the entire study.  You 
must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study.  Please note 
that if you have completed a prior version of this study, you may not 
complete the present study.  As we are unable to take responses from 
people who have completed prior versions of this study, this HIT will not 
be approved if our records indicate that you have already completed prior 
versions of this study.  Thank you!  
  
Please click on the link below to view the consent form and begin this 
study: 
 
Survey link: Click here to begin. 
 
Provide the survey code provided at the end of the study here: (Please note 
that the code must be entered correctly for you to receive payment) 
 
 
Qualtrics setup (Study 1, Phase 1) 
 
The protocol consisted of the following steps listed in order of administration: 
 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Captcha verification 
 
3. State emotion measures: measures are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. PANAS 
b. STAI-S  
 
4. Instructions:  
You will now be asked to write about two different dilemmas that you are 
currently experiencing, one dilemma that is causing you to feel anxiety 
and another dilemma that is causing you to feel sad.  You will make 
ratings about the dilemmas after writing about each dilemma. 
 
5. Write about first dilemma: the first dilemma is for either the anxiety or sadness 
condition.  Anxiety and sadness conditions are presented in random order across 
participants. 
 
Instructions for the anxiety condition: 
Describe a current dilemma in your life that is causing you to 
experience anxiety, and that you would like to receive social support from 




Please provide adequate information so that someone reading this 
description could potentially understand your situation and provide social 
support to you.  Your response must be between 600-1200 characters 
including spaces (roughly 100-200 words). 
 
Instructions for the sadness condition: 
Describe a current dilemma in your life that is causing you to 
experience sadness, and that you would like to receive social support from 
someone on.  
  
Please provide adequate information so that someone reading this 
description could potentially understand your situation and provide social 
support to you.  Your response must be between 600-1200 characters 
including spaces (roughly 100-200 words). 
 
6. Rate dilemma: items within each set of ratings are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH 
emotion you experienced while thinking about the dilemma. (1 = Not 






b. Please indicate how helpful you think each type of support would be 
on a scale from 1 = Not helpful at all, to 9 = Extremely helpful. (1 = 
Not helpful at all, 5 = Somewhat helpful, 9 = Extremely helpful) 
• To receive emotional support 
• To receive advice on what to do 
 
c. Using the scale below, please answer the following questions: (1= Not 
at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely) 
• How important is this dilemma to you? 
• How complicated is this dilemma for you? 
 
7. Steps 5-6 are repeated for the second dilemma: the dilemma is for either the 
anxiety or sadness condition, whichever was not completed in Steps 5-6. 
 
8. Consent for re-contact: 
Thank you for writing about your dilemmas.  We may share your dilemmas 
anonymously to people in future studies and ask them to provide social 
support in response to your dilemmas.  If you are interested in reading the 
responses that other people may have to your dilemmas, please indicate 
that we may contact you in the future to provide you with the responses of 
others and to have you read and rate these responses.  Participation for this 
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will be compensated at a rate equal to or higher than the rate for the current 
study.   
  
Please note that not all participants in this study may be contacted to 
receive and rate responses provided by other participants.   
 
Options:  
- Yes, I would like to be contacted in the future to receive responses written 
by others regarding my dilemmas and to rate these responses.  
 
- No, I would not like to be contacted in the future to receive responses 
written by others regarding my dilemmas. 
 
9. State emotion measures: measures are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. PANAS 
b. STAI-S  
 
10.  Brief COPE Scale 
 






12.  Demographics measures 
a. MacArthur SES Scale 
b. Demographics (age, gender, ethnicity) 
 
13. Verification question: this consisted of a simple math problem. 
 




Study1 (Phase 2) Instructions and Materials 
 
MTurk setup for Study 1 (Phase 2) 
Four HITs were administered to counterbalance the order of the tasks.  All four HITs contained 
the following information: 




2. HIT Description:  
Read short essays, write responses, make ratings, and complete 
questionnaires.  Please note that your written responses may be shown to 
other people in future studies, but will not be accompanied by identifying 
information. 
 
3. HIT Keywords: survey, psychology 
 
4. Reward Per Assignment: $2 
 
5. Time Allotted Per Assignment: 2 hours 
 
6. Worker Requirements:  
a. Location: United States 
b. HIT Approval Rate (%) for All Requesters’ HITs: Greater than or equal to 95% 
c. Number of HITs Approved: Greater than 0 
d. Study Completion: Has not been granted (set to exclude participants in prior pilot 
studies) 
e. Project Contains Adult Content: Checked (set to exclude participants under 18 
years of age) 
 
7. HIT Preview Description:  
Read short essays, write responses, and make ratings. 
This is a psychology study being conducted at Columbia University.  We 
are seeking to understand how people respond to dilemmas that others are 
experiencing in their lives.  In this study, you will read a description about 
a personal dilemma that someone is currently experiencing and has written 
about (these people have agreed to share these dilemmas 
anonymously).  After reading about the dilemma, you will be asked to 
write a response to the dilemma in an essay that is around 100-200 words, 
and to make ratings about it.  You will also answer questionnaires about 
your personality and emotional experiences.  Please note that your written 
responses may be shown to other people in future studies, but will not be 
accompanied by any identifying information.   
 
This study is expected to take 60-120 minutes to complete.  The time it 
takes to complete this study will depend on how fast you naturally read, 
write, and complete questionnaires.  Due to differences that people may 
have with this, you will have up to 2 hours to complete the entire 
study.  You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this 
study.  Please note that if you have completed a prior version of this study, 
you may not complete the present study.  As we are unable to take 
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responses from people who have completed prior versions of this study, 
this HIT will not be approved if our records indicate that you have already 
completed prior versions of this study.  Thank you!   
 
Please click on the link below to view the consent form and begin this 
study: 
 
Survey link: Click here to begin. 
 
Provide the survey code provided at the end of the study here: (Please note 
that the code must be entered correctly for you to receive payment) 
 
Qualtrics setup (Study 1, Phase 2) 
The following four conditions were administered to separate groups of participants (each 
condition was administered through a separate HIT):  
1) Anxiety dilemma presented before the sad dilemma, with ratings of target’s emotions 
(Step 6) collected before written response to target (Step 7a).   
2) Sad dilemma presented before the anxiety dilemma, with ratings of target’s emotions 
(Step 6) collected before written response to target (Step 7a).   
3) Anxiety dilemma presented before the sad dilemma, with written response to target 
(Step 7a) collected before ratings of target’s emotions (Step 6). 
4) Sad dilemma presented before the anxiety dilemma, with written response to target (Step 
7a) collected before ratings of target’s emotions (Step 6). 
 
The protocol consisted of the following steps listed in order of administration: 
 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Captcha verification 
 
3. State emotion measures: measures are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. PANAS 




4. Instructions:  
You will now read brief statements written by individuals describing 
dilemmas they are currently experiencing in their lives.  After reading 
each statement, you will write a response to the person experiencing the 
dilemma. 
 
5. Read first dilemma from target: the first dilemma is from either the anxiety or 
sadness condition of Phase 1, with the order of dilemmas determined by the group the 
participant is in. 
 
6. Rate and write response to first dilemma: steps a and b are completed in different 
orders depending on the participant’s group.  Items within each set of ratings are 
presented in random order across participants. 
 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH 
emotion you think the PERSON WHO WROTE THIS STATEMENT 






b. What would you say to the person experiencing this dilemma?   
 
Please write a response that expresses what you would say in 
person.  Your response must be between 600-1200 characters 
including spaces (roughly 100-200 words). 
 
Your response may be shown to the person who is experiencing this 
dilemma.   
 
7. Additional ratings for the first dilemma:  
Please answer the following questions about this dilemma: (1= Not at 
all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely) 
• How important do you think this dilemma is for the person? 
• How complicated do you think this dilemma is for the 
person? 
 
8. Steps 5-7 are repeated for the second dilemma: the second dilemma is from either 
the anxiety or sadness condition of Phase 1, whichever was not presented in steps 5-7. 
 
9. Read first dilemma again: the order that anxiety and sad dilemmas are presented is 




10. Rate first dilemma: items within each set of ratings are presented in random order 
across participants. 
 
a. Please indicate how helpful you think each type of support would be 
for the person experiencing this dilemma. (1 = Not helpful at all, 5 = 
Somewhat helpful, 9 = Extremely helpful) 
• To provide emotional support 
• To provide advice on what to do 
 
b. Please answer the following questions about this dilemma: (1= Not at 
all clearly, 5 = Somewhat clearly, 9 = Extremely clearly) 
• How clearly did the person experiencing this dilemma 
EXPRESS WANTING SUPPORT from someone? 
• How clearly did the person experiencing this dilemma 
EXPRESS THE EMOTIONS they were experiencing? 
 
c. Please answer the following questions about this dilemma: (1= Not at 
all clearly, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely) 
• How similar do you think you are to the person experiencing this 
dilemma? 
• Have you experienced a similar dilemma in your life before? 
 
d. Please answer the following questions about this dilemma: (1= Not at 
all clearly, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Extremely) 
• How helpful were you TRYING TO BE when writing your 
response to the person experiencing this dilemma? 
• How helpful do you think your written response WILL 
ACTUALLY BE to the person experiencing this dilemma? 
 
11. Steps 9-10 are repeated for the second dilemma. 
 






e. 3D Wisdom Scale 
f. BWSS  
 
13. Demographics measures (age, gender, ethnicity) 
 
14. Verification question: this consisted of a simple math problem. 
 




16. Received code word to submit HIT 
 
Study 2 (Phase 1) Instructions and Materials 
MTurk setup for Study 2 (Phase 1) 
Two HITs were administered to recruit participants primarily experiencing either anxiety or 
sadness.  The following information was presented in the HITs.  Information that differed 
between conditions has been listed separately for each condition. 
1. HIT Title: 
Anxiety condition 
 
Write about a dilemma in your life that is causing you to feel anxiety due 
to financial issues. 
 
Sadness condition  
 
Write about a dilemma in your life that is causing you to feel sadness due 
to a loss of a close relationship. 
 
2. HIT Description:  
Write about a current dilemma that you'd like to receive support for, 
answer questions, and make ratings.  Please note that your written 
response may be shown to other people in future studies, but will not be 
accompanied by identifying information. 
 
3. HIT Keywords: survey, demographics, psychology 
 
4. Reward Per Assignment: $3 
 
5. Time Allotted Per Assignment: 1 hour 
 
6. Worker Requirements:  
a. Location: United States 
b. HIT Approval Rate (%) for All Requesters’ HITs: Greater than or equal to 95% 
c. Number of HITs Approved: Greater than 0 
d. Study Completion: Has not been granted (set to exclude participants in prior pilot 
studies) 
e. Project Contains Adult Content: Checked (set to exclude participants under 18 




7. HIT Preview Description:  
Anxiety condition 
Are you experiencing a current dilemma in your life that is causing 
you to feel anxiety due to financial issues? 
 
This is a psychology study being conducted at Columbia University.  We 
are seeking to understand the dilemmas that people have in their lives for 
which they would like to receive social support from others on.  In this 
study, you will be asked to write about a current dilemma that is causing 
you to experience anxiety due to financial problems in an essay that is 
around 100-200 words. This dilemma can involve issues related to your 
job or other difficulties that stem from financial issues.  You will also be 
asked to make ratings regarding the nature of this dilemma and to answer 
questionnaires about your personality and emotional experiences.  Please 
note that your written responses may be shown to other people in future 
studies, but will not be accompanied by any identifying information. 
 
This study is expected to take 30-60 minutes to complete.  The time it 
takes to complete this study will depend on how fast you naturally write 
and complete questionnaires.  Due to differences that people may have 
with this, you will have up to 1 hour to complete the entire study.  You 
must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study. 
 
Please click on the link below to view the consent form and begin this 
study: 
 
Survey link: Click here to begin. 
 
Provide the survey code provided at the end of the study here: (Please note 





Are you experiencing a current dilemma in your life that is causing 
you to feel sad due to a loss of a close relationship? 
 
This is a psychology study being conducted at Columbia University.  We 
are seeking to understand the dilemmas that people have in their lives for 
which they would like to receive social support from others on.  In this 
study, you will be asked to write about a current dilemma that is causing 
you to experience sadness due to a loss of an important relationship in an 
		
244	
essay that is around 100-200 words. This dilemma may involve the loss 
of a friendship, significant other, or family member whom you were close 
to.  You will also be asked to make ratings regarding the nature of this 
dilemma and to answer questionnaires about your personality and 
emotional experiences.  Please note that your written responses may be 
shown to other people in future studies, but will not be accompanied by 
any identifying information.  
 
This study is expected to take 30-60 minutes to complete.  The time it 
takes to complete this study will depend on how fast you naturally write 
and complete questionnaires.  Due to differences that people may have 
with this, you will have up to 1 hour to complete the entire study.  You 
must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study. 
 
Please click on the link below to view the consent form and begin this 
study: 
 
Survey link: Click here to begin. 
 
Provide the survey code provided at the end of the study here: (Please 
note that the code must be entered correctly for you to receive payment) 
 
 
Qualtrics setup for Study 2 (Phase 1)  
Two conditions were set up to recruit participants primarily experiencing either anxiety or 
sadness.  The protocols for these two conditions consisted of the following steps listed in order 
of administration.  Information that differed between conditions has been listed separately for 
each condition. 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Captcha verification 
 
3. Write about dilemma:  
Anxiety condition 
 
Please describe a current dilemma you would like to receive support from 
others for that is causing you to experience anxiety due to financial 
problems. This dilemma can involve issues related to your job or other 




Try to provide enough information so that someone reading about your 
dilemma can understand your situation and try to help you with it.  Your 





Please describe a current dilemma you would like to receive support from 
others for that is causing you to experience sadness due to a loss of an 
important relationship.  This dilemma can involve the loss of a friendship, 
significant other, or family member whom you were close to. 
 
Try to provide enough information so that someone reading about your 
dilemma can understand your situation and try to help you with it.  Your 
response must be between 600-1200 characters including spaces (roughly 
100-200 words). 
 
4. Rate dilemma: items within each set of ratings are presented in random order across 
participants) 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH 
emotion you experienced while thinking about the dilemma. (1 = Not 







b. How much would you like someone to help you do the following 
things for your dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = 
Extremely) 
• Think about your current situation in a different way 
• Leave or change the current situation you are in 
 
c. How much would you like someone to provide the following regarding 
your dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely) 
• Emotional support 
• Advice on what to do 
 
d. Using the scale below, please answer the following questions about the 
dilemma you are experiencing: (1= Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = 
Extremely) 
• How much are you able to change the dilemma? 





e. Using the scale below, please answer the following questions about the 
dilemma you are experiencing: (1= Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = 
Extremely) 
• How important is this dilemma? 
• How complicated is this dilemma? 
 
5. Consent for Re-contact: 
Thank you for writing about your dilemma.  We may share your dilemma 
anonymously to others and ask them to respond to your dilemma.  If you 
are interested in reading the responses that other people may have to your 
dilemma, please indicate that we may contact you in the future to provide 
you with the responses of others and to have you read and rate these 
responses.  Participation for this will be compensated at a rate equal to or 
higher than the rate for the current study.   
  
Please note that not all participants in this study may be contacted to 
receive and rate responses provided by other participants.   
 
Options:  
-Yes, I would like to be contacted in the future.  
- No, I would not like to be contacted in the future. 
 
6. State emotion measure: PANAS 
 
7. State emotion and trait measures: (presented in random order across participants) 
a. STAI-S 




f. BEQ  
 
8. Demographics (age, gender, ethnicity) 
 
9. Debriefing statement 
 












Study 2 (Phase 2) Instructions and Materials 
 
MTurk setup for Study 2 (Phase 2) 
Four HITs were administered to present four conditions, which counterbalanced the order of the 
tasks (see Qualtrics setup).  All HITs contained the following information: 
1. HIT Title: Read short essays, write responses, and make ratings. 
 
2. HIT Description:  
Read short essays, write responses, make ratings, and complete 
questionnaires.  Please note that your written responses may be shown to 
other people in future studies, but will not be accompanied by identifying 
information. 
 
3. HIT Keywords: survey, psychology 
 
4. Reward Per Assignment: $6 
 
5. Time Allotted Per Assignment: 90 minutes 
 
6. Worker Requirements:  
a. Location: United States 
b. HIT Approval Rate (%) for All Requesters’ HITs: Greater than or equal to 98% 
c. Number of HITs Approved: Greater than 100 
d. Study Completion: Has not been granted (set to exclude participants in prior pilot 
studies) 
e. Project Contains Adult Content: Checked (set to exclude participants under 18 
years of age) 
 
7. HIT Preview Description:  
Read short essays, write responses, and make ratings. 
This is a psychology study being conducted at Columbia University.  We 
are seeking to understand how people respond to dilemmas that others are 
experiencing in their lives.  In this study, you will read descriptions about 
personal dilemmas that other people are currently experiencing and 
have written about (these people have agreed to share these dilemmas 
anonymously).  After reading about each dilemma, you will be asked to 
write a response to the dilemma in an essay that is around 100-200 words, 
and to make ratings about it.  You will also answer questionnaires about 
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your personality and emotional experiences.  Please note that your written 
responses may be shown to other people in future studies, but will not be 
accompanied by any identifying information.   
 
This study is expected to take 45-90 minutes to complete.  The time it 
takes to complete this study will depend on how fast you naturally read, 
write, and complete questionnaires.  Due to differences that people may 
have with this, you will have up to 90 minutes to complete the entire 
study.  You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this 
study.  Please note that if you have completed a prior version of this study, 
you may not complete the present study.  As we are unable to take 
responses from people who have completed prior versions of this study, 
this HIT will not be approved if our records indicate that you have already 
completed prior versions of this study.  Thank you!   
 
Please click on the link below to view the consent form and begin this 
study: 
 
Survey link: Click here to begin. 
 
Provide the survey code provided at the end of the study here: (Please note 





Qualtrics Setup for Study 2 (Phase 2) 
 
The following four conditions were administered to separate groups of participants (each 
condition was administered through a separate HIT): 
1) Participant was trained to implement situation modification as a social emotion 
regulation strategy for the targets, with the anxiety dilemma presented before the 
sad dilemma.  
2) Participant was trained to implement situation modification as a social emotion 
regulation strategy for the targets, with the sad dilemma presented before the 
anxiety dilemma.  
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3) Participant was trained to implement reappraisal as a social emotion regulation 
strategy for the targets, with the anxiety dilemma presented before the sad 
dilemma.  
4) Participant was trained to implement reappraisal as a social emotion regulation 
strategy for the targets, with the sad dilemma presented before the anxiety 
dilemma. 
The protocol consisted of the following steps listed in order of administration.  
Information that differed between conditions is listed separately for each condition. 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Captcha verification 
 
3. Instructions for providing support:  
 
Situation modification groups 
In this study you will first be asked to read brief statements written by 
other people about dilemmas in their lives.  After reading each statement, 
we will ask you to write a response to the person experiencing the 
dilemma 
 
When writing your response, we would like you to help the person change 
or modify the situation so that their dilemma causes them less 
distress.  For example, you could help the person by suggesting things that 
they could do to separate themselves from whatever is distressing, if only 
temporarily, such as seeking out experiences that might make them feel 
better.  Alternatively, you could suggest actions the person can take to 
directly change the situation that is distressing.  Or you could suggest the 
person seek out others whose presence might be soothing or who may be 
able to help them directly.  In other words, please try to help this 
person by telling them what they could do to change their dilemma.   
  
Also note that in your response, please avoid telling the person how to 
think about their situation and what it means to them.  The reason for this 
is that prior studies suggest that sometimes it is better to tell others what 
they could do to change their situation and their engagement with it as 




With these instructions in mind, we now will ask you to do the following: 
 
1) You will be shown an example dilemma and example response to give 
you an idea of what you will be asked to do.  Please read these examples. 
  
2) You will practice writing a response on a sample trial.   
  
3) Following this, you will begin the study and respond to two dilemmas 




In this study you will first be asked to read brief statements written by 
other people about dilemmas in their lives.  After reading each statement, 
we will ask you to write a response to the person experiencing the 
dilemma. 
 
When writing your response, we would like you to help the person change 
the way they think about their situation, or reframe what it means to 
them, so that their dilemma causes them less distress.  For example, you 
could help the person look on the bright side by pointing out positive 
aspects of their situation, especially if they don’t see them or don’t 
appreciate them as much as they could.  Alternatively, you could help the 
person understand that their dilemma, or some aspects of it, may not be as 
bad as they seem to think.  Or you could help the person step back from 
their dilemma to see their situation from a more distanced, objective and 
neutral perspective.  In other words, please try to help this person think 
about or look at their dilemma in a new way.   
 
Also note that in your response, please avoid directly telling the person 
what they should do about their dilemma (for example, what actions they 
should/could take to resolve it).  The reason for this is that prior studies 
suggest that sometimes it is better to tell others how to think about their 
dilemmas as opposed to telling others what they should do. 
 
With these instructions in mind, we now will ask you to do the following: 
  
1) You will be shown an example dilemma and example response to give 
you an idea of what you will be asked to do.  Please read these examples. 
 
2) You will practice writing a response on a sample trial.   
  
3) Following this, you will begin the study and respond to two dilemmas 




4. Example Trial: 
 
 





Instructions: The following are examples of a dilemma that someone 
has written about and a response to the dilemma.  Please read the 
dilemma first and then read the response to the dilemma.  The 
response provides an example for how you might respond to a 
dilemma.  
  
Press the button when you are done reading the examples.  You will 




“I currently am living apart from my significant other because he's 
working out of state.  We own a home together and his out of state 
restaurant business currently supports both of us since I was laid off from 
my job.  I have always been independent and a bit of a loner, and so this 
arrangement works for me.  He is less happy about it and has asked me 
numerous times to work with him.  I love him, but absolutely hate where 
he's currently living (a congested city environment) and really cannot 
imagine living there.  He says he hates it too and wants to retire to his 
home with me though he doesn't think it will be for another year or 
two.  The issue is now he is looking for another business in his current 
location because he says that is where the money is and when he opens his 
second business, I will have to move up there to help him.  I am really 
looking for any excuse not to move, even to go so far as to return to school 
or seek employment locally.  I am starting to feel terribly guilty about it 
and really don't know what to do.” 
  
Response to Dilemma 
  
It is unfortunate that you are going through such a complicated 
situation.  Perhaps you can try to change your situation.  Maybe try to find 
a compromise with your significant other.  Talk to him about it and see if 
it might work for both of you to split your time between your home and 
the city.  Perhaps you could contribute to the household financially by 
obtaining a job locally as you mentioned.  If the two of you can't find a 
compromise, this relationship may not be sustainable for the long-term 
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and you may want to consider whether or not staying in this relationship 





Instructions: The following are examples of a dilemma that someone 
has written about and a response to the dilemma.  Please read the 
dilemma first and then read the response to the dilemma.  The 
response provides an example for how you might respond to a 
dilemma.  
  
Press the button when you are done reading the examples.  You will 




“I currently am living apart from my significant other because he's 
working out of state.  We own a home together and his out of state 
restaurant business currently supports both of us since I was laid off from 
my job.  I have always been independent and a bit of a loner, and so this 
arrangement works for me.  He is less happy about it and has asked me 
numerous times to work with him.  I love him, but absolutely hate where 
he's currently living (a congested city environment) and really cannot 
imagine living there.  He says he hates it too and wants to retire to his 
home with me though he doesn't think it will be for another year or 
two.  The issue is now he is looking for another business in his current 
location because he says that is where the money is and when he opens his 
second business, I will have to move up there to help him.  I am really 
looking for any excuse not to move, even to go so far as to return to school 
or seek employment locally.  I am starting to feel terribly guilty about it 
and really don't know what to do.” 
 
Response to Dilemma 
  
It is unfortunate that you are going through such a complicated 
situation.  Perhaps you could evaluate your situation differently.  Living in 
the city may not be as stressful as you think it will be.  Try to think about 
the positive things that the city may be able to offer you and the fact that 
you will be closer to your significant other.  You mention that you are 
starting to feel guilty about finding an excuse to avoid moving.  Perhaps 
you can focus instead on the positive contributions you’d be able to make 




5. Practice trial:  
 
 
Situation modification groups 
PRACTICE 
 
Instructions: You will now practice writing a response.  Please read 
the dilemma first and then write a response to the person 




“Recently an old friend of mine moved back to town after living in another 
state for several years. While we have grown apart in many ways since we 
were younger we've remained friends. He came back here basically in the 
throes of a mid-life crisis, trying to pursue career dreams we had when we 
were younger, goals that didn't work out then and are even more unlikely 
to work out now. So he came back with practically no money, no job lined 
up--no job to make money while he pursues his other goal--and very few 
people he knew from back when he was still living here. I told him before 
he returned that I thought the whole thing was a bad idea and there wasn't 
much I could do to help him but he came anyway, and now I'm feeling 
increasing pressure to help him out or put him up because he's totally 
without a support system here and knows very few people. I don't want to 
get involved with his whole deal, the last time we had been trying this 
years ago it ended badly and I want nothing more to do with it, but I 
worry what will become of him and our friendship if I put him off.” 
 
What would you say to the person experiencing this dilemma?  Try to help 
this person modify/change their situation by suggesting what they can do.   
  
Please write a response expressing what you would say in person (in other 
words, don't just describe this person's situation, but write directly to the 
person).  Your response must be between 600-1200 characters including 





Instructions: You will now practice writing a response.  Please read 
the dilemma first and then write a response to the person 








“Recently an old friend of mine moved back to town after living in another 
state for several years. While we have grown apart in many ways since we 
were younger we've remained friends. He came back here basically in the 
throes of a mid-life crisis, trying to pursue career dreams we had when we 
were younger, goals that didn't work out then and are even more unlikely 
to work out now. So he came back with practically no money, no job lined 
up--no job to make money while he pursues his other goal--and very few 
people he knew from back when he was still living here. I told him before 
he returned that I thought the whole thing was a bad idea and there wasn't 
much I could do to help him but he came anyway, and now I'm feeling 
increasing pressure to help him out or put him up because he's totally 
without a support system here and knows very few people. I don't want to 
get involved with his whole deal, the last time we had been trying this 
years ago it ended badly and I want nothing more to do with it, but I 
worry what will become of him and our friendship if I put him off.” 
 
What would you say to the person experiencing this dilemma?  Try to help 
this person reframe the way they think about their situation.   
  
Please write a response expressing what you would say in person (in other 
words, don't just describe this person's situation, but write directly to the 
person).  Your response must be between 600-1200 characters including 
spaces (roughly 100-200 words). 
6. Read and respond to first dilemma: order of anxiety and sad dilemmas is 
determined by the condition that the participant is in. 
 
Situation modification groups 
 
Please read the statement below describing a dilemma that someone is 
currently experiencing. 
  
(EXAMPLE DILEMMA) "I'm having financial problems due to the 
student loan debt that I have. I recently graduated; however, I have yet to 
find a stable job, and all my debt and expenses are adding up. I've had to 
terminate my apartment lease and move back in with my parents until I 
can find a job in order to save money. I've applied at a number of different 
companies, but it seems other candidates have more experience than I do, 
giving them better chances at getting jobs. I've received financial help 
from my family for the time being so I don't cripple myself financially, but 
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I'd like to be more independent and have the chance to pay them back as 
soon as possible.” 
  
What would you say to the person experiencing this dilemma?  Try to help 
this person modify/change their situation by suggesting what they can 
do.      
 
Please write a response expressing what you would say in person (in other 
words, don't just describe this person's situation, but write directly to the 
person).  Your response may be shown to the person who is experiencing 
this dilemma.   
  
Your response must be between 600-1200 characters including spaces 





Please read the statement below describing a dilemma that someone is 
currently experiencing. 
 
(EXAMPLE DILEMMA) "My sister and my relationship has recently been 
strained. We've been getting along a lot less lately. One of the reasons is 
because she doesn't really carry on a conversation when we talk. I know 
the major reason is because she's thinking about the things she's worried 
about but it makes me sad because I feel like she doesn't care enough to 
try to keep the conversation going. I also do not like the fact that she 
basically refuses to pay for food when we go out together. I always have to 
pay and when I ask her to pay for even just a drink, she says no. I don't 
really know what to do anymore. We have always been close and now I 
feel like since we're 9 years apart and my life is just getting started, we 
don't really have anything in common anymore now that I'm 21 and she's 
30. I don't really think it should make that much of a difference but it does 
because she is consumed with things that I feel she shouldn't be. It's really 
complicated. I wish that I could have a better relationship with her 
because I have always considered her a "best friend" and she is my sister. 
I hope that we can get over this but I think it has to come from her now as 
I have tried to get along with her."  
 
What would you say to the person experiencing this dilemma?  Try to help 
this person reframe the way they think about their situation.   
  
Please write a response expressing what you would say in person (in other 
words, don't just describe this person's situation, but write directly to the 
person).  Your response may be shown to the person who is experiencing 




Your response must be between 600-1200 characters including spaces 
(roughly 100-200 words). 
 
7. Read first dilemma again 
 
8. Rate first dilemma 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you think 
the PERSON WHO WROTE THIS STATEMENT feels the following 
emotions in response to their dilemma. (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 







b. How helpful do you think it would be to provide the following things 
to the person experiencing this dilemma? (1 = Not helpful at all, 4 = 
Somewhat helpful, 7 = Extremely helpful) 
• To help this person change or leave the current situation. 
• To help this person think about the current situation in a 
different way. 
 
• To provide emotional support 
• To provide advice on what to do 
 
c. Please answer the following questions: (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 
7 = Extremely) 
• How clearly did this person experiencing this dilemma 
express wanting support from someone? 
• How clearly did this person experiencing this dilemma 
express the emotions they were experiencing? 
 
• How important do you think this dilemma is for this person? 
• How complicated do you think this dilemma is for this 
person? 
 
• How helpful were you trying to be when writing your 
response to this person? 
• How helpful do you think your written response will actually 
be to this person? 
 
• How similar do you think you are to this person? 




9. Steps 6-8 repeated for second dilemma 
 
10. State emotion measure: PANAS 
 
11. State emotion and trait measures: (presented in random order across participants) 
a. STAI-S 
b. STAI-T  
c. ERQ 
d. CES-D 
e. 3D Wisdom Scale 
f. BWSS  
 
12. Demographics (age, gender, ethnicity) 
 
13. Debriefing statement and consent for re-contact 
 
14. Participants were provided a code word to submit the HIT 
 
 
Study 2 (Phase 3) Instructions and Materials 
Re-contact message sent through MTurk 
Dear Participant, 
 
A few weeks ago, you completed a study in which you described a 
dilemma that you are experiencing in your life.  You had consented to 
having other people in this study respond to your dilemma, and to being 
contacted for follow-up studies.  We have asked a participant in this study 
to write a response to you to provide social support.  We are hoping you 
would be interested in reading this response and rating your thoughts on it.   
 
This follow-up study will take approximately 10-20 minutes to complete.  
Upon completion of this study, we will compensate you for your 
participation by providing a bonus of $5 to your MTurk account.  Please 
note that we may close this study after a few days, so please complete this 
study as soon as you can. 
 
To begin this study, please click on the following link below.  You will 
see a consent form and will be asked to enter your MTurk assigned 
Worker ID.  Afterward, you will be asked to enter the following 3-Digit 




(LINK TO QUALTRICS STUDY) 
 
When you have completed this study, please respond to this email at 
CUSurveyStudy@gmail.com with the survey code provided at the end of 
the study and your MTurk Worker ID.  We will compensate your account 
within 24 hours of receiving your email indicating completion of the 
study.  Thank you! 
 
Qualtrics setup for Study 2 (Phase 3) 
 
The protocol consisted of the following steps listed in order of administration: 
 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Read written description of dilemma from Phase 1 
Please read the description of the dilemma that you wrote about in the last 
study. After reading this, please answer the questions below. (If you did 
not write this dilemma or if you don't remember this dilemma, please stop 
the study immediately and let the Requester know.) 
  
(EXAMPLE DILEMMA) “I recently ended a long term relationship that I 
really did not want to see end. While things could have been better, I did 
not think that they were at a critical point that necessitated a break up. I 
try to think back on some key points to determine if there was a different 
decision that could have led to a different outcome. Part of me though, 
after reflection, thinks that no matter what fork in the road I took, the 
outcome would still be the same. People sometimes grow apart and in 
these cases, it’s not always a mutual decision that leads to these results. 
It’s difficult to adjust to my daily routine when a large part of it has been 
removed unexpectedly.” 
3. Rate dilemma: items within each set of ratings are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH 
emotion you are currently experiencing at the moment, after having 










b. Please answer the following questions: (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 
7 = Extremely) 
• How clearly do you remember this dilemma? 
• How much does this dilemma currently affect you? 
 
4. Read response from provider implementing social emotion regulation strategy.  
 
We have asked another participant in this study to provide written support 
to you about your dilemma and you will now read the response that 
someone has written to you.   
 
While this response is intended to be helpful, please keep in mind that it is 
written by another participant in this study who may not have professional 
expertise with respect to the kind of dilemma you are experiencing.  If you 
believe it may be useful, we encourage you to seek professional help for 
any ongoing dilemmas that you are experiencing. 
 
Please press the arrow to read this response. 
 
(EXAMPLE RESPONSE) "I'm terribly sorry to hear about your break-
up. I know regret is something that is hard to shake when these things 
happen, but keep in mind that you made a bold, thoughtful decision - on 
the part of both parties. It sounds like that you and your significant other 
were growing apart from each other. You realized this, and maybe he/she 
realized it as well but was just as afraid to make the first move. It's always 
a tough decision to be made when romantic relationships grow stagnant. 
If the endearing qualities are enough to weather the doldrums, then you 
would have known it. By sticking with someone that you see no (or an 
uncertain) future with is not only prolonging the inevitable, but also 
wasting the time of both of you. So I applaud your courage in following 
your instincts and making your move!” 
 
5. Rate response 
a. Please indicate the greatest amount of EACH emotion you are 
currently experiencing at the moment, after having read the response. 







6. Read provider’s response again and make additional ratings 
 




• How helpful do you think this response was? 
 
b. How much does this response help you do the following for your 
dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely) 
• Think about the situation in a different way 
• Leave or change the current situation 
 
c. How much does this response provide the following? (1 = Not at all, 4 
= Somewhat, 7 = Extremely) 
• Emotional support 
• Advice on what to do 
 
d. What is your impression of the person who wrote the response to 
you?  Please rate how you think the person is on the following traits 
(these ratings will not be shown to the person who wrote the response). 












e. Is there anything you would like to say to the person who wrote this 
response to you?  If so, please write it below.   
 
7. State emotion measure: PANAS  
 
8. Participants were provided a debriefing statement and code word to send to the 









Study 2 (Phase 4) Instructions and Materials 
Re-contact message sent through MTurk. 
Dear Participant, 
 
A few weeks ago, you completed a study in which you described a 
dilemma that you are experiencing in your life and you had also received a 
response from another participant who had written to you regarding your 
dilemma. 
 
We are hoping you would be interested in completing another brief 
follow-up study that will ask you to make some ratings.  This follow-up 
study will take approximately 10-20 minutes to complete.  Upon 
completion of this study, we will compensate you for your participation by 
providing a bonus of $5 to your MTurk account.   
 
To begin this study, please click on the following link below.  You will 
see a consent form and will be asked to enter your MTurk assigned 
Worker ID.  Afterward, you will be asked to enter the following 3-Digit 
Subject Number:  XXX 
 
(LINK TO QUALTRICS STUDY) 
 
When you have completed this study, please respond to this email at 
CUSurveyStudy@gmail.com with the survey code provided at the end of 
the study and your MTurk Worker ID.  We will compensate your account 
within 24 hours of receiving your email indicating completion of the 
study.  Thank you! 
 
Qualtrics Setup for Study 2 (Phase 4) 
 
The protocol consisted of the following steps listed in order of administration: 
 
1. Informed consent 
 
2. Read written description of dilemma from Phase 1 
Please read the description of the dilemma that you wrote about in the 
initial study. After reading this, please answer the questions below. (If you 
did not write this dilemma or if you don't remember this dilemma, please 
stop the study immediately and let the Requester know.) 
  
(EXAMPLE DILEMMA) “The biggest dilemma I am facing currently 
surrounding financial issues is dealing with my student loans. I am self-
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employed and due to an unexpected turn of events, my business has 
suffered significantly. As such, I have found myself in a position where I 
am unable to make my monthly student loan payments. I am already 
behind on a couple of payments. Fortunately, my business is beginning to 
turn around. However, it is enormously difficult to get out of the financial 
hole I now find myself in. I have exhausted most sources of help provided 
by my student loan issuers. I have found myself in the position where I 
have to find multiple alternative sources of income and put in 
considerably more hours of work in order to overcome this hurdle.” 
3. Rate dilemma: items within each set of ratings are presented in random order across 
participants. 
a. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH 
emotion you are currently experiencing at the moment, after having 








b. Please answer the following questions: (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 
7 = Extremely) 
• How clearly do you remember this dilemma? 
• How much does this dilemma currently affect you? 
 
c. Over the last month, how much have you been able to do the following 
regarding your dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = 
Extremely) 
• Leave or change the situation 
• Think about the situation in a different way 
 
d. Over the last month, to what degree have people in your life provided 
you with the following in regards to your dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = 
Somewhat, 7 = Extremely) 
• Emotional support 
• Advice on what to do 
 
4. Read provider’s response  
 
In the last study, you read a response that another participant in this study 
had written to you regarding your dilemma.  We will now ask you to read 
this response again and to make some ratings on it. 
 




(EXAMPLE RESPONSE) "Sadly this is becoming more and more 
common for today's college graduates.  If owning a business is your 
dream and it is not allowing you to take care of your financial obligations, 
you may have to decide if now is the time to pursue business ownership.  
Depending on how much you owe, you could take a year or two and 
secure a steady job to get these balances paid off.  If you want to keep at 
the business plan you currently have, try to work with the lenders on 
getting a financial deferral for a period of time while you get back on your 
feet.  Another possibility is to get a part time job where you work enough 
hours to cover your payments.  You could allocate that entire paycheck to 
your student loans.  I know that will be tough while running your own 
business, but sometimes you got to sacrifice and go through difficulty to 
achieve your end result.  The military is also an option as they paid off a 
huge part of my student loans.  Just some options, hope I helped.” 
 
5. Rate response 
a. Please indicate the greatest amount of EACH emotion you are 
currently experiencing at the moment, after having read the response. 







6. Read response again and make additional ratings 
a. Please answer the following question: (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 
= Extremely) 
• How helpful has this response been to you since you received 
it? 
 
b. How much has this response helped you do the following for your 
dilemma? (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Extremely) 
• Leave or change the situation 
• Think about the situation in a different way 
 











































Negative Autobiographical Events for Emily/Mark 
 
1. There is a person in my apartment building who always complains about the 
smallest noise issue from my floor. This person lives above me, and she made it a 
point to harass me each time there was some noise. She even called the landlord to 
complain about the noise, which made me very angry. 
 
2. I got really sick recently. One morning, I was so weak that I went to take a 
shower and could no longer stand up. I was getting dizzy and had to stay in bed for 
a couple of days. My voice was gone too. 
 
3. My cousin recently got married, but for financial reasons I was unable to attend. 
Although the wedding was short notice, I feel guilty for not going. 
 
4. I traveled all the way upstate for a concert. The concert was already over by the 
time I got there and my partner, who bought me the ticket, was not given back the 
money. I felt bad because my partner had to go out of budget to plan this for us. 
 
5. My parents were on the brink of having a divorce. That really made me feel sad 
because seeing that now makes me think twice about marriage and all that comes 
with it. 
 
6. I was at work when my boss came up to me and really insulted my intelligence. I 
felt offended because I'm a professional and my boss was out of line. I also felt 
embarrassed because other coworkers could hear what my boss was saying. 
 
7. My sister has experienced some bouts of depression after being laid off. I have 
tried to help her re-organize her life, lift her up. I sympathize with her and feel bad 
that she has lost motivation to look for another position. 
 
8. My father was driving with me from New York to Vermont when he fell asleep 
at the wheel and drove off the road, causing both of us minor injuries. I felt scared 



















Neutral Autobiographical Events for Emily/Mark 
 
1. I go grocery shopping every weekend at my local supermarket, which has great, cheap 
food. However, last time I went, I ended up spending more money than usual. 
 
2. I ordered a meal and the server asked if I would like bread or crackers. I asked for bread 
and she gave me a few extra pieces, which made me feel more valued as a customer. 
 
3. I was standing in line at a bookstore waiting to check out. The next available cashier 
announced that anyone who was paying with a credit card could come to him. I was paying 
with cash so I stayed where I was. It made me feel slightly annoyed. 
 
4. When I was looking for a new apartment, an agent promised me one particular 
apartment. On getting back to him a few days later, I discovered he had rented it out. 
Fortunately, I got a notice later from the agent that he had found another apartment for me. 
 
5. I remember looking out into the water as I was right next to the beach. I was lost in the 
beautiful sight of the ocean. I lost all the stress from work and could just feel the crisp air 
breeze. 
 
6. I was at the movie theater for a screening of a documentary. I thought there would be 
previews before it started, but instead they cut right to the feature presentation. I was glad 
that the movie was starting but also would have enjoyed seeing previews. 
 
7. I made myself a salad yesterday. I have planned to prepare at least two meals a week in 
an effort to eat healthier. It was pretty relaxing, but I was not looking forward to cleaning 
up dishes afterwards. 
 
8. I was browsing Netflix with my partner and we decided to watch a sitcom. I had already 
seen the first two episodes and my partner hadn't, so I agreed to watch them again so we'd 






Brain regions recruited during self-regulation 
    MNI 
Coordinates 
Region Hemisphere # Voxels t x y z 
Reframe > Immerse       
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 401 5.85 -36 20 54 
 L 171 5.85 -36 20 54 
 L 134 5.31 -42 12 52 
 L 96 4.90 -46 2 50 
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 199 5.78 -56 18 8 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L 1178 6.14 -12 36 52 
 L 234 6.14 -12 36 52 
 L 361 5.99 -10 14 64 
 L 240 5.50 -12 56 36 
 L 179 5.37 -8 30 60 
 L 110 5.20 -18 20 64 
 L 23 4.24 -14 60 18 
 L 28 4.18 -24 48 36 
Inferior parietal lobule L 498 6.95 -48 -60 30 
 L 468 6.95 -48 -60 30 
 L 30 3.81 -54 -64 46 
Anterior temporal lobe L 809 6.13 -48 4 -42 
 L 116 6.13 -48 4 -42 
 L 93 6.01 -64 -16 -24 
 L 48 5.71 -46 -8 -28 
 L 159 5.24 -48 0 -28 
 L 80 4.98 -58 -6 -30 
 L 30 4.74 -60 8 -20 
 L 67 4.69 -58 2 -18 
 L 51 4.61 -64 -8 -28 
 L 48 4.54 -54 8 -16 
 L 92 4.37 -52 10 -22 
 L 23 4.09 -48 20 -26 
Middle temporal gyrus L 127 4.43 -48 -42 0 
Caudate L 381 6.19 -14 -4 24 
 L 27 6.19 -14 -4 24 
 L 78 5.19 -14 2 20 
 L 73 5.10 -14 12 14 
 L 37 4.92 -20 -2 20 
 L 50 4.54 -16 18 10 
 L 40 4.26 -12 -4 10 
 L 39 4.04 -22 2 6 




Notes.  Regions were identified through the contrast Reframe negative > Immerse negative for 
the Self condition.  Clusters were defined with a permutation-based threshold of p < .001, k  > 94 
voxels, which corresponds to a whole-brain familywise error-corrected value of p < .05.  L = 
Left, R = Right, t = maximum t-score for the given cluster, located at the corresponding MNI 
























Cuneus R 205 4.18 28 -92 -6 
 R 117 4.18 28 -92 -6 
 R 60 4.13 34 -94 0 
 R 27 3.84 32 -86 -6 
Inferior occipital gyrus L 141 4.18 -32 -94 -8 
 L 93 4.18 -32 -94 -8 
 L 23 3.99 -42 -86 -8 
 L 25 3.80 -18 -84 -6 
Cerebellum, declive R 692 5.92 32 -66 -28 
 R 230 5.92 32 -66 -28 
 R 112 5.64 22 -88 -38 
 R 95 4.92 22 -74 -28 
 R 143 4.57 32 -80 -32 
 R 27 4.44 12 -90 -36 
 R 85 4.39 26 -70 -34 
Immerse > Reframe       




Brain regions recruited during social emotion regulation 
    MNI 
Coordinates 
Region Hemisphere # Voxels t x y z 
Reframe > Immerse       
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 632 6.68 -50 30 -8 
 L 296 6.68 -50 30 -8 
 L 122 5.84 -38 56 -6 
 L 113 4.96 -48 50 -12 
 L 32 4.39 -32 18 -16 
 L 69 4.12 -46 28 -16 
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 189 5.30 -52 20 12 
 L 109 5.30 -52 20 12 
 L 36 4.75 -48 16 6 
 L 44 4.28 -50 28 6 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L 2575 6.46 -10 22 60 
 L 193 6.46 -10 22 60 
 L 177 6.28 -8 16 60 
 L 166 6.20 -6 8 66 
 L 220 6.11 -14 58 34 
 L 181 5.89 -12 42 52 
 L 167 5.85 -4 60 34 
 L 177 5.79 -36 24 48 
 L 131 5.41 -8 32 60 
 L 94 5.16 -40 10 54 
 L 79 5.12 -18 34 56 
 L 79 5.01 -18 28 60 
 L 119 4.97 -10 54 42 
 L 51 4.95 -36 16 60 
 L 65 4.80 -48 2 52 
 L 79 4.77 -32 28 56 
 L 60 4.21 -2 62 18 
 L 35 4.00 0 50 14 
 L 17 3.87 -10 48 12 
 R 115 5.02 16 44 52 
 R 105 4.97 12 58 32 
 R 131 4.68 18 30 58 
 R 49 4.09 14 56 40 
 R 37 4.06 6 48 50 
 R 43 3.76 12 22 58 
Inferior parietal lobule L 677 6.92 -52 -64 36 
 L 388 6.92 -52 -64 36 
 L 218 5.45 -40 -62 28 




Notes.  Regions were identified through the contrast Reframe Negative > Immerse Negative for 
the Other condition.  Clusters were defined with a permutation based threshold of p < .001, k  > 
 L 36 3.95 -54 -60 44 
Anterior temporal lobe L 1351 6.14 -50 2 -30 
 L 224 6.14 -50 2 -30 
 L 207 5.87 -50 -34 -2 
 L 196 5.47 -58 -6 -28 
 L 95 5.28 -48 4 -42 
 L 39 4.90 -46 -4 -44 
 L 85 4.82 -64 -22 -18 
 L 87 4.73 -40 16 -36 
 L 122 4.70 -58 4 -20 
 L 105 4.68 -52 12 -22 
 L 65 4.33 -58 -18 -20 
 L 58 4.32 -42 18 -30 
 L 16 4.10 -52 20 -22 
 L 51 3.94 -62 -38 0 
Anterior temporal lobe R 480 5.21 48 10 -34 
 R 135 5.21 48 10 -34 
 R 98 5.04 50 -2 -30 
 R 22 4.84 50 -2 -42 
 R 50 4.83 48 4 -42 
 R 51 4.55 48 16 -22 
 R 52 4.32 58 2 -28 
 R 40 4.22 40 16 -36 
 R 24 3.99 36 10 -36 
Caudate L 487 5.90 -16 10 16 
 L 224 5.90 -16 10 16 
 L 58 5.03 -10 -2 10 
 L 62 4.77 -20 2 12 
 L 64 4.40 -12 0 20 
 L 79 4.36 -18 6 6 
Caudate R 134 5.16 8 18 6 
 R 94 5.16 8 18 6 
 R 40 4.37 10 6 2 
Precuneus L 99 5.45 -10 -56 34 
 L 56 5.45 -10 -56 34 
 L 43 4.26 -2 -52 34 
Cerebellum, tuber L 98 4.38 -36 -78 -34 
Cerebellum, declive R 819 7.34 40 -64 -26 
 R 365 7.34 40 -64 -26 
 R 140 5.16 36 -80 -22 
 R 314 4.75 30 -82 -34 
Immerse > Reframe       
None       
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84 voxels, which corresponds to a whole-brain familywise error-corrected value of p < .05.  L = 
Left, R = Right, t = maximum t-score for the given cluster, located at the corresponding MNI 




Preprocessing with fmriprep 1.2.2 
 
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPprep 1.2.2 
(Esteban, Markiewicz, et al. (2018); Esteban, Blair, et al. (2018); RRID:SCR_016216), which is 
based on Nipype 1.1.5 (Gorgolewski et al. (2011); Gorgolewski et al. (2018); 
RRID:SCR_002502). 
Anatomical data preprocessing 
The T1-weighted (T1w) image was corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) 
using N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al. 2010, ANTs 2.2.0), and used as T1w-reference 
throughout the workflow. The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped 
using antsBrainExtraction.sh (ANTs 2.2.0), using OASIS as target template. Spatial 
normalization to the ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version 2009c (Fonov et al. 
2009, RRID:SCR_008796) was performed through nonlinear registration 
with antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0, RRID:SCR_004757, Avants et al. 2008), using brain-
extracted versions of both T1w volume and template. Brain tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was performed on the brain-extracted 
T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, Zhang, Brady, and Smith 2001). 
Functional data preprocessing 
For each of the 6 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks and sessions), the following 
preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were 
generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A deformation field to correct for 
susceptibility distortions was estimated based on a field map that was co-registered to the BOLD 
reference, using a custom workflow of fMRIPrep derived from D. 
Greve’s epidewarp.fsl script and further improvements of HCP Pipelines (Glasser et al. 2013). 
Based on the estimated susceptibility distortion, an unwarped BOLD reference was calculated 
for a more accurate co-registration with the anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was then 
co-registered to the T1w reference using flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson and Smith 2001) with the 
boundary-based registration (Greve and Fischl 2009) cost-function. Co-registration was 
configured with nine degrees of freedom to account for distortions remaining in the BOLD 
reference. Head-motion parameters with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation 
matrices, and six corresponding rotation and translation parameters) are estimated before any 
spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson et al. 2002). The BOLD time-series 
(including slice-timing correction when applied) were resampled onto their original, native space 
by applying a single, composite transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility 
distortions. These resampled BOLD time-series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in 
original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD time-series were resampled to 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run in 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym space. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were 
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generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were 
calculated based on the preprocessed BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three 
region-wise global signals. FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using 
their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al. 2014). The three 
global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a 
set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise 
correction (CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal components are estimated after high-pass 
filtering the preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for 
the two CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). Six tCompCor 
components are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the 
subcortical regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which 
ensures it does not include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, six components are calculated 
within the intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks 
calculated in T1w space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using 
the inverse BOLD-to-T1w transformation). The head-motion estimates calculated in the 
correction step were also placed within the corresponding confounds file. All resamplings can be 
performed with a single interpolation step by composing all the pertinent transformations 
(i.e. head-motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction when available, and co-
registrations to anatomical and template spaces). Gridded (volumetric) resamplings were 
performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos interpolation to 
minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos 1964). Non-gridded (surface) 
resamplings were performed using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer). 
Many internal operations of fMRIPrep use Nilearn 0.4.2 (Abraham et al. 2014, 
RRID:SCR_001362), mostly within the functional processing workflow. For more details of the 
pipeline, see the section corresponding to workflows in fMRIPrep’s documentation. 
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